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Editorial

Richard Gombrich

“Taiwan has the highest number of Buddhist nuns in the world and also a greater proportion relative to monks, a situation in monastic Buddhism unlike any other on earth.”¹ “[I]t is estimated that there are around 15,000 nuns active in Taiwan at present.”²

Yet, a hundred years ago there was not a single ordained Buddhist nun in Taiwan. How did the nuns’ movement there begin?

Let me briefly show the wide historical significance of this question. The largest body of nuns in Taiwan for the past half century has been at Fo Guang Shan in southern Taiwan, a huge monastery for both sexes founded by the Master Xingyun in the 1950s. Voramai Kabilsingh, the first Thai woman to receive full ordination, was ordained there in 1970. Her daughter, Chatsumarn Kabilsingh, was later ordained in Sri Lanka in 2003 as Bhikkhunī Dhammānanda, and has been a foremost proponent of religious rights for Buddhist women.

In 1988 Xingyun founded Xilai Monastery, “the largest Buddhist temple in the Western world”, in a suburb of Los Angeles, and “decided to offer the Chinese ordination rite to Theravada as well as Tibetan nuns so that they might eventually establish Fo Guang Shan ordination lineages in their own countries”.³ In 1998 he held a huge ordination ceremony for both monks and nuns from all the major Buddhist traditions in Bodh Gaya.⁴

To learn about the antecedents to these developments, read our article by Yu-Shuang Yao. It turns out that during the Japanese occupation of Taiwan a Rinzai

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²Ibid.
Zen monk called Gisei Higashiumi had learnt Hokkien, the local form of Chinese, and in 1919 held a ceremony in southern Taiwan at which he ordained 84 monks and 79 nuns. He repeated these ordinations for over 20 years, and arranged for the nuns, in total perhaps several hundred, to be educated in Japan. An intriguing detail is that in 1917 the Chinese monk Tai Xu had held an ordination ceremony in the very same temple. He was later to become internationally famous as the founder of “Humanistic Buddhism”. In the 1917 ceremony he ordained only men; but it is intriguing to speculate that he may have influenced the large scale female ordination held only two years later.

I would also like to draw attention to the “supplement” to the Journal: “The Authenticity of the Early Buddhist Texts” by the Ven Sujato and the Ven Brahmali. The authors asked my advice about where to publish it. As it is clearly too long for an article, but probably too short for a book, I asked their permission to publish it hors de série as a special supplement to our Journal. It is now on our main web site and is accessible without a subscription. I regard this as a very important contribution to Buddhist studies. In my view, anyone who reads it will hardly be able to sustain the scepticism about our knowledge of what the Buddha taught which has become so fashionable in academia. It deserves to command wide attention.

I deplored this scepticism in my editorial for vol.5, in the context of the next IABS conference, which will be held in Vienna this August, and I remarked on the absence of the words “Pāli” and “Theravāda” from the published schedule. Now that the detailed programme has been published, there is something else which I find odd. 35 panels and 25 sections are to meet, and the participants (speakers) at these meetings are listed as numbering 458 in all. That’s an average of between 7 and 8 participants per meeting; and that in turn means that very many meetings will involve fewer people than 7! What can be deduced from this fragmentation? I used to think, perhaps naïvely, that a conference was a meeting at which people conferred. The OED gives as meanings for “confer” “converse” and “consult”; Webster’s Dictionary hits the nail on the head with “compare and exchange ideas”. How much reaction can a speaker expect to their ideas from so small an audience?
The Hīnayāna Fallacy

Anālayo

In what follows I examine the function of the term Hīnayāna as a referent to an institutional entity in the academic study of the history of Buddhism. I begin by surveying the use of the term by Chinese pilgrims travelling in India, followed by taking up to the Tarkajvālā’s depiction of the controversy between adherents of the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna. I then turn to the use of the term in the West, in particular its promotion by the Japanese delegates at the World’s Parliament of Religions in Chicago in 1893. I conclude that the current academic use of the term as a referent to a Buddhist school or Buddhist schools is misleading.

The Chinese Pilgrims

According to the succinct definition given in the Encyclopedia of Buddhism, Hīnayāna “is a pejorative term meaning ‘Lesser Vehicle’. Some adherents of the ‘Greater Vehicle’ (Mahāyāna) applied it to non-Mahāyānist schools such as the Theravāda, the Sarvāstivāda, the Mahāsāṃghika, and some fifteen other schools.”

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5I am indebted to Max Deeg, Sāmaṇeri Dhammadinnā, Shi Kongmu, Lambert Schmithausen, Jonathan Silk, Peter Skilling, and Judith Snodgrass for comments on a draft version of this paper.

4Strong 2004: 328, who continues by indicating that in the Encyclopedia of Buddhism the term “mainstream Buddhist schools” is used instead. This term, which is an improvement over Hīnayāna, has not found unanimous acceptance, cf., e.g., Sasaki 2009: 25 note 2: “I cannot, however, subscribe to the indiscreet use of the term ‘Mainstream’, which implies a positive assertion about a particular historical situation, and therefore, although completely outmoded, I continue to use the terms ‘Mahāyāna’ and ‘Hīnayāna’”; for critical comments on the expression “mainstream” cf. also Skilling 2013: 101f.
When trying to contextualize the term Hinayāna in the historical setting in India,\(^2\) obvious sources for information are the descriptions provided by the Chinese pilgrims Fǎxiǎn, Xuánzàng and Yìjìng. The indications they give, however, make it clear that to use the term Hinayāna as an umbrella term for the Buddhist schools or sects that arose in India, which tradition usually numbers as eighteen, is not entirely straightforward.

Reporting on the conditions of monasteries in early 5th century India, Fǎxiǎn (法顯) on several occasions refers to monastics who were practising the Mahāyāna and the Hinayāna (大小乘學). According to his description, in one region three thousand monks practiced the Mahāyāna and the Hinayāna conjointly; in an adjacent region where the Buddha-Dharma flourished the Mahāyana and the Hinayāna were also practiced conjointly; and for Sāṅkāśya he records that about a thousand monks and nuns were also practising Mahāyāna in combination with Hinayāna.\(^3\)

Mahāyāna and Hinayāna are mutually exclusive terms,\(^4\) thus both terms could not really be used to describe the practice of the same person. Therefore I take Fǎxiǎn’s description to imply that some monastics out of the group he was describing followed the Mahāyāna, while other monastics followed the Hinayāna. These different vocations did apparently not prevent them from in some way living together.

However, since in order to become monastics in the first place these practitioners of the Mahāyāna and the Hinayāna would have to be ordained in any of the ‘eighteen’ schools, it becomes clear that Hinayāna as an umbrella term for these Buddhist schools does not fit the situation described by Fǎxiǎn. If all eighteen

\(^2\)The term Hinayāna itself means, in the words of Rhys Davids 1913: 684, “a wretched, bad method, or system, for progress on the way towards salvation”. The common expression “small vehicle” is in fact, as already pointed out by Nattier 2003: 173 note 4, “not based on the Indian term at all, but on the Chinese expression ... 小乘 ... used by Kumārajīva and others.” Besides the fact that 小 does not render the pejorative hīna- as well as 幻 or 下, yāna need not imply a “vehicle”, cf., e.g., Gombrich 1992, Vetter 2001: 62-66, Anālayo 2009 and Walser 2009.

\(^3\)T 2085 (高僧法顯傳) at T LI 859a: 三千僧兼大小乘學, 859a: 兼大小乘學 (which thus does not explicitly indicate that these were monastics), and 860a: 僧及尼可有千人 ... 雜大小乘學.

\(^4\)Cf., e.g., the Mahāyānasūtrakāra, Lévi 1907: 4.24: tasmād anyonyavirodhād yad yānām hīnaḥ hīnām eva tat, na tan mahāyānāṃ bhavitum arhati, which, after having mentioned five aspects of opposition between the two yānas, concludes that due to this mutual opposition the Hinayāna is indeed inferior, it is incapable of becoming the Mahāyāna. For a study of the contrast between Mahāyāna and Hinayāna in this work in general cf. D’Amato 2000.
schools are Hinayāna, members of one or the other of these schools should then not be Mahāyāna. Mahāyāna, alternatively referred to as the bodhisattvayāna or the buddhayāna, is “great” precisely because its followers have embarked on the path of the “bodhisattva” with the aspiration to become a “Buddha” in future. This decision marks the difference compared to the Hinayānists, who do not aspire to future Buddhahood and who have not embarked on the path of the bodhisattva. Yet, if Fāxiān’s description is to be trusted, some members of a monastic Hinayāna school were at the same time adherents of the Mahāyāna.

The impression that something is not quite right with the use of Hīnayana for all of the Buddhist schools is further reinforced when turning to Xuánzàng (玄奘), who travelled to India two centuries later. In his travel records, Xuánzàng also regularly mentions that in India and elsewhere Buddhist monks practiced both Mahāyāna and Hinayāna. On several occasions in his description of the situation in India he refers to practitioners of the Mahāyāna who were at the same time members of the Sthavira-nikāya (學大乘上座部法). In India itself he reports that nearly a thousand such monks were found at Bodhgayā, nearly five hundred in Kaliṅga, and nearly three hundred in another two locations.

In the light of the conclusion that already suggests itself based on Fāxiān’s description, Xuánzàng’s reference to these Mahāyāna practitioners found among the members of the Sthavira school is perhaps less puzzling than it might seem at first sight. That is, this description may simply refer to monastics ordained in the Sthavira tradition(s) whose spiritual vocation was to follow the bodhisattva path and who would presumably have studied Mahāyāna texts. The same interpreta-

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5Cf., e.g., T 2087 (大唐西域記) at T LI 889c7, 890b4, 893c17, 896b7, 910a5, 910b9, 927a22, 934c15, 935a8, 936b13, 937a4, 937c8, 938a4 and 940a17. Xuánzàng usually mentions not only the number of monastics, but also the number of monasteries in which they were living (except for 910b10, which describes the situation in Nepal). Since at T LI 877a16 he indicates that the followers of the Mahāyāna and of the Hinayāna were dwelling apart from each other, 大小二乘, 居止區別, I take it that in the situation he describes the practitioners of the Mahāyāna and the Hinayāna were not staying in the same monastery.

6T 2087 at T LI 918b14, 929a3, 935c2 (which has a slightly different formulation) and 936c15. For Sri Lanka, which Xuánzàng did not visit personally, he mentions adherents of the Sthavira school that cultivate the Mahāyāna numbering twenty-thousand, T 2087 at T LI 934a14. Regarding this reference, Deeg 2012: 153 could be right that this is an attempt “by Xuanzang to upgrade the otherwise, at least in a Chinese context, low-ranked Hinayāna-sthavirās to the respected status of Mahāyāna-monks”, although I doubt this would be the case for the other references of this type.

7Bechert 1973: 13 comments that “the Mahāyāna-Sthaviravādin are those sections of the Sthaviravāda community who had accepted Mahāyāna doctrines although they still belonged to [the] Sthaviravāda school as far as bhikṣu ordination and vinaya-karma was concerned.”
tion would probably also apply to an eleventh century Khmer inscription, which refers to monks who have ordained as *mahāyāna sthavira bhikṣus*.8

To be sure, this interpretation only works if we allow that the Sthavira or other Buddhist schools were not entirely composed of Hinayāna followers. That this appears to have been indeed the case can be seen from the report of the *Vinaya* specialist Yìjìng (義淨), who travelled India in the later part of the 7th century. He explains that in the case of the four main monastic schools (*nikāyas*) the distinction between the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna is uncertain.9 In fact, the distinction between Buddhist schools, *nikāyas*, is a matter of monastic ordination traditions, whereas the distinction between the Mahāyāna and the Hīnayāna refers to a vocational distinction.10 The two distinctions have no necessary relation to each other.11

As Gombrich (1988: 112) points out, “Mahāyāna ... is not a sect, but a current of opinion which cut across sects as properly defined.” Bechert (1992: 96f) explains that “the formation of Mahāyāna Buddhism took place in a way which was fundamentally dissimilar from that of the formation of Buddhist sects. Whereas the formation and growth of Buddhist *nikāyas* took place mainly on the basis of local communities, the rise of Mahāyāna Buddhism was a development which pervaded the whole sphere of Buddhism and many *nikāyas* ... One could not be a Buddhist monk without being a member of one of the old sects ... [yet] members of any one of these sects could have accepted the religious ‘program’ of Mahāyāna without leaving the community of their *nikāya*.”

How reliable is the information provided by Fǎxián, Xuánzàng and Yìjìng? The descriptions furnished by the Chinese pilgrims certainly need to be read keep-

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8Cœdès 1929: 22,3: *vraḥ paṃnvas bhikṣu mahāyāna sthavira*, trsl. id. 23: “qui ont pris les ordres comme moines (*bhikṣu*) dans (la secte) Mahāyāna ou (dans la secte) Sthavira”; cf. also the similar rendering by Assavavirulhakarn 2010: 88: “monks ordained as Mahāyāna or Sthavira”. Yet, as Bizot 1988: 111f convincingly argues, to convey such a sense one would expect the inscription to be worded differently, wherefore it seems more probable that the reference is to monks ordained in a Sthavira tradition who are followers of the Mahāyāna. Skilling 2013: 149 note 159 comments that “we cannot say with certainty whether Xuanzang and Sūryavarman I used the compound in the same sense, but in any case Cœdès’ translation of the term as *dvanda* ... is incorrect, given that there is no such thing as a Mahāyāna *bhikṣu* ordination.”

9T 2125 (南海寄歸內法傳) at T LIV 205c: 其四部之中, 多學小乘, 少習餘部; cf. also Deeg 2006: 120f.

10Cf. the discussion in La Vallée Poussin 1930.

11This difference does not seem to have been fully clear to Xuanzang himself, as in T 2087 at T LI 891a: he speaks of a thousand monks, of which many practice the Hinayāna, while a few practice in other schools (*nikāyas*), 多學小乘, 少習餘部.
ing in mind that they combine first hand impressions with hearsay and hagiography in a manner not easily set apart from each other. Moreover, the way they describe conditions in India must have been influenced by awareness of the propagandistic effect their reports would have back in China.\(^{12}\)

Now according to Schopen (2000/2005: 10), “in China in the third century the Mahāyāna was of 'paramount importance', well situated among the ecclesiastical and social elite, well on its way – if not already – mainstream. In India it is, during the same period, embattled, ridiculed, scorned by learned monks and the social elite ... and at best marginal.”\(^{13}\) In such a setting one would expect the pilgrims to err on the side of overstressing the dominance of the Mahāyāna and belittling the Hīnayāna, in line with the stark contrast between the two yānas with which they would have been familiar from textual sources available in China.\(^{14}\) Since their descriptions do not corroborate such a stark contrast and repeatedly show the Mahāyāna in a less than dominant position, it seems that their accounts deserve to be taken seriously in this respect. That is, the report that both yānas were practiced by Indian monastics stands a good chance of reflecting actual conditions, even if the numbers given may not necessarily be accurate.

**The Tarkajvālā**

If the descriptions given by the Chinese pilgrims stand a chance of reflecting the ground situation in India in the 5th to 7th century, the question arises in what sense all of the Buddhist monastic schools can be assembled under the heading of being Hīnayāna. An example of such use can be found in Paramārtha’s biography of Vasubandhu, who according to the traditional account was a follower of the Hīnayāna until he converted to the Mahāyāna. The biography, apparently compiled in China, reports that Vasubandhu had completely learned the principles of the eighteen schools and had well understood the Hīnayāna; he held on to the Hīnayāna as right and had no faith in the Mahāyāna, as this was not taught by

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\(^{12}\)For the case of Xuanzang cf. the discussion in Deeg 2009.

\(^{13}\)Cf. also the observation by Bareau 1985: 648 that Faxian and Xuanzang report only rarely instances of actual Mahāyāna forms of practice in India.

\(^{14}\)Deeg 2006 suggests that the stark contrast between the two yānas made in Chinese texts, even though in actual fact there was no substantial presence of the Hīnayāna in the country, served as a foil to avert criticism raised against the Buddhist tradition as a foreign creed not suitable to the situation in China. In this way, qualities perceived as negative could be attributed to the Hīnayāna tradition, with the prevalent Mahāyāna in contrast being a form of teaching that was suitable for the Chinese.
the Buddha. This description suggests a relationship between the application of Hīnayāna to the eighteen schools and the perennial accusation of the Mahāyāna as not stemming from the Buddha.

Vasubandhu provides several arguments against this accusation in the Vyākhāyayukti, which seem to have formed the basis for a similar series of arguments in the Tarkajvālā, a 6th century doxographical work that offers a detailed examination of the Buddhist schools and their tenets. This examination is preceded by a reference to those who are of an “inferior aspiration”, hīnādhimukta / dman mos. The Tarkajvālā reports that those of inferior aspiration criticize the Mahāyāna on the grounds that it was not taught by the Buddha, as its teachings are not included in the discourses, etc., and do not exist among the eighteen schools. That is, the accusation that the Mahāyāna is not the Buddha’s teaching is rooted in the observation that its teachings are not found in the discourse collections transmitted by the eighteen schools.

The Tarkajvālā then comes out with arguments against such challenges. One is to propose that the Mahāyāna teachings are part of a compilation carried out by Samantabhadra, Mañjuśrī and Maitreya, etc. Of course, the disciples (of the eighteen schools) did not include the Mahāyāna teachings in their collections because these were beyond their ken.

The reasoning recorded in the Tarkajvālā makes it clear in what sense – from the Mahāyāna viewpoint – all of the eighteen Buddhist schools are Hīnayāna. This

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15 T 2049 (婆藪槃⾖法師傳) at T L 190c12: 法師既遍通⼗⼋部義, 妙解⼩乘, 執⼩乘是不信 大乘, 謂摩訶衍⾮佛所說; cf. also Takakusu 1904: 290 and Tola and Dragonetti 1996/1997: 244.
16 For a study of these arguments in the Vyākhāyayukti cf. Cabezón 1992; cf. also Pāsādika 2009: 503.
17 Eckel 2008: 303, (4.1). The importance of the Tarkajvālā for appreciating the application of the term hīnayāna to the Buddhist schools suggests itself to me from the circumstance that this work employs the corresponding Tibetan term theg pa dman pa on several occasions, cf. D 3856 dza 42b8, 48a8 and 48b1 or Q 5256 dza 45b7, 51a4 and 51b8 (dbu ma’i snying po’i grel pa rtog ge ’bar ba). In contrast, I have not been able to locate occurrences of the term hīnayāna with a digital search in central doxographical works like the Mañjuśrīpariprcchā, T 468 (⽂殊師利問經), the Śāriputrapariprcchā, T 1465 (舍利弗問經), the Samayabhedoracanacakra, T 2031 (異部宗輪論), T 2032 (十八部論) and D 4138 or Q 5639 (gzhung lbs kyi bye brag bkod pa’i ’khor lo), and of course in the Dīpavamsa. The term hīnayāna is also relatively rare or even absent in early Mahāyāna discourses, as already noted by, e.g., Kimura 1927: 119, Harrison 1987: 80, Williams 1989/2009: 43, Harrison 1990: xviii, Karunaratne 1992: 453, and Nattier 2003: 172.
notion emerges as an expedient reply to being challenged for lacking canonical authority. Those who according to tradition compiled the teachings of the Buddha, an event called the first saṅgīti and located at Rājagṛha, did not include the superior Mahāyāna teachings. Therefore the teachings they did include are fit to be reckoned Hīnayāna, and those who transmit those teachings – the ‘eighteen’ schools – deserve the same epithet.

Thus the application of the term Hīnayāna emerges in the context of a polemical argument; it does not reflect the actual historical situation. To reckon the teachings collected at the first saṅgīti at Rājagṛha as Hīnayāna is in fact an anachronism, as the early Buddhist period does not yet know of the generalized aspiration to become a Buddha in the future. Therefore from a historical viewpoint it is not meaningful to apply the distinction between Hīnayāna and Mahāyāna to early Buddhism. Such a distinction presupposes the existence of the bodhisattva path as an ideal to be emulated, which one may either reject or else adopt. For such a decision to be possible and thus to form the basis for a meaningful distinction, the bodhisattva ideal first of all has to come into existence.

This would be like applying the term “protestant” to early Christianity. While the teachings of early Christianity can indeed be seen as in some way being a protest against certain aspects of Judaism, the term “protestant” only makes sense from the time of Luther onwards, once the distinction between Catholics and Protestants has come into being. In the same way, it makes only sense to use the qualification Hīnayāna for those who are unwilling to pursue the bodhisattva path, who have decided not to embark on the bodhisattvayāna. As long as this yāna has not yet come into existence, it is not really possible to qualify someone as “inferior” because of not embarking on this yāna.

The passages surveyed above from the Chinese pilgrims show that the application of the term Hīnayāna to the ‘eighteen’ Buddhist schools does not fit what appear to have been the actual historical conditions in ancient India. Monastic followers of the Mahāyāna were at the same time members of a Buddhist school by dint of their ordination. Skilling (2004: 143) explains that “available scriptures

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20 For a study of the first traces of developments, evident in later layers of the early discourses, that eventually would have lead to the arising of the bodhisattva ideal, cf. Anālayo 2010.

of the eighteen schools allow all three options: it is one’s own decision whether [to] become an Arhat, a Pratyekabuddha, or a Buddha, and to practice accordingly. That is, the eighteen or four schools embrace the three yānas.”

In sum, the term Hinayāna as a referent to the teachings of early Buddhism or to the Buddhist schools has its origins and meanings in a polemic context; it does not accurately represent the historical situation. Nevertheless, the term has been used widely in academic publications. In what follows I survey the development that appears to have contributed to this usage.

The Parliament of Religions

According to recent research, use of the term Hinayāna in western publications becomes a broadly visible phenomenon at the beginning of the 20th century and steadily increases until reaching a peak around 1960. The event that appears to have exerted particular influence in this respect is the World’s Parliament of Religion in 1893 at Chicago, in the sense of leading to a more widespread use of the term Hinayāna.

The World’s Parliament of Religion – the first time in the West that representatives of religions from around the world came together – had a strong impact on the reception of Buddhism in the United States of America. The Parliament itself was held in 1893 as part of the Columbian exposition to celebrate the four hundredth anniversary of the journey of Columbus to the New World.

The Columbian exposition was an opportunity for the United States of America as well as for Japan to show themselves to the world as modern nations. For the Japanese, presenting Japan as a civilized modern nation with an ancient culture – of which Japanese Buddhism was seen as a central aspect – carried the hope that acquiring recognition from the West would enable a renegotiation of unfair

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22 Perreira 2012: 454.
23 Perreira 2012: 500 explains that “it was in Chicago at the 1893 World’s Parliament of Religions when the terms by which we study Buddhism took a decisive turn. From this time forward, the terms Mahāyāna and Hinayāna are in ascendance, and will gradually eclipse ‘Northern Buddhism’ and ‘Southern Buddhism’ as the main categories by which Buddhism was to be organized in scholarly and popular discourse.”
24 In his study of Buddhism in America in the period 1844-1912, Tweed 1992/2000: 31 notes that “with the possible exception of the publication of Arnold’s Light of Asia, no single event had more impact than the World’s Parliament of Religions of 1893.”
treaties that had earlier been imposed upon Japan by the Western powers. At the same time, success abroad would of course result in a welcome strengthening of Buddhism at home, which was still recovering from the previous persecutions during the Meiji period.

Against this background, a central aim of the Japanese delegation at the World’s Parliament of Religion was to counter Western perceptions of the Pāli canon as representative of original Buddhism and to establish the authenticity of the Mahāyāna Buddhism of Japan. A recurrent theme in the presentation of the delegates was thus naturally the polemic discourse that establishes the canonical authenticity of the Mahāyāna, following the traditional arguments based on the Hīnayāna / Mahāyāna divide and the pànjiāo (判教) schemes of classifying Buddhist teachings so as to accommodate their diversity within a coherent system that can be attributed to a single teacher, the Buddha. Due to the need to differentiate themselves from other forms of Buddhism in Asia – Sri Lankan Buddhism was represented at the Parliament by Anagārika Dharmapāla and Siamese Buddhism by Prince Chudhadharn – the Japanese delegates recurrently identified the Theravāda theme was taken up explicitly by one of the Japanese delegates, Hirai Kinzō, in his talk at the Parliament; cf. Barrows 1893: 445 or Houghton 1894: 159.

Snodgrass 2003: 199 indicates that “up to the time of the Parliament in 1893 almost nothing was known about Japanese Buddhism beyond the general assumption that as a form of Mahayana it was necessarily a later and therefore aberrant form of the original teachings of the historical Buddha.” Thus, in the words of Snodgrass 2003: 9, “the task ... the delegates faced ... was to relate Japanese Buddhism to the Western construct that privileged the Theravāda of the Pali texts. They needed to show that Japanese Buddhism encompassed all of the truth of the Theravāda – that is, all those aspects of Buddhism which had attracted contemporary Western approval – but that Theravāda, Southern Buddhism, was no more than a provisional and introductory expression of the Buddha’s teachings.” Harding 2008: 139 notes that “Japanese Mahāyāna, portrayed as the culmination of Buddhism, was actively differentiated from earlier schools of Southern Buddhism, pejoratively labelled ‘Hinayāna.’ Perreira 2012: 512 explains that “approaching the Columbian Exposition as a unique opportunity to recast the terms by which the Buddhism of Japan had been defined in Western scholarship, the Japanese ... fully embraced the idea that the Buddhism of Japan was indeed more ‘developed,’ but not in the sense of being less genuine or authentic as Western scholarship insisted – rather, it was portrayed as more progressive, and, as such, it constituted the very essence of the Buddha’s teaching.”

In his detailed study of the pànjiāo taxonomies, Mun 2006: 1f points to early fifth century China as the starting point, when “Kumārajīva systematically translated an enormous amount of texts”, which led to “an urgent need to devise doctrinal classifications in order to explain ... contradictions among them.” Thereon “Kumārajīva classified the Buddha’s teaching into two groups, i.e., the Mahāyāna and the Hinayāna”, presenting “the Mahāyāna as superior to the Hinayāna.”
vāda as being the present day manifestation of the Hinayāna known to them from their own doctrinal background.

In his initial presentation at the Parliament, the layman Noguchi Zenshirō remarked that, instead of making gifts of Japanese teapots and the like to his American hosts, he wished to make a gift of the best of his possessions, which is Buddhism. He then announced that the delegation had brought thousands of books for distribution to their hosts, among them Kuroda’s *Outline of the Mahāyāna, as Taught by the Buddha*.

As the title already indicates, the book by Kuroda, which had been specifically prepared for distribution at the Parliament, claims that the Mahāyāna was taught by the Buddha himself. The term Hinayāna is used by Kuroda as a referent to the Buddhism found in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia.

The Shingon representative Toki Hōryū introduced precisely the same claims in his presentation at the Parliament, namely that the Buddha taught Mahāyāna and that the Hinayāna is now found in Southern Buddhism.

The argument presented by Toki Hōryū and Kuroda was in fact crucial to the effort of the Japanese delegation.

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28 Barrows 1893: 440 or Houghton 1894: 156.  
29 Snodgrass 2003: 82f notes that “the Japanese were very aware of the importance of the published record of the conference to Western understanding of their religion ... the delegates and their supporters not only prepared their papers with this in mind but prepared a number of books on Japanese Buddhism for distribution.”  
30 Kuroda 1893: iif introduces the terms Mahāyāna and Hinayāna and then explains that “though these two doctrines are not without differences, they were both taught by one Buddha”, adding that in Japan Hinayāna is considered “only as secondary branch of religious knowledge”, whereas in “Southern India, Ceylon, Birmah, Siam, etc., only the Hinayāna is taught.” Snodgrass 2003: 178 reports that the publication by Kuroda “achieved greater permanence than others because it was reprinted and further distributed through the Theosophical Society in 1894.” Kuroda 1893 was also translated into German by Seidenstücker 1904, thereby extending the influence of his presentation to German readers. Similar doctrines were also made available to the French by Fujishima 1889: 54f, who repeats the statement by Nanjio 1886: 2 quoted below (note 36) on the Hinayānists not being ashamed and speaking evil of Mahāyāna texts, followed by ingeniously arguing, in regard to certain Mahāyāna-sūtras that he reckons as having become part of the Tripiṭaka a century after the Buddha’s demise: “si ces derniers n’avaient pas existé auparavant, d’où les aurait-on tirés?”  
31 Barrows 1893: 543 or Houghton 1894: 222, which differ in their record of the details of his talk.  
32 Snodgrass 2003: 221 comments that “establishing that the Mahayana was the Buddha’s teaching was pivotal. Upon this rested the claim that Japanese Buddhism was ‘real’ Buddhism.”
The Jōdo Shinshū representative Yatsubuchi Banryū then recommended to his audience the study of the *History of Japanese Buddhist Sects* by Professor Nanjō. Nanjō, who had studied under Max Müller in Oxford and thus spoke with the credentials of an accredited academic, claims in his book that the *Buddhāvatamsakasūtra* was the first teaching given by the Buddha after his awakening. Having identified the eighteen schools as Hīnayāna, Nanjō then highlights the inability of the Hinayānists to understand the Mahāyāna.

The Tendai representative at the Parliament, Ashitsu Jitsuzen, again identified the Buddhism found in southern Asian countries like Ceylon and Siam as Hīnayāna, followed by presenting Japanese Mahāyāna Buddhism as the most powerful Buddhist tradition.

During the Parliament, the Rinzai representative Shaku Sōen befriended the publisher Paul Carus. A year after the Parliament Carus published his influen-
tial *Gospel of Buddha* with an introduction that contrasts the Hinayāna to the Mahāyāna. As a result of the contact between Shaku Sōen and Paul Carus, D.T. Suzuki, a lay Zen disciple of Shaku Sōen, came to stay in the United States with Carus.

In his *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, the prolific writer D.T. Suzuki continues in ways similar to the Japanese delegates at the Parliament. He presents the Mahāyāna as a teaching originating from the time of the historical Buddha, and criticizes the Western perception of Hinayāna Buddhism as the only genuine teaching of the Buddha.

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39 According to Tweed 1992/2000: 65, “with the possible exception of Olcott, Carus was probably more influential in stimulating and sustaining American interest in Buddhism than any other person living in the United States.”

40 After referring to the Hinayāna, Carus 1894: ix explains that “following the spirit of missionary propaganda, so natural to religious men who are earnest in their convictions, later Buddhists popularised Buddha’s doctrines and made them accessible to the multitudes ... they constructed, as they called it, a large vessel of salvation, the Mahāyāna, in which the multitudes would find room and could be safely carried over ... the Mahayāna is a step forward in so far as it changes a philosophy into a religion and attempts to preach doctrines that were negatively expressed, in positive propositions.”

41 Perreira 2012: 528 comments on Suzuki that “it is largely owing to his influence that Buddhism, from this time onward, will increasingly be conceived as being divided into two principal schools – Hinayāna and Mahāyāna”. In a paper on Suzuki, Pye 2008: 11 comments that “there is probably no other single writer whose works have had a greater influence on the European and North American reception of Buddhism.”

42 Suzuki 1907: v refers to “Mahāyāna Buddhism, whose history began in the sixth century before the Christian era.” As Snodgrass 2003: 263 comments, “the concern to show that Mahayana and Japanese Buddhism are the teachings of the historical Buddha remains.”

43 Suzuki 1907: 11 explains that “what is generally known to the Western nations by the name of Buddhism is Hinayānism, whose scriptures ... are written in Pāli and studied mostly in Ceylon, Burma and Siam. It was through this language that the first knowledge of Buddhism was acquired by Orientalists; and naturally they came to regard Hinayānism or Southern Buddhism as the only genuine teachings of the Buddha ... Owing to these unfortunate hypotheses, the significance of Mahāyānism as a living religion has been entirely ignored; and even those who are regarded as best authorities on the subject appear greatly misinformed and, what is worse, altogether prejudiced.”
Current Usage

From the Parliament to subsequent publications, the distinction between Mahāyāna and Hinayāna successfully made its way into the general discourse on Buddhism. While the term Hinayāna was known earlier, it appears to have come into prominent use after the World’s Parliament of Religion in 1893, where its promotion by the Japanese delegation and then by D.T. Suzuki stands in a logical continuity with the polemics recorded in the Tarkajvalā. Throughout, the expression Hinayāna serves to deflect criticism of the lack of canonical authority of the Mahāyāna. In spite of a general awareness of the fact that the term stems from a polemical context and has clear pejorative connotations, the use continues up to the present day.

An example, chosen simply for the sake of illustration, would be the sketch of the history of Buddhism in Faure (2009: 7 and 10), who reports that “a schism occurred between the disciples of the Buddha that eventually led to a separation into the two main schools – the ‘Great Vehicle’ (Mahāyāna) and the ‘Lesser Vehicle’ (Hinayāna) ... the ‘Lesser Vehicle’ ... later became Theravāda.” “Hinayāna (a term we are using here for want of a better one and which we do not intend

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44Harding 2008: 16 notes that “the 1893 World’s Parliament of Religions provided a singularly spectacular showcase of positions, prejudices, preferences, and portrayals that continue to determine the presentation and reception of Buddhism in both Asia and the West.”

45In a paper on the Western reception of Zen, Sharf 1995: 108 comments that “given the pedigree of these early Zen missionaries, one might have expected Western scholars of Buddhism to approach their high-minded pronouncements with considerable caution, if not scepticism, but such has rarely been the case.”

46Already Rémusat 1836: 9–12 introduced the term with a detailed discussion. Rockhill 1883/1907: 196, after translating the section from the Tarkajvalā on the Buddhist schools, reported that these were referred to as Hinayāna. Beal 1884: 5 identified the little vehicle with early Buddhism. Eitel 1888: 63f offered a short entry on Hinayāna that speaks of “18 subdivisions.” Monier-Williams 1889/1995: 159 indicated that “the people of Ceylon, Burma and Siam have always preferred the ‘Little Vehicle’”; etc.

47Perreira 2012: 519 explains that the “effort to promote Mahāyāna and Hinayāna as the basic division in Buddhism ... continued long after the Parliament, and it eventually gained traction in the United States.”

48According to Perreira 2012: 450f, the Inaugural Conference of the World Fellowship of Buddhists, held in Sri Lanka in 1950, appears to have been particularly instrumental in drawing public attention to the pejorative connotations of the term Hinayāna.

49For the type of reasoning involved cf., e.g., Sharma 1976: 131, who holds that while “on the one hand the term Hinayāna is undesirable as it is a pejorative; on the other hand it is useful academically as referring to the pre-Mahāyāna schools collectively.”
to have any pejorative connotations whatsoever) was initially transmitted to Sri Lanka during the reign of Ashoka and then, from the tenth century CE, spread throughout Southeast Asia (Myanmar, Thailand, Laos, Cambodia). It lives on today in the form of Theravāda.”

A schism involves a splitting of a monastic community that leads to the resultant factions undertaking their respective communal observances independently. This is different from a vocational difference based on the individual decision whether or not to embark on the bodhisattva path. As the reports by the Chinese pilgrims show, this vocational difference cuts across the Buddhist monastic schools which, including the Mahāsāṃghika school, are comprised under the heading of the “eighteen schools”. Thus the distinction between Hinayāna and the Mahāyāna is not the product of a schism.

The Theravāda tradition cannot simply be considered a developed form of Hinayāna. Identifying Theravāda as a form of Hinayāna is self-contradictory, since among the Buddhist populations of Burma, Sri Lanka and Thailand the aspiration to become a Buddha in the future has for a long time been a recognized aim, attested to in inscriptions and texts. This makes it misleading to refer to these Buddhist populations with a term that by definition stands in contrast to the bodhisattva path.

The main problem in presentations of this type is not merely the continued use of a pejorative term, instead of using other and less loaded alternatives. The real problem is that the contrast between Hinayāna and Mahāyāna, in the words of Skilling (2005: 270), refers to “trends in ideas and practices that developed ... within the institutions of the Buddhist samghas”. Hence it is not meaningful to use these terms as if they were in themselves samgha institutions.

Such misapplication naturally tends to obscure an accurate perception of the historical situation. According to Cohen (1995: 18), “the prevailing conception of the nikāyas as sub-species of the Hinayāna should be aborted ... the Mahāyāna/Hinayāna distinction ... loses most of its significance as a handle for Indian Buddhist institutional history.”

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50 Cf., e.g., Bechert 1961/1982 and Hüskens 1997.
52 Cf., e.g., the discussion in Katz 1980 and also above note 1.
At times, the use of Hinayāna in academic publications is not really required. Thus the classic on the Buddhist schools by Bareau (1955) has the title *Les sectes bouddhiques du petit véhicule*. The topic of his research would have been clear to the reader if he had just chosen *Les sectes bouddhiques*, “the Buddhist sects”. This suffices to show that the topic in question is the nikāyas and there seems to be no real benefit in adding the qualification that these are of the “little vehicle”.

A key reference work by Norman (1983) has the title *Pāli Literature, Including the Canonical Literature in Prakrit and Sanskrit of all the Hinayāna Schools of Buddhism*. Here as well, there seems to be no need for the qualification Hinayāna once the *Schools of Buddhism* have been mentioned, which makes it fairly clear that literature of nikāya Buddhism is intended, not Mahāyāna works. If a need is felt to make this indubitably plain in the title, however, then instead of Hinayāna an expression like nikāya Buddhism would be preferable. Thus the title could read: *Pāli Literature, Including the Canonical Literature in Prakrit and Sanskrit of all the Schools of (nikāya) Buddhism*.

The issue is not one of redundancy only, however. The problem that can result from considering the Theravāda tradition as Hinayāna can be exemplified with a page in the study of Buddhism in Burma by Spiro (1970/1982: 62). After quoting Suzuki’s *Outlines of Mahāyāna Buddhism*, Spiro explains that “the Bodhisattva ideal is not found – nor for reasons just suggested, could it be found – in the Theravāda tradition.” On the very same page he then reports that “in Theravādist Burma ... there has been a long tradition of aspiration to Buddhahood.”

If there has been a long tradition of aspiration to Buddhahood, then it is not really possible to state that the bodhisattva ideal is not found in the Burmese Theravāda tradition. Yet, such a contradiction is not easily noticed as long as we are misled by the assumption that the Buddhist traditions fall into two distinct institutional categories, of which in principle only one advocates the bodhisattva path. This is to fall prey to what I would call the “Hinayāna fallacy”, taking polemical arguments as if they were accurate descriptions of historical facts.

Cohen (1995: 20) points out that once “Mahāyāna is positively characterized by its members’ pursuit of the bodhisattva path; the Hinayāna is negatively characterized as the non-Mahāyāna” and by the fact that its members do not pursue the bodhisattva path. “However, when positively characterized, the Hinayāna

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53 While Spiro 1970/1982: 61 was aware of the fact that Suzuki’s presentation is the “point of view of a partisan”, he nevertheless seems to have been influenced by the basic underlying distinction that informs Suzuki’s presentation.
is defined by members’ affiliation with one or another nikāya, which, of course, means that the Mahāyāna is known negatively by its members’ institutional separation from those same nikāyas.” Cohen (1995: 21) concludes that “we are left with the Mahāyāna/Hīnayāna distinction as a mere structural dualism devoid of specific content, a mere nominalism.” In fact, neither of these two descriptions reflects historical reality, making it clear that there is something basically wrong with the distinction between the Hīnayāna and the Mahāyāna as historical categories.

In the words of Silk (2002: 367f) “the referent of the term ‘Hīnayāna,’ when it occurs in Buddhist texts themselves, is never any existent institution or organization, but a rhetorical fiction … a fundamental error is thus made when we imagine references to ‘Hīnayāna’ in Mahāyāna literature to apply to so-called Sectarian Buddhism, much less to Early Buddhism.” Skilling (2013: 76) concludes that “the Hinayāna never existed, anywhere or at any time, as an establishment or organization, as a social movement, as a self-conscious historical agent. Nor was Hīnayāna a stage or period in the development of Buddhism … the Hinayānist was defined by Mahāyānist polemics; he was a dogmatic construction, not a social identity. He was a straw man, a will-o’-the whisp, a māyāpuruṣa.”

Conclusions

By way of conclusion, it seems to me that the use of the term Hīnayāna as a fundamental category for studying the history of Buddhism is misleading. As far as I can see, the term Hīnayāna is best confined to discussions of Mahāyāna polemics. The problems of continuing to deploy it as a classificatory concept for studying the history of Buddhism are, in brief:

1) Referring to Buddhism in India at least until the reign of Aśoka as Hīnayāna is meaningless, since neither Mahāyāna nor its opponents had so far come into existence and their main issue of contention — the option to follow the bodhisattva ideal — was still in the making. A better term for this period would be “early Buddhism”.

2) Hinayāna as an umbrella term for the Buddhist monastic schools is misleading, because Mahāyāna was not confined to laity. Terms that can be used instead

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54 On the Pāli discourses as reflecting “early Buddhism” cf. Anālayo 2012.
would be “Buddhist schools” and/or “nikāya Buddhism”; the period in question would be “Buddhism of the middle period”.

3) The use of Hinayāna for the traditions of Buddhism in Sri Lanka and Southeast Asia is incorrect, because the respective Buddhist traditions recognize the assumed distinctive characteristic of the Mahāyāna – the bodhisattva path – as a viable option of practice. A better term would be “Theravāda”.

**Abbreviations**

D Derge edition
Q Peking edition
T Taishō (CBETA) edition

**References**


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55 Cf., e.g., Strong 1995: 87.

56 Schopen 1995/2004: 94 uses the expression “Middle Period of Indian Buddhism” for “the period between the beginning of the Common Era and the year 500 C.E.”. On following his definition, the two centuries between the time of Aśoka and the beginning of the Common Era would require a term on its own, which could be, e.g., the “post-Aṣokan” period.

57 For a more detailed discussion of my reasons for using the term Theravāda cf. Anālayo 2013.


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Editor’s Note on Geoff Bamford’s Article on dharma/dhamma.

Part of the interest of this article lies in the context of its production. Geoff Bamford was invited to speak at a large conference in India. Below we reproduce the publicity for that conference. It announces that the conference is designed to show “the essential identity” between dharma and dhamma; in other words, to show that the Buddha’s concept was the same as that found in brahminism/Hinduism. After the conference Geoff was pressed to send the text of his speech for publication; but when he had done so, he heard nothing more. The reason can easily be surmised: his paper takes issue with the basic premise of the conference. This conference was a piece of cultural politics, and Geoff found himself on the wrong side.
Dharma-Dhamma International Conference,  
Sept. 21-23, 2012, Sanchi/Bhopal

Hosts: 1. Center for Study of Religion and Society, New Delhi, India;  
2. Mahabodhi Society, Sri Lanka

The central theme of the Conference is Dharma-Dhamma which has been a pivotal and pervasive concept and overriding principle in Indian culture commonly shared by all religious traditions of India. It has played a dominant and cardinal role in shaping Indian view and way of life. It has covered every facet of human existence and cosmic life in so far as it has been the

- sustaining (dharuka),
- regulating (niyamaka) and
- life-enhancing (sadhaka)

force in Indian cultural ethos. It has been the foundational tenet in Hinduism and Buddhism.

AIM

The Conference aims to focus on the essential identity between the Dharma-Dhamma view points. We find that these thoughts are as relevant today as they have been over millennia of Pilgrims’ Progress, exemplified by the abiding continuum of Hindu and Buddhist Civilizations.

We aim through this conference, to facilitate the cross-pollination of ideas and foster harmony between the two ancient Civilizations, so that Dharma-Dhamma becomes a veritable celebration of freedom.

It is all the more essential in view of the forces released by Globalisation today, to integrate the Orient through the common factor of Dharma-Dhamma link provided by centuries of cultural and civilisational inter-connectedness.

SCOPE & THEME

This conference will explore the following subjects:

- Hindu Dharma – Bauddha Dhamma
  - as Philosophia Perennis and Universalis – Perennial and Universal Philosophies
- Expression of Hindu and Bauddham thoughts in art and architecture
- Archaeological and Historical perspectives
- Sampradayas and patterns of worship in temples
- Renaissance in Hindu and Bauddham temples
- Areas for cooperation between Hindu and Bauddham scholars and prominent citizens
- Socio-economic cooperation among the Indian Ocean Rim countries

INDICATIVE LIST OF THEMES OR TOPICS:

1. Specific paradigms of sanatana dharma and bauddha dhamma
2. Root cause of existence in dharma-dharma
3. Dharma-dharma in pursuit of a universal cause
4. Dharma-dharma an inclusive growth (abhyudayam)
5. Dharma-dharma as the strongest cultural foundation in the Orient
6. Dharma-dharma as the ordering principle
7. Dharma-dhamma as universal ethos
8. Dharma-dhamma principle as the enduring metaphor, a cultural continuum
9. Dharma-dhamma in cosmic sense
10. Dharma-dhamma in social and ethical sense
11. Dharma-dhamma in forms of worship
12. Dharma-dhamma and ecological preservation
13. Dharma-dhamma as synthesis of social values
14. Phenomenology of dharma-dhamma in various systems of thought
15. Precepts of dharma-dhamma in canonical texts
16. Dharma-dhamma as the highest metaphysical principle
17. Dharma-dhamma and consciousness studies
18. Dharma-dhamma and wadharma
19. Dharma-dhamma and rajadharma, jurisprudence
20. Delineation of dhamma in Abhidhamma texts
21. Dharma-dhamma and meditative practices
22. Dharma-dhamma as a normative principle
23. Dhamma analysis in Abhidhamma
24. Dharma-dhamma and liberation (nihs'reyas)
25. Place of s'eeala as causal factor in dharma-dhamma
26. Dharma in Upanishads
27. Dharma in epics
28. Dhamma in Jataka texts
29. Practice of dharma-dhamma as guarantor of peace in international relations
30. Dharma-dhamma in cosmogenic myths
31. Dharma-dhamma and existential world-views
32. Dharma-dhamma as aesthetic expressions in art and architecture
33. Dharma-dhamma as expressions in performing arts
34. Dharma-dhamma and archaeology
35. Specific contributions of scholars, for example, Ananda K. Coomaraswamy, TRV Murty, Bhikkhu Bodhi
36. Geographical spread of dhamma-dhamma from the Urals to the Setusamudram, from the Urals to the Mekong delta
37. Zen Buddhism and metaphysics

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On Careful Distinction between Usages of Dharma/Dhamma

Geoffrey Bamford

This paper briefly reviews the early history of the term dharma/dhamma, focusing primarily on Buddhist sources. Then it considers implications for the contemporary understanding of Buddhism, e.g. in relation to Hinduism.

It first establishes some basic assumptions about antique, polysemic terms like dharma and about Indic culture. After a quick glance at Vedic usage, it then maps the semantic field of dhamma in the Pali sutta material. Next, it considers how thereafter the sāvakas sought to systematise and package the notion of dhamma. After that, it reviews Asoka’s innovations.

Moving on to Brahmanical sources, it mentions some recent research on the Dharma-sūtras & -śāstras, then looks rapidly at the Epic literature. On this evidence, it offers some preliminary generalisations about early Buddhist and Brahmanical thinking and practice, as revealed in ideas of dharma/dhamma.

These two cultural currents developed in a dialectical relationship, each seeking progressively to confute and/or co-opt the other. The Buddhist usage is grounded in a psychological and the Brahminical in a social vision; the Buddhist usage is primarily descriptive, the Brahmanical prescriptive.

Indian Buddhism emerges in a context conditioned by Brahmanism, just as later Hinduism is conditioned by Buddhism. So, one can usefully compare the two traditions, e.g. by analysing the various usages of dharma/dhamma in them. But such analysis hardly shows them to be ‘essentially identical’. Attempts to de-emphasise what is distinctive about Buddhism seem counter-intuitive. They are also counter-productive, particularly in relation to India’s cultural diplomacy.
Introduction

How to locate Buddhism in an Indian context? How does it relate to Hinduism? What does the history tell us? And what does this mean for Hindu-Buddhist relations? In particular, how can modern Indians connect with Buddhists worldwide?

For instance, how helpful is it to posit an essential identity between Hinduism and Buddhism? Can we usefully see both as based on a single ‘concept and overriding principle’, namely dharma/dhamma?

To explore these questions, let us briefly review the history of that term. Then let us consider contemporary Hindu-Buddhist relations in that light.

Context

First, we may establish one or two basic assumptions. These, I suggest, are widely shared across the world-wide community of those who study India's heritage.

Antique Polysemic Terms

Old words, like dharma, remain in use. Old ideas may also retain some power. However, this is on the model of ‘my grandfather’s axe’:

This is my grandfather’s axe.
My father replaced the handle; I replaced the blade. ¹

Abbreviations in this paper for citations from the Pali are those used in the PTS Dictionary.

¹This ontological paradox asks whether the axe is still the same as the one my grandfather used: perhaps, since form and function remain constant, it is the same; perhaps, since material and manufacture differ, it is not. The implicit response is that what we call by a certain name is bound to be variable, particularly over long periods of time. That must surely apply to the term dharma/dhamma. After all:

➞ to start with, language is a social phenomenon:
  - words are used, and work, in particular ways in particular situations for particular people; and
  - these usages relate to one another in ways that:
    · are coherent enough for people to coordinate thought and action and so
    · can indeed be analysed and understood, but nonetheless
    · defy simple explanation;

➞ and then, on top of that, like all social phenomena, language usage is subject to continual change.

So, words that remain in use over long periods cannot be assumed to have constant meanings. Over millennia, meanings can shift to such an extent that a connection between original and contemporary usages can be established only with extreme difficulty.
That is: we can of course map the usages of an antique, polysemic term² like dharma/dhamma; this exercise, for which etymology is relevant, will be helpful in exploring the import of particular, ancient usages; but we cannot by this means establish some transcendent, immutable meaning that applies across all historical contexts.

Indic Culture: the Great Bifurcation

Indic culture was from the first expressed in a social order centred on a spiritual élite, whose status was separate from political or economic power. This pattern crystallised initially around a kinship group, the Brahmins.³ An alternative ‘vanguard group’ then emerged.

²Homophones are distinct words, with unconnected meanings, which happen to sound the same: e.g. “dear” and “deer”. Polysemy, by contrast, is when a word carries a range of meanings which, for users of the language, are linked semantically, so that each is naturally understood in relation to others. Consider the word “creep” as in “wage creep” (slow but steady increase) and “he’s a creep” (disconcerting). The contrast between polysemes and homophones is relative, not absolute. In the two senses of “beloved” and “over-priced”, the word “dear” may now be considered either way, (although a few hundred years ago the polysemic connection, via etymology, was clearer).

³Our ancestors’ languages and thought-worlds differ from what we are familiar with today. Thus, the patterns of polysemy in old Indo-Aryan are unusual from a contemporary perspective. The word vṛka, for instance, can refer equally to a wolf and a plough; a closely related word is used for a handful of grass. [To understand this, we must imagine: the action of the hand twisting up a bunch of grass stems from the ground; the way a ploughshare raises the earth, twists it over and drops it away; and the action of the wolf on the prey animal’s neck...] When it comes to abstract terms, there is a consistent tendency for a word, or at least a set of closely connected forms, to be used in contexts that from today’s perspective would seem to be opposites — seeing and shining, for instance. [Loka, normally ‘the world’, has one attested usage in the sense of ‘the faculty of vision’, while āloka covers ‘looking/seeing’, ‘sight/vision/aspect’, ‘light/lustre/splendour’, ‘flattery’...] The moral of the story is that we must treat ancient words and texts with great care.

Suppose, for instance, that an ancient term like dharma has an etymologically identical homophone in a contemporary language. We can be sure that the contemporary meaning does not correspond to the original: that would be possible only if all the other categories in that modern language, in relation to which the meaning of dharma emerges in use, had also been held constant for several thousand years.

³There is, however, some evidence that, in the very early Vedic period, a Brahmin was someone who behaved in a certain way — an inspired singer of sacred songs — rather than someone born into a certain type of family.
That was around the Buddha’s time. There was a great bifurcation: Indian cultural history resolved itself into two distinct currents, the orthodox Brahmanical and the heterodox renunciate (or šramaṇa), which cross-fertilised.\(^4\)

The Brahmanical order was about households and ritual. It preserved antique language-forms and ceremonies. It was particularist: the spiritual élite formed a quasi-ethnicity, and defined the rest of society in terms of quasi-ethnic groupings, each with its own character and norms; and cultural transmission fell under purview of a closed circle. This was a hierarchical, esoteric approach with strong magical overtones. It sought support among local, landed élites, which it in turn served.

The šramaṇa (particularly the early Buddhist) current was formed of people who had left the family to join an all-comers group of wandering meditators. Using vernacular language and wary of ritual, it offered an exoteric, universalist message. It deprecated identification with ethnic or quasi-ethnic groupings: all roles were in principle open to all population strata. Sceptical of authority, it defined itself in rational-empirical and ethical terms, and found support among the socially mobile and economically innovative.

The differences are clear. Indeed, they go further.

The Brahmanical vision is all about essences and identities. The essence of the person is identical with that of the universe. That is absolute reality. The aim is to understand it. Verbal formulae (from tat tvam asi to saccidānda) are felt to help. This is an idealist ontology, in which specific formulations of being, of ‘what is’ are powerful. And gods are important.

The Buddhist aim is to clear the mind of unhelpful habits and concepts. That involves being careful of language, which tends to confuse, and so not trying to define what is, as such. This approach discourages thoughts of essences and identities, suggesting instead close observation and analysis of how we experience life. It is a process philosophy: it teaches us to relate to our environment holistically, without reference to particular, enduring entities. And gods have limited scope.

**Dharma/Dhamma Usage**

**Before the Buddha**

That is the background. Then, what about Dharma?

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\(^4\)Bronkhorst 2007.
In the Veda, the word was relatively rare. It was associated with royal management of public affairs. Upaniṣadic references filled this out: a weaker man was supposed to make requests of a stronger by appealing to a standard of truth or fairness called dharma.

But so far the term had a relatively limited usage within the literature. It was within the Buddhist tradition that it first assumed a central position.

**Around the Buddha’s Time**

**Particular patterns to universal truth: the semantic field of dhamma**

*Dhamma* is all over the Pali *suttas*. Its usages are manifold.

Now, we can understand big, abstract ideas as extensions of small, practical ones. Thus, in the *suttas*:

1. The simplest and most casual usage of *dhamma* conveys the idea of “what it’s like” — ‘it’, here, being a phenomenon in experience. Each such phenomenon/experience is understood to have a characteristic quality, a pattern, nature or rule:

   \[
   \text{yan kiści samudaya-dhammañ sabban tan nirodha-dhammañ}
   \]
   
   (‘if it’s the sort of thing that arises, then it’s necessarily the sort of thing that fades away’)

2. And how do we recognise what phenomena are like? With the mind! So *dhamma* is what we experience via the sixth sense of mind:

   \[
   \text{manasā dhammañ viññāya}
   \]

   (‘cognising the nature-of-the-phenomenon with the mind’)

From there, the usage is extended:

3. first to cover the totality of what is cognised, as in:

   \[
   \text{diṭṭhe [va] dhamme}
   \]

   (‘in the phenomenal world’)

---

7D i. 110, 180; S iv. 47 & passim.
8S iv. 185 etc.
9S iv. 175, 205 etc.
ye dhammā hetuppabhavā tesañ hetuñ Tathāgato āha
(‘the Buddha has explained the causal basis of all causal phenomena’)

for, after all,

manopubbangamā dhammā
(‘for phenomena to emerge in experience, the mind has to get busy first’);

4. then to express what the mind cognises when operating at its peak:

samāhite citte dhammā pātubhavanti
(‘when you get your heart-and-mind together, insights-into-experience arise’)

5. and finally to describe the Buddha’s teaching:

sammādhammo
(‘the perfect quality of experience’ and
‘the perfect insight into experience, which yields such quality’ and
‘the perfect teaching, which crystallises such insight’)

So the dhamma semantic field looks like this:

Figure 1: dhamma semantic field

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10 Vin i. 4. The term ‘causal’ will do here, though there are overtones of ‘conditional’ and also indeed of ‘motivational’.
11 DhP 1.
12 S iv. 78.
13 S i. 129.
In the vinaya, dhamma also means a rule. This is a specialised, peripheral usage. After all, the säsana is often referred to as dhamma-vinaya, implying that dhamma is mainly seen as a category separate from the field of rule-making.

So, Buddhists used dhamma prescriptively as well as descriptively. But, they respected the distinction; and, descriptive usages predominate.\textsuperscript{14}

Overall, the dhamma discourse offers an experiential description of the human condition, in which generalisations are grounded in precise particulars. It starts with momentary, personal insights and goes on to abiding truths about the human condition (and also to the forms\textsuperscript{15} in which those truths come down to us).

The doctor’s medicine: dhamma as doctrine

The big picture described is the doctrine. The understanding embodied in the doctrine is the ultimate experience-pattern or mind-object.

It is the medicine that Doctor Buddha offers. You and I, patients, may choose to take it. Classically\textsuperscript{16} it is described\textsuperscript{17} thus:

1. Svākkhāto (“well formulated”)
   Gotama’s formulation is helpful: it helps people in their personal, moral and psycho-spiritual development.

2. Sandiṭṭhiko (“open to examination”)
   It is about physical and above all cognitive behaviours that people can explore and cultivate so as to benefit themselves and those around them. Anyone who puts their heart into this will find it makes sense and works.

3. Akāliko (“timeless, instantaneous”)
   The approach does not vary. It is ever-fresh in experience. As one unders-
tands and internalises it, it starts to work — experience improves, in the instant.

4. *Ehipassiko* ("come-and-see")
   It is freely available for all to learn about and to try out. It is universally relevant and true: there are no special dispensations.

5. *Opanayiko* ("gets-you-there")
   It leads to personal transformation. That is why people cultivate it — out of a personal motivation, not to fulfil a social obligation. It does not disappoint.

6. *Paccattam veditabbo viññūhi* ("what those who develop their consciousness will come to terms with in personal experience")

To apply it, you work on yourself. That work brings *dhamma* expertise.

**The psychological basis of dhamma: a contemporary description**

So, what unites *dhammas* in the sense of patterns or mind-objects with The *Dhamma* or Doctrine? Both usages refer to a process of personal understanding. The understanding in question, as Karunadasa suggests, was typically that of people for whom the practice of Buddhist meditation (sati, *samatha-vipassanā*, *bhāvanā*) was central.

*Dhamma* thinking starts with this process of psychological self-training. In the language of contemporary psychology, the assumption would be that:

- we can train our physical and above all cognitive behaviour to help us attend to our momentary experience closely and dispassionately; indeed,
- momentary experience is properly the primary object of people’s attention, thought and language-use; and
- its various qualities, mental or material, are to be understood on their own terms, that is:
  - it hardly matters what the experience is attributable to (‘out there’ or ‘inside’);

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what matters is that:
* heart-and-mind is always involved, and that
* problems arise when heart-and-mind gets carried away from the experience itself to thoughts and judgements about what it may be attributable to and why; so

it is helpful instead simply to focus on the experience-quality itself, in the moment.

The suggestion is: “Don’t get carried away, focus on the experience: don’t think things, think dhammas.” So, an appropriate translation for dhamma is often just ‘thing’

\[
\text{lokadhammā}^{19}
\]

(‘things of this world’)
\[
\text{manopubbangamā dhammā}^{20}
\]

(‘mind is the forerunner of all things’)

After the Buddha’s Time

Alas, the general public tends to be concerned with ‘things’ — with what is (real) and what not. And, alas, people’s default assumption is that reality is material, so that once dead it is as if we had never been; while the alternative assumption relates reality to ideal entities (God, fame, consciousness), so that we may in some sense live forever. So, how to suggest that there is no point in looking beyond experience, no need to assume (or deny) some independent, determinative reality?

We can say: reality isn’t the point — what matters is the quality of the experience-instant. We can say: “don’t think things or ideas, think dhammas.” We can say the dhamma approach is to steer by the middle (majjhima paṭipada).\(^{21}\) When in danger of falling for materialism (ucchedadā), head back towards idealism (sassatavāda); but not all the way; when you might be going too far, head back in the other direction; and so on.

We can say these things. Still, it is a hard sell.

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\(^{19}\)D iii. 260; Nd2 55
\(^{20}\)Dhp 1. This is the standard translation — see also the alternative rendering given on @@p. 5 above.
\(^{21}\)Dhammacakka pavattana sutta SN 56:11.
People like ideals. Consider the development of Buddhist religiosity: as the Buddha became an object of worship, his dhamma acquired a quasi-magical patina. Now, of course, the faculty of ‘putting the heart’ (saddhā) can counteract psychological blockages (avijjā). In that sense, devotion is good; not if it distracts people from working on themselves. So, saddhā must be channelled. Accordingly, we are told of the Buddha saying:

\[
\text{Yo ... Dhammam passati so mam passati}^{23}
\]

(“If you want to see me, look at the Dhamma!”)

And he was represented as constantly drawing attention back to the need for exploration and understanding of one’s own psychological processes:

\[
\text{Yo paṭiccasamuppādam passati, so Dhammam passati.}^{24}
\]

(“If you want to see the Dhamma, look into the way experience develops out of underlying conditions!”)

Thus, if people want ideals, it is necessary to give them ideals. Or at least to give something that can be understood as an ideal but will actually focus the mind in a helpful way.

Similarly if people want reality there is no point in telling them they are wrong, so, there is nothing for it, dhamma must be identified with ‘reality’. But only provisionally, only conditionally!

The trouble is, to make sense of dhamma thinking, a person has to work with it for a while. So, how to present it to those who have not yet had a chance to do that? A certain creative ambiguity is inevitable.

That strategy must have worked particularly well in the charismatic, subversive phase of early Buddhism, when the only aim was to help individuals achieve a positive, transformative experience. Later, there were institutional structures to maintain. In this setting, Dhamma teaching was inevitably routinised,^{25} so that

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^{22}Cf. the Kālāma-sutta.

^{23}The Vakkali Sutta is in the Samyutta Nikāya.

^{24}Majjhima-nikaya I, Nal. 241, PTS 191.

^{25}Weber suggests that the values — we might say dhammas — with which an organisation first develops are not sustainable in the next phase, when the organisation becomes established. An established institution cannot depend on the surge of spirit that characterises a start-up. The organisational processes must become routine. This will tend first to neutralise and then finally to destroy the original values. (Cf. Weber1978:1121-1157).
concepts and experiences were less tightly fused. Moreover, those concepts had to be defended against controversialists from competing traditions. So, gradually, from the pudgala-vāda through the Sarvāstivāda to the tathāgatarābha, the deconstruction of individual self-hood was gently de-emphasised and a sort of quasi-ontology re-emerged. Even the purist Theravadins came to suggest that dhammas (in first sense: experience-qualities) are known in a real and ultimate way (saccikattha ... paramattha).  

After all, the dhamma analysis was about understanding experience in a way not distorted by self-interest or emotion — a way that was detached, impartial, certain. And people do think of such understanding as ‘real’. So Buddhists could hardly avoid speaking of ‘reality’, as it were.

In the middle-Indo-Aryan cultural context, that tended to involve reference to svabhāva, ‘self-existence’. This term came to prominence in the Brahminical discourse, but the Abhidhammikas clearly felt they could not reject it entirely; so, they found a use for it. Dhammas, they said, are indeed qualities or characteristics — but a dhamma does not qualify or characterise any (other) entity. No, dhammas just have their own nature (saka-bhāva). They do not emerge from or return to any other-nature (para-bhāva).

attano sabhāvam dhārentī ti dhammā
(“dhammas are so called because they bear their own nature”)  

This sophisticated response sought to appropriate and redefine the opponents’ concept. But it was risky: the idea of a dhamma bearing its own nature was potentially misleading.

The danger was clearly recognised, for an alternative, subtler definition was then offered:

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26The monastic community came to recognise a split between two contrasting monkly career-paths (and value-systems). There were the proponents of book-learning, granthādhura, and those who undertook experiential enquiry, vipāsanādhura.

27Karunadasa, op. cit. p. 8.

28Interestingly, the Brahminical literature came in time to use svabhāva in a sense similar to the first meaning of dhamma (‘quality’, cf. Figure 1 on p. 40). An example of this usage would be prītisvabhāvātmā krāṇjaliḥ “with a heart full of joy, he folded his hands in prayer”. Bhagavata-purāṇa 3.21.12.

29Cf. e.g. MhNdA 261; DhsA 126; VsmS V 6. We are close to the Zen koan about the sound of one hand clapping. But the Zen masters had it easier: confronted with Confucianism, they could formally erect the goal of exploding conceptual thought. Indian Buddhists, by contrast, were concerned to defend rationality against the mystificatory tendencies they saw in Brahmanical quarters.
“A dhamma is defined as that which is borne by its own conditions.”

That is, a dhamma is what comes into experience when the conditions are right: an emergent system-characteristic, we may say. That does not seem too far from Nāgārjuna’s thinking, though he of course took a different line on svabhāva: in all of experience, (all dharmas), he saw śūnyatā, emptiness, i.e. the fact of being a mere reflection of causes and conditions — and this he identified specifically as the absence of svabhāva.

Asoka

That is the rarefied end of the dhamma spectrum. Asoka, by contrast, was concerned with the other end — common-or-garden dhamma, so to say.

Asoka was a Buddhist layman (upāsaka) who studied canonical texts. But he wanted to encourage everyone to behave well — or, raison d'état led his government to foster civic sentiments across the whole population — and some would doubtless not have taken kindly to too much detailed Buddhism. So, from the suttas aimed at lay-people he distilled down a lowest-common-denominator Dhamma-for-all that no one could object to.

At the same time, he extended this basic ‘social Dhamma’ to cover e.g. relations between sects and the correct internal and external behaviour of states. A universal emperor (cakkavattī), he clearly felt he was in a position — as the Buddha, a renunciate, was not — to spell out the implications of Buddhist social doctrine.

One implication was to elevate the ksatriya or governmental role. In the Brahmins’ view, kings had no freehold on divinity but instead depended on regular Brahmanical renewals of their lease: a king could hardly justify his position by an exclusive focus on promoting people’s moral or spiritual welfare. But that is just what Asoka sought to do. While foreswearing personal divinity and de-emphasising ritual, he claimed the role of spiritual preceptor to his people —

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30 Abhvk 414; DhsA 63; PsmA 18; Mvn 6.
31 http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/nagarjuna/
32 Minor RE 1
33 Bhabra inscription.
34 Thus RE IX echoes the Sigālovāda Sutta (Dīgha Nikāya §31).
35 He condemns useless maṅgala, although it has been suggested, e.g. by Olivelle (in Olivelle, Leoshko & Ray Op. cit., p. 175), that:
and accordingly took the promotion of popular welfare, physical as well as moral and spiritual, to unparalleled heights.\textsuperscript{36}

His approach seems almost anachronistic. The purpose of government, he suggested, was to serve the people, and in the process to protect and promote a sort of ‘civil religion’,\textsuperscript{37} something like what Rousseau\textsuperscript{38} later spoke of, with:

- a transcendental dimension, reward for virtue, punishment for vice;

and above all

- exclusion of religious intolerance.

That last point is unique. Other ancient empires permitted diverse beliefs, but did any stoop to encourage mutual tolerance between subject peoples (not helpful for ‘divide and rule’)? How modern Asoka seems!

Today, we understand the promotion of tolerance to be central to any government-supported consensus-of-values. Accordingly, we expect such a consensus to be very loosely defined. As Robert Bellah says:

God [is] a word almost all Americans can accept but that means so many different things to so many different people that it is almost an empty sign.\textsuperscript{39}

In Asoka’s case, dhamma takes the place of ‘God’. People of various views could read their own priorities into his Dhamma, which he presented as defining a broad core common to every religious current.\textsuperscript{40}

\textsuperscript{36}The statements that through his [Aśoka’s] preaching of Dharma gods have mingled with humans (MRE 1), and that he has shown celestial chariots and elephants, fires of hell, and the like to the people (RE 4), … show elements relating to religion and public religious displays.

\textsuperscript{37}Such a policy was of course foreshadowed in canonical Buddhist texts such as the Cakkavattisihanādasutta and the Kū.tadantasutta.

\textsuperscript{38}Robert Bellah popularised the use of Rousseau’s expression in recent times, applying it to contemporary America. See Bellah 1967, pp. 1-21. For the analogy with Asoka cf. Olivelle, Leoshko & Ray op. cit. p. 173.

\textsuperscript{39}Chapter 8, Book 4 of The Social Contract (1762)

\textsuperscript{40}It is in this context that we can understand why, though Asoka doubtless subscribed to notions of rebirth and karmic reward, he makes no mention of them. After all, the Buddhist psychological understanding of kamma contradicted other sects’ core belief systems, so if Asoka had expressed his views on this he could have got people’s backs up.
Accordingly, like ‘God,’ this Dhamma risked becoming a vacuous concept. Yes, by encompassing all affiliations, it could improve social relations — but, later, when imperial power waned, it could also be hi-jacked for other, different ends.

The term was already used in a loose sense to speak of what was proper to a particular group, e.g. the Buddha-dhamma. Asoka then associated it with being good in a general way. So, the inference could be drawn that a good person conformed to group standards. Stretching the point, Brahmanical opinion could define being good as filling the role appropriate to one’s birth.

Nothing could have been further from Asoka’s conception. He carefully avoids reference to varna or jāti and addresses all without distinction. He promotes an inclusive sense of citizenship.

He is intolerant only of exclusivism. This emerges from his opposition to certain ‘religious’ practices. RE 1 bans animal sacrifice using Brahmanical technical terms. Both it and RE 9 (condemning pointless rituals) were sited, physically, with a view to suppressing and replacing sacrificial ceremonies. Thus, while respectful of Brahmins, Asoka nonetheless outlawed some Brahmanical practices.

He proposed new behaviours instead. The first illustration he offers for the ‘Celebration of Dharma’ is looking after the waged and unwaged members of your household.

Ayāṁ tu mahāphale maṅgale ya dhammamamgaḷaṁ. Tat etta: dāsabhatakamhi samyapratipatti. Gurūṇam apaciti sādhu; pāṇesu sayamo sādhu; bamhaṇasamanāṇaṁ sādhu dānaṁ. (“This auspicious rite, however, produces great results, namely the Celebration of Dharma. That is this: proper regard toward slaves and servants. [Also], respect for elders is good; restraint with regard to living beings is good; giving to Brāhmaṇas and Śramaṇas is good.

Asoka’s dhamma is thus centrally concerned with mitigating inequalities. It is hardly surprising that he stood against extreme claims of Brahmanical privilege.

41 Cf. Olivelle (in Olivelle, Leoshko & Ray op. cit.) “Aśokan Dharma … is a universal Dharma applicable to all, regardless of social station, economic status, gender, or nationality”.
42 Vālabh and vprahu for ritual slaughter and the offering of slaughtered animals.
44 If this stance had outraged most of the population, Asoka would not have found it politic. Moreover, its subsequent shift to strict vegetarianism shows how Brahmanical orthodoxy adapted to the same climate of opinion that had Asoka tapped into and shaped. [At the time of Patañjali, meat-eating was normal, for Brahmins as well as for other Ārya groups. So for instance, commenting on Pāṇini 1.1.1 (I: 5), Patañjali repeats the old dictum to the effect that pañca pañcanakhā bhaksyā (“The five five-nailed animals can be eaten”).
45 RE 9: Girnār.
He was of course respectful of Brahmins. He just did not want socio-political Brahmanism to be normative: an entrenched hierarchy of purity was inconsistent with his development-oriented (and so presumably, to some degree, meritocratic) state. If some Brahmins wished to keep themselves to themselves, that was fine, but their ideas should not be imposed on others by the machinery of justice.

Indeed, Asoka makes no link between the spheres of law and of dhamma. He approaches behaviour via motivation (in line with the Buddhist view of kamma). Accordingly, he suggests that the goal of social progress depends on social harmony, which in turn reflects individuals’ psychological equilibrium. The universal values and principles he evokes are psychological. His approach is thus distinctively Buddhist.

The Dharmasūtras/-śāstras

The Dharmasūtras and -śāstras stand in a sharp contrast. Here, dharma is intimately connected with enforceable rules.

Recent work has suggested that this complex literature may reveal a developing set of Brahmanical responses to the emergence of heterodox currents,

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46 Olivelle says (Olivelle, Leoshko & Ray op. cit. p 172): “Another significant point in ... the definition of Asokan Dharma is its silence on social vices or crimes, such as theft, murder, adultery, and other sexual offenses. Clearly, these were of major concern to the state, as seen in all the legal literature of ancient India. Indeed, theft is often cited as the main reason for the very institution of kingship. It would have been an easy move for Asoka to include prohibitions against such vices within his Dharma, just as he did in the case of killing animals. It appears, however, that Asoka considered his Dharma to be something far more personal and 'religious.'”

47 People exhibit behaviour consistent with their understanding. That includes those who understand existence in terms of the Buddha-dhamma. So, the term Dhamma can be correlated with certain typical behaviour — and from a description of such behaviour it is obviously possible to derive a prescription. Still, rather than evoking behaviour as such, the Buddhist Dhamma tends instead to be associated with cognitive and motivational factors that underlie behaviour.

That is to say that people who truly understand their existence (i.e. in terms of dhammas, and of the Dhamma) develop their experiential processes (through bhāvanā) in such a way that their motivations (sankhārā) become less complex and twisted, more straightforward and positive. Their karma, we may say, improves; so, they behave well. That behaviour, then, is in no way coerced. It springs from their living awareness of dhammas, and of the Dhamma, so it is spontaneous.

This strategy of approaching behaviour via motivation is central to the Buddhist understanding of kammavipāka and hence of morality. So Asoka’s unwillingness to associate dhamma with law makes good Buddhist sense.

48 A good summary of the various scholars involved and of the arguments they have advanced is Olivelle’s piece on the early history of the Dharmaśāstra, in Olivelle (2006), pp. 169 ff.
specifically Buddhism, and above all to the Asokan reforms.\textsuperscript{49} It suggests there were two broad streams of Brahmanical opinion, ‘liberal’ and ‘conservative’ roughly:

1. One response was to accommodate and/or co-opt the śramaṇa tendency. Thus, the four āśramas were initially presented as alternate life-choices. A young Brahmin could opt for one of three permanent roles — as a scholar, a householder or a renunciate (e.g. a Buddhist monk).\textsuperscript{50}

2. The alternative response was to shore up support among conservative ārya local groups by validating and championing traditional patterns of social control: codifying behaviours that had previously not warranted literary attention:

   • first domestic rituals (Grhyasūtras) and then
   • conventions of village-level social interaction (Dharmasūtras/śāstras)

At first, the ‘liberals’ set the tone:

   • it was acknowledged that the new dharma-literature simply recorded established usage, so it could not command obedience by invoking the Veda;\textsuperscript{51}
   • the rules laid down were not too restrictive; and
   • women and śūdras\textsuperscript{52} both had a modicum of status.

But over time, the ‘conservatives’ strengthened:

   • the renunciate way of life became just an optional add-on to the standard kulika-grhastra career; and
   • the ‘lower orders’ were put firmly in their place: rules became tougher and were imposed more fiercely.

In short, the Buddhist impulse would seem initially to have stimulated some movement away from strict hierarchical norms. But then the trend was reversed, presumably once there was a realistic prospect of establishing or re-establishing Brahmanical hegemony.

\textsuperscript{49}Olivelle, Leoshko & Ray op. cit., p. 3: “[R]ecent scholarship … has viewed much of post-Asokan Indian literature, especially the epics and the legal texts, as responses to Asokan reforms.”

\textsuperscript{50}Olivelle, op. cit., p. 179.

\textsuperscript{51}Olivelle, op. cit., pp. 171–2.

\textsuperscript{52}ĀpDh 2.29.11. 15
The Epics and After

How did that prospect emerge? How did Brahmanical thinking adapt to the Buddhist efflorescence and seek to stem the tide? How, indeed, did Hinduism in something like the modern sense start to emerge?

Wezler\(^{53}\) suggests that religiosity based on dharma rather than the élitist sacrifice led to a “democratization regarding the access to salvation.” That is: the Brahminical system had previously concerned itself only with the requirements of the ārya; now, it had to make provision for others.

Only, how to do so while maintaining formally consistency with existing positions? The solution was ‘separate development.’

The first stage was to highlight the division of society into distinct, kin-based groupings. Then one could posit a separate if compatible path for each group.

The Rāmāyana and Mahābhārata present this new idea of dharma. In a society based on cities, and an economy with a complex division of labour, it is held to be vital that different communities be clearly and permanently identified and distinguished. To this end, a model is presented. It is based on the two small groups at the ‘top’, Brahmins and ksatriyas. The behaviour conventionally expected of these groups is understood to be fixed and codified, and observance of such group-specific codes is held to be the overriding, sacred duty of all concerned. The same pattern is then extended to other quasi-ethnic groupings.

Individual conduct is thus derived from an absolute and eternal social framework. This is then reinforced by deriving the social from the cosmic: to legitimize the sacralisation of these Brahmanical social norms, the epics link dharma to a hypo-postatised cosmic order. And to consolidate support among the populace, they evoke a new spirit of devotionalism (bhakti).\(^{54}\)

The substance and the appeal of this literature lies in its casuistic elaboration of this new dharma. The approach differs in detail: straightforward Rāma favours a rigid formalism, subtle Kṛṣṇa sells a somewhat devious flexibility.\(^{55}\) Still, in both cases the dramatic complexity draws the audience in to the dharma discourse, while the grandeur of the tale, reinforced by bhakti, elevates the notion of a cosmic ordering principle.

Some Buddhists felt obliged to respond in kind. The Trikāya doctrine hypo-postatises a transcendent principle under the rubric dharmakāya, (also known a

\(^{53}\)Wezler 2004, 643.

\(^{54}\)Biardeau 1981, 78, n. 1 and Biardeau 1997, 81.

svabhāvikakāya). Still, that universal principle is hardly to be confused with any Brahmanical counterpart: it corresponds primarily to a dimension of experience, one whose description we can trace back to the Pali canon.\(^5^6\)

The Dynamic of Developing Usage

So we can see that Brahmanical opinion responded to Buddhist thinking and practice, and Buddhist ideas evolved in response to Brahmanical developments. This was a dialectical relationship.

Naturally enough, the overall pattern of dharma/dhamma usage differed sharply between Brahminical and Buddhist circles:

- The type of discourse it supported was different:
  - In the Brahmanical context, the term was primarily prescriptive.
  - In Buddhist literature, by contrast, it was mainly used descriptively.

Correspondingly:

- The Brahmanical usage tended to conflate the descriptive with the prescriptive, fact with value.
- The Buddhists, by contrast, were generally careful to differentiate descriptive from prescriptive, fact from value.

- That is perhaps understandable when we consider the goal of the discourse:
  - The Brahmanical usage aimed to inhibit undesirable social behaviour.
  - The Buddhist usage served to stimulate desirable cognitive behaviour.

So, Brahmanical authors propound absolute injunctions on how to behave yourself. Their Buddhist counterparts offer conditional advice on how to develop yourself. Asoka highlights the difference:\(^5^7\)

people’s progress in dhamma is in two ways, by dhamma rules and by conviction. [But] rules count for little; most is by conviction.

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\(^5^6\) Cf. the Pabhassara Sutta. It is interesting in this connection to note the Zen Koan “What is the Dharma-Body of the Buddha?” “Next step, next step!” In other words, despite the apparent hypostatisation, the original remained.

\(^5^7\) In his last and longest inscription, PE VII.
• Inevitably, therefore, the specific content of the term dharma/dhamma differed widely between the two traditions, too:
  
  – The Buddhist usage is grounded in personal experience. The basic frame of reference is psychological. Reference to external reality, whether social, abstract-theoretical or cosmic, is secondary and carefully qualified.
  
  – The Brahminical usage is oriented out towards society and the cosmos. The whole idea is to align personal behaviour with social imperatives and thereby with some supernal reality.

**Conclusion**

This paper offers no more than a quick glance at the history. Still, it may be enough to throw some light on Hindu-Buddhist relations.

Buddhism and Brahmanism developed in reaction to one another. Of course there was common ground: for instance, Buddhists recognised Brahmanical gods (although they had quite different ideas of what a god was). And of course adepts of both traditions may in some cases have attained a similar ‘non-dual’ quality of experience. Still, each tradition sought at every stage to co-opt and/or confute the other. The idea that they could be seen as ‘essentially identical’ seems quite odd, (particularly given the Buddhist take on essential identities).

Yet that idea has gained such a hold! There almost seems to be a wish that Buddhism should not really be a separate phenomenon: if it is not a part of contemporary Hinduism, then at least it cannot be understood without reference to Hinduism. This notion of ‘Hindu Bauddh’ is influential. That has implications within India, and implications for India’s external relations.

On the internal Indian context, I hesitate. Still, many across the world, who love India, look forward to the time when Dr Ambedkar’s concerns will be fully addressed, and weep at the suggestion that — in view of reservation and other policies, and of changing mores — such problems as may previously have been associated with caste and untouchability no longer arise, or no longer matter.

On Indian relations with non-Indian Buddhists, I speak with conviction. Suppose that you, an Indian Hindu, attend a conference on Hinduism, where a Lithuanian scholar suggests that Hinduism must be understood in terms of the Indo-European heritage — implies indeed that your understanding of Hinduism is
limited. How do you react? So, how do you imagine that delegates to an international Buddhist conference react when an Indian colleague makes a presentation coloured by the assumptions of the ‘Hindu Baudh’? Everyone is very polite, naturally, but....

The great Indic heritage has had more than one incarnation. The idea that this great culture might be strait-jacketed into some monolithic identity seems wholly out of keeping with the exuberant, individualistic, creative, contrary, free-flowing India that we all know and love.

Moreover, Buddhism long ago outgrew its Indian origins. It is not merely disrespectful of other Buddhists but also demonstrably inaccurate to suggest that:

- what is true of most Indian traditions must necessarily be true of Buddhism in all its forms; and that

- everything that has happened as the Buddhist tradition has developed across Asia and more widely must be reducible to some Indian original.

Above all, the prevalence of ‘Hindu Baudh’ thinking incapacitates India’s cultural diplomacy. The Buddhist heritage should facilitate collaboration between Indians and other Asians. Yet while the Chinese, to their credit, are playing the ‘Buddhist card’ with some success, India alas really is not. We all badly need that to change.

It can easily be done. All it will take is a frank recognition and acceptance of the difference between Buddhist and Hindu traditions.\(^{58}\) That is the first step towards exploring what we may have in common.

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\(^{58}\)This was recognised in the Bhopal conference on dharma/dhamma held in September 2012, for which this paper was prepared. While some contributors, following the line of preliminary materials issued by the conference organisers, spoke of Buddhism’s ‘essential identity’ with Hinduism, Dr Arun Shourie was very clear about the implausibility of any such identity.
Bibliography


Practices Related to the Lotus Sūtra in Yanshou’s Zixing lu

Yi-hsun Huang

This article aims to understand the practices related to the Lotus Sūtra in Yongming Yanshou’s 永明延壽 (904–975) life and in one of his works, the Zhijue chanshi zixing lu 智覺禪師自行錄 (Records of Yanshou’s self-cultivation). In this text, 108 daily events are listed as Yanshou’s self-cultivation. Of those related to the Lotus Sūtra, I have identified three categories: 1. the construction of Lotus halls (fahua tang 法華堂); 2. the veneration, printing and distribution of the Lotus Sūtra; 3. cultivation of the Lotus Samādhi.

As this article shows, although Yanshou is well-known as a synthetic practitioner, embracing the doctrines of different schools and engaging in various practices, he always tried hard to integrate them under the ultimate goal of attaining enlightenment.

Since the Lotus Sūtra was translated into Chinese by Dharmarakṣa in 286 AD in Changan, the teachings of the sūtra have made it one of the most important sūtras in China. The Tiantai tradition is characterized by the practice of meditation and its exegetical method in accordance with the teachings of the Lotus Sūtra. The Lotus Sūtra also inspired many special Buddhist practices in the Tang dynasty (618–907). To continue working on this topic after the Tang, this article aims to understand the practices related to the Lotus Sūtra in the life of Yongming Yanshou 永明延壽 (904–975) from the Five Dynasties (907–960) and one of his works, the Zhijue chanshi zixing lu 智覺禪師自行錄 (“Records of Yanshou’s Self-cultivations”; referred to hereafter as the Zixing lu).

In the history of Chinese Buddhism, Yanshou is known as a synthetic practitioner. To understand this characteristic, we have to look at the historical context of Yanshou’s life from two aspects. First, Yanshou was born sixty years after the Huichang 会昌 Buddhist persecution (845) and experienced the last large-scale imperial Buddhist persecution, which was initiated by Emperor Shi 世 of the Later Zhou 周 in 955. During the Huichang Buddhist persecution, Chinese Buddhism suffered from the destruction of Buddhist temples, the defrocking of thousands of monks and nuns, and the destruction of Buddhist texts. Yanshou’s compilation of the one-hundred-fascicle Zongjing lu 宗鏡錄 ("Records of the Tenet-mirror", T 48, no. 2016) can be seen as a response to the need for a comprehensive doctrinal superstructure covering the range of Indian and Chinese Buddhist thought after the Huichang Buddhist persecution.2

The Song historian monk Huihong 惠洪 (1071–1128) describes Yanshou’s broad-minded approach in his Zongjingtang ji 宗鏡堂記 ("Records of Zongjing Hall"). He recounts a visit to Jingci Si 淨慈寺, a Buddhist temple where Yanshou resided for fifteen years (961–976).3 Huihong was told by an old monk that there were two pavilions at the temple and they were the places where the Zongjing lu was compiled. The old monk explained that at that time Yanshou often lamented that scholarly monks specializing in Huayan 華嚴, Faxiang 法相, and Tiantai 天台 tended to argue with each other. Like fire and ice, they could not coexist, and this situation was not constructive. Yanshou thus instructed his disciples each broadly to study the doctrines of a different school and to debate with each other. Finally, Yanshou reconciled their arguments with the theory of mind-only as a means of harmonizing their differences.4 This is the first factor contributing to Yanshou’s synthetic character.

Second, if we look at the Buddhist environment of the Wuyue 吳越 Kingdom, where Yanshou was born, we can also understand another aspect of Yanshou’s synthetic approach. Although all of the Wuyue kings believed in Buddhism, the nature of each king’s relationship with Buddhism varied. In the early period of the kingdom, King Qian Liu’s 錢鏐 (r. 893–932) construction of Buddhist monasteries and support for Buddhist monks helped him acquire renown as a virtuous king. He believed that Buddhist rituals and the practice of dhāraṇī chanting for

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2See Jan Yün-hua, Yanshou foxue sixiang de xingcheng 延壽佛學思想的形成, pp. 242–43.
3Jingci si was called Yongming Si 永明寺 during Yanshou’s abbacy.
4Jingci sizhi, p. 224 and Jan Yunhua, Yanshou foxue sixiang de xingcheng, pp. 220–21.
protection helped him consolidate his authority over the state. Buddhism also provided a means to assuage his guilt over slaughter in battles.\(^5\)

During the middle period of peace and prosperity, Buddhism offered a path for rulers such as Qian Yuanguan 錢元瓘 (r. 932–942) to express their wishes for fortune, happiness and even liberation in the present and future. As the Wuyue kingdom came to a close, Qian Hongchu 錢弘俶 (r. 947–978) expressed his wishes to protect the kingdom by erecting \(\text{dhārāni}-\text{sūtra}\) stone pillars and helped bring the Tiantai master Zhiyi’s 智顗 (538–597) works back from Korea. Thus Buddhism served both political and religious functions for each of the Wuyue kings.\(^6\)

However, at the same time, the Wuyue kings also supported Daoist priests and often used Daoism as a means of supernatural power. They were concerned more with the efficacy of the ritual than with religious affiliation. When ritual reaped good results for the kings and the state, they rewarded the practitioners. They bestowed purple robes on Buddhist monks, honorific titles on Daoist priests, and new temples on local deities. To summarize their attitude towards various religions, it was pragmatic. This is the religious atmosphere Yanshou lived in. This, I believe, is the second factor that contributed to Yanshou’s synthetic character. This synthetic approach is also seen in Yanshou’s practices related to the \(\text{Lotus Sūtra}\).

I have chosen the \(\text{Zixing lu}\) as the main source in order to understand the role of the \(\text{Lotus Sūtra}\) from a more practical aspect. This article first tries to see the role of the \(\text{Lotus Sūtra}\) in Yanshou’s life, then gives a brief introduction to the \(\text{Zixing lu}\), and finally analyzes the practices related to the \(\text{Lotus Sūtra}\) in the \(\text{Zixing lu}\) to show the soteriological meaning of the \(\text{Lotus Sūtra}\) in Yanshou’s practice.

**The Role of the \(\text{Lotus Sūtra}\) in Yanshou’s Life**

There are 27 records containing Yanshou’s biography, starting from the \(\text{Song gaoseng zhuan}\) 宋高僧傳 (“Biographies of Eminent Monks of the Song”), compiled in 988, to the \(\text{Jingtu shengxian lu}\) 淨土聖賢錄 (“Record of the Pure Land of Masters and


Laymen”), compiled around 1790 in the Qing dynasty. These sources are varied in compilation dates and sectarian affiliation. Some of them portray Yanshou as a Chan master, while others depict him as a Pure Land master. However, a description that commonly appears in different sectarian sources is his interest in the Lotus Sutra, as shown in the following two passages from the Jingde chuan-deng lu 景德傳燈錄 (a Chan source) and the Longshu zengguang jingtuwen 龍舒增廣淨土文 (a Pure Land source).

持法華經，七行俱下，才六旬悉能誦之，感群羊跪聽。
(In his youth, ...) he chanted the Lotus Sutra, [reading] seven lines at a glance, and was able to recite it entirely from memory in only sixty days. (As he did so,) he inspired a flock of sheep to kneel down and listen.

少誦法華經。 When he was young, he recited the Lotus Sutra.

Based on his biographies, we may conclude that the Lotus Sutra played an important role in Yanshou’s early training, and his skill in reciting the Lotus Sutra was said to evoke a miraculous response. Yanshou’s special connection with the Lotus Sutra may also be seen in his works. In the complete list of Yanshou’s works recorded in the Zixing lu, two works are directly related to the Lotus Sutra: Fahua lizanwen 法華禮讚文 ("Praise for the Lotus Sutra") and Fahua lingrui fu 法華靈瑞賦 ("Verse on Miraculous Power of the Lotus Sutra"). Although neither work is extant, it is not difficult to see Yanshou’s veneration of the Lotus Sutra by just looking at the titles of these two works. Furthermore, the Lotus Sutra is frequently cited in two of Yanshou’s fa-

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10 Zixing lu, X63, p. 165a12 and p. 165b3.
mous works, the Zongjing lu 萬善同歸集 and Wanshan tonggui ji ("Meaning of Myriad Good Deeds", T 48, no. 2017).\(^{11}\)

**Introduction to the Zixing lu 自行錄**

The Zixing lu is a work written by Yanshou’s disciple, Chuanfa Xingming 傳法行明 (932–1001).\(^{12}\) Xingming mentioned his own name in the preface of the work and explained that he compiled the work based on Yanshou’s discourses and Xingming’s inquiries of Yanshou.\(^{13}\) There are 108 daily events described as Yanshou’s self-cultivation in the Zixing lu. Xingming first lists the events according to the six periods of a day (zhousyelishi 畫夜六時). He starts with Yanshou’s routines, going from morning, noon, evening, early night, midnight up to late night, and finally activities done in his spare time. After item 55, the remaining events are listed randomly. The reason for this might be that after listing the basic routines, Xingming observed something else, or Yanshou told him to add things he had missed. The purpose of compiling this work, according to Xingming, is both self-cultivation and the benefit of others (zili lita 自利利他).\(^{14}\)

The 108 daily activities include some basic Buddhist practices such as taking refuge in the Buddha, Buddhas, and the Three Jewels, worshipping the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, making confession and offerings, burning incense, circumambulating the Buddhas and Bodhisattvas, meditating, preaching, compiling, and publishing Buddhist texts, and reading Mahayana sutras. The Mahayana sutras read are the Lotus Sutra, Huayan Sutra, Heart Sutra, Nirvana Sutra, and Prajñāpāramitā Sutra. Based on the 108 daily events, we can tell that Yanshou was a very religious monk who was full of compassion and tried to benefit all sentient beings by every means.

**Practices Related to the Lotus Sutra in the Zixing lu**

Among the Mahayana sutras Yanshou chanted in the Zixing lu, the Lotus Sutra appears frequently in his daily activities. I categorize the events related to the

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\(^{11}\) The Lotus Sutra is mentioned at least 124 times in the Zongjing lu and 28 times in the Wanshan tonggui ji.

\(^{12}\) Wang Cuiling discovered in the preface of the Zixing lu that Yanshou’s disciple, Chuanfa Xingming, described himself as the author of the text; see her Sugyoroku no kiso deki kenkyu, p. 49.

\(^{13}\) Zixing lu, X63, p. 159a16–17.

\(^{14}\) Zixing lu, X63, p. 159a15.
Lotus Sūtra into three activities: 1. the construction of Lotus halls (fahua tang 法華堂); 2. veneration, printing and distribution of the Lotus Sūtra; 3. cultivation of the Lotus Samādhi.

I. Construction of Lotus Halls

The very first event recorded in the Zixing lu is that Yanshou established Lotus halls in many places throughout his life, but Xingming did not provide detailed information about what Yanshou did in the Lotus hall. If we trace back the origin of the Lotus hall and its function, the earliest text in which the term “Lotus hall” appears is the Bianzheng lun 辨正論. The Bianzheng lun is an apologetic text written by the monk Falin 法琳 (572–640), defending Buddhism from Daoist and Confucian criticisms in the early Tang.

To show the strong support the court gave to Buddhism, Falin argues that many emperors and officials from the Northern and Southern Dynasty to the Tang were pious Buddhists. Among them, Falin names an official called Zhengqiong 鄭瑋 in the Wei Dynasty (386–534), who established a Buddhist temple called Jingyushi 淨域寺, constructed a Lotus hall, often held vegetarian feasts and painted the images of Buddha. However, since the information is too brief, we are not able to know the specific function of the Lotus hall.

Fortunately, in Daoxuan’s Xugaozhuan 續高僧傳 (“Further Biographies of Eminent Monks”), the biography of the monk Faxiang 法嚮 (?–630) provides a more detailed description. Faxiang is said to observe precepts purely, chant the Lotus Sūtra, and understand it thoroughly. He established a Lotus hall next to Qixia Si 栖霞寺 and practiced Zhizhe’s 智者 (538–597) Lotus Repentance (Fahua chan 法華懺) in that hall. Faxiang devoted twenty-one days to the Lotus Repentance and is said to have received a great auspicious response (ruiying 瑞應). Some years later, in a different text, the Hongzan fahua zhuan 弘贊法華傳 (“Biographies of Lotus Sūtra Devotees”) compiled by Huixiang 惠詳 (d.u.), a different monk named Facheng 法誠 (563–640) was said to have devoted himself to chanting the Lotus Sūtra and established a Lotus hall.

Based on Faxiang’s biography, the function of Lotus hall is for devotees to chant the Lotus Sūtra and practice the Lotus Repentance in it. These two activities

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13 Zixing lu, X63, p. 159a20.
14 Bianzheng lun, T52, p. 515c6–8.
15 Xu gaoseng zhuan, T50, p. 605c13–21.
were also recorded in the Zixing lu. We therefore could see a continuation of constructing Lotus halls in a few monks’ lives from the Wei dynasty, through the Tang, to Yanshou’s time in the Five Dynasties.

II. Veneration, Printing and Distribution of the Lotus Sūtra

In China, the efforts of Lotus devotees centering on the Lotus Sūtra are commonly summarized as the five practices of upholding, reading, reciting, explaining, and copying the Lotus Sūtra.\(^\text{19}\) In the 55th event of the Zixing lu, Yanshou is said to worship (li 禮) “the true, pure and profound Dharma (zhenjing miaofa 真淨妙法)” of the Lotus Sūtra every morning.\(^\text{20}\) It is also said in the 84th event that, for the benefit of all sentient beings in the world Yanshou especially prepared incense and flowers as offerings to the Lotus Sūtra at the six periods of day and night.\(^\text{21}\) Furthermore, in the 99th event, Yanshou often printed and distributed (yinshi 印施) various sūtras and mantras including the Lotus Sūtra.\(^\text{22}\)

As for the purpose of worshipping the Lotus Sūtra, three vows can be summarized from the Zixing lu: Yanshou wished that all sentient beings might realize the ultimate meaning of One Vehicle (wu jiujing yisheng 悟究竟一乘), achieve Lotus Samādhi (zheng fahua sanmei 證法華三昧), and attain rebirth in Amitābha’s Pure Land (sheng mituo jingfang 生彌陀淨方).\(^\text{23}\) The latter two vows will be discussed in the next section.

The concept of One Vehicle is the essential tenet in the Lotus Sūtra: the Buddha tells the assembly that his earlier teachings were provisional.

\[
\text{十方佛土中, 唯有一乘法, 無二亦無三, 除佛方便說。}
\text{但以假名字, 引導於眾生, 說佛智慧故, 諸佛出於世。}
\text{唯此一事實, 餘二則非真。終不以小乘, 濟度於眾生。} \quad \text{(24)}
\]

In the Buddha lands of the ten directions

There is only the Dharma of the One Vehicle,

there are not two, there are not three,

except when the Buddha preaches so as an expedient means,


\[^{20}\text{Zixing lu, X63, p. 160b13.}\]

\[^{21}\text{Zixing lu, X63, p. 163c18.}\]

\[^{22}\text{Zixing lu, X63, p. 164b18–19.}\]

\[^{23}\text{Zixing lu, X63, p. 160b13–14, 163c18–19, and 164b18–19.}\]

\[^{24}\text{Lotus Sūtra, T9, p. 8a17–21.}\]
merely employing provisional names and terms in order to conduct and guide sentient beings and preach to them the Buddha wisdom. The Buddhas appear in the world solely for this one reason, which is true; the other two are not the truth. Never do they use a lesser vehicle to save sentient beings and ferry them across.\(^{25}\)

Since people were not ready for the Buddha’s highest teaching, they had to be brought to enlightenment by expedient means. The *Lotus Sūtra* represents the final, highest teaching, and supersedes all other teachings.

Furthermore, the *Lotus Sūtra* also emphasizes that the three vehicles are actually the One Vehicle, the Buddha vehicle, through which all sentient beings become buddhas. Carl Bielefeldt concludes that it is Śākyamuni’s promise that “all Buddhists, whether or not they now recognize it, are destined for supreme, perfect enlightenment. In the darkness of the latter age, when doubts are many and hopes seem dim, this promise will be a beacon to all believers, guiding them surely to the other shore.”\(^{26}\) "Thus, when Yanshou wishes that all sentient beings may realize the ultimate meaning of One Vehicle, he is dedicating the merit from his veneration of the *Lotus Sūtra* to all sentient beings and wishes them to achieve Buddhahood.\(^{27}\) This special meaning of the *Lotus Sūtra* must give people hope in the dark time of Buddhist persecutions.

### III. Cultivation of the Lotus Samādhi

Yanshou’s other two vows related to his worship of the *Lotus Sūtra*—that all sentient beings might achieve Lotus Samādhi and attain rebirth in Amitābha’s Pure Land—appear in the 55th and 78th events in the *Zixing lu*. The 55th event reads:

\[\text{晨朝，禮妙法蓮華經真淨妙法，普願一切法界眾生，同證法華三昧，成生彌陀淨方。}\]

\[\text{In the morning, [Yanshou] worships the truly pure and profound}\]

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\(^{25}\) My translation is based on Burton Watson’s *The Lotus Sūtra*, p. 35, with slight modification.


\(^{27}\) *Zixing lu*, X63, p. 163c3.

\(^{28}\) *Zixing lu*, X63, p. 160b13–14.
Dharma of the *Lotus Sūtra* and hopes that sentient beings can achieve the Lotus Samādhi and attain rebirth in Amitābha’s Pure Land all together.

Since the *Lotus Sūtra* is not usually considered to be a major Pure Land scripture by Pure Land practitioners or Buddhist scholars, Yanshou’s incorporation of the Lotus Samādhi and Pure Land practice is worth noting.

However, Yanshou is not the only exception in the Wuyue Kingdom. Daniel Getz also remarks that devotion to the *Lotus Sūtra* was often closely associated with Pure Land practice in China, especially self-immolation for achieving rebirth in the Pure Land.²⁹ Devotees of the *Lotus Sūtra* should be quite familiar with Pure Land belief because Buddha Amitābha and rebirth in his Pure Land are mentioned in the *Lotus Sūtra*. In the “*Huachengyu pin* 化城喻品” (“Chapter of the Parable of the Phantom City”), the Buddha introduced his disciples to an ancient Buddha named Great Universal Wisdom Excellent Thus Come One (*datong zhisheng yulai* 大通智勝如來). Before this Buddha left the householder’s life, he had 16 sons. After hearing that their father had achieved perfect enlightenment, these 16 princes went to visit him and also left the householder’s life. Finally, all of them achieved perfect enlightenment and became Buddhas. One of them is Buddha Amitābha in the west.³⁰

Moreover, the *Yaowang pusa benshi ping* 藥王菩薩本事品 (“Chapter of the Former Affairs of the Bodhisattva Medicine King”) emphasizes that in the five hundred years after the Buddha passed away, if a woman hears the *sūtra* and practices as the *sūtra* teaches, when her life comes to an end she will immediately go to the Pure Land.³¹ These two passages show the canonical connection between the *Lotus Sūtra* and Pure Land belief.

This could explain why the practice of chanting the *Lotus Sūtra* for gaining rebirth in the Pure Land often appears in the monks’ biographies of Wuyue. For example, the monk Shaoyan 紹嚴 (898–971) vowed to chant the *Lotus Sūtra* ten thousand times and wished for rebirth in the Pure Land. He even planned to offer himself to the Three Sages of the West by immolating his body, but the Wuyue king Qian Hongchu prohibited him from doing that.³²

²⁹See his Siming Zhili and Tiantai Pure Land in the Song Dynasty, p. 178.
³²Shiguo chunqiu 十國春秋, v. 89, p. 1293. Some other monks took more rapid ways in order to gain access to the Pure Land. Monk Zhitong 志通 decided to devote himself to Pure Land practices.
With Yanshou’s explanation in the Zixing lu, we will be able to understand the incorporation of the Lotus Samādhi and Pure Land practice with a more systematic understanding. First, let us trace back the origin of the Lotus Samādhi, which is one of the important samādhis in the Tiantai school. According to the Xu gaoseng zhuán, Zhiyi journeyed to Mount Dasu 大蘇山 in 560 and met his master Huisi 慧思 (515–577). Huisi instructed him in devotions centered around the figure of the Bodhisattva Samantabhadra (Puxian 普賢) and in the Ease and Bliss (Anle 安樂) practices.33

Zhiyi later compiled the Fahua sanmei chanyi 法華三昧懺儀 (“Manual of Lotus Samādhi Repentance”; T46, no. 1941). The Lotus Samādhi Repentance is a twenty-one-day practice based mainly upon the twenty-eighth chapter of the Lotus Sūtra, Puxian pusa quanfa pin 普賢菩薩勸發品 (“The Chapter on the Exhortations of the Bodhisattva Samantabhadra”), and on a short scripture known as the Guan puxian pusa xingfa jing 觀普賢菩薩行法經 (“The Sūtra on the Practice of Visualizing the Bodhisattva Samantabhadra”).34 There are ten items with regard to what should be done physically in the Lotus Samādhi Repentance:35

1. Adorn and purify the meditation chamber (yanjing daochang 嚴淨道場)
2. Purify the body (jingshen 淨身)
3. Make an offering of your physical, verbal, and mental deeds (sanye gongyang 三業供養)
4. Petition the Buddhas (fengqing sanbao 奉請三寶)
5. Pay homage to the Buddhas (zantan sanbao 讚歎三寶)
6. Worship the Buddhas (lifo 礼佛)
7. Repentance (chanhui 懺悔)

after reading the Xifang jingtu lingrui zhuán 西方浄土靈瑞傳 (Records of Auspicious Response of the West Pure Land). He jumped from a high rock two times, but he was only slightly injured. Finally, he died in Mt. Fahua with auspicious signs; see Song gaoseng zhuán, T50, p. 858c12–859a19. For further readings on this topic, see James A. Benn’s “The Lotus Sūtra and Self-immolation” in Readings of the Lotus Sūtra, pp. 107–31.

33Xu gaoseng zhuán, T50, p. 564b17–18.
8. Circumambulate [the Buddha image] (xingdao xuanrao 行道旋遶)
9. Recite the Lotus Sūtra (song fahuajing 詳法華經)
10. Bring to mind the true aspects of reality (siwei yi shijingje 思惟⼀實境界)

According to Zhiyi’s Fahua sanmei chanyi, these ten procedures (shifa 事法) are basic steps for beginners (xinxue pusa 新學菩薩) with varying faculties. Because they are not able to enter deep samādhi yet, these ten procedures are applied to tame their minds and eradicate their obstacles and bad karma. By doing so, they will be able to purify their body and mind, and then rejoice in the Dharma.36

However, Zhiyi also stresses that experienced practitioners who wish to be constantly immersed in profound absorption could directly practice the Anle xing 安樂行 (“Course of Ease and Bliss”).37 The Course of Ease and Bliss refers to the practice explained in the Fahua jing anle xing yi 法華經安樂行義 (“Meaning of the Course of Ease and Bliss in the Lotus Sūtra”) compiled by Huisi, based on the fourteenth chapter of Kumārajīva’s translation of the Lotus Sūtra.38 Experienced practitioners can directly contemplate the true character of all dharmas as empty, do not make mistakes internally or externally, and have unceasing great compassion toward all sentient beings.39

Regarding the difference between the Lotus Samādhi repentance and the Course of Ease and Bliss, as Daniel Stevenson says, the distinction between them seems to become less absolute in Zhiyi’s works.40 Yanshou, by citing Huisi, explains in his Zongjing lu that if the practitioner performs the Course of Ease and Bliss with repentance of the six senses, this is called the Course of Ease and Bliss with form (Youxiang anle xing 有相安樂行). If the practitioner utilizes the means of directly contemplating the emptiness of all dharmas, this is called the Course of Ease and Bliss without form (wuxiang anle xing 無相安樂行). However, with form or without form, Yanshou emphasizes that the purpose of the cultivations is to understand that the subject who is doing repentance and the object of repentance are both empty (nenghui suochan jukong 能悔所懺俱空).41 The core of the cultivations is to help the practitioner understand the meaning of emptiness.

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36Fahua sanmeichan yi, T.46, p. 954b29–955b27.
38Daniel Stevenson, The Meaning of the Lotus Sūtra’s Course of Ease and Bliss, p. 77.
41Zongjing lu, T.48, p. 966a8–18.
Then, how do we connect the cultivation of the Lotus Samādhi with rebirth in the Pure Land? The explanation can be found in the 78th event in the Zixing lu:

In each of the six periods of day and night, [Yanshou] makes a vow along with all sentient beings in the world that they may realize the Lotus Samādhi and attain the sudden and perfect enlightenment of the One Vehicle. [He hopes that] at the time of death they are not agitated, their evil karma is extinguished, and having right mindfulness of the present moment, their vow to attain rebirth in the western Pure Land is realized and they entrust their lives to Buddha Amitābha. [In the Pure Land], they achieve great insight of forbearance, penetrate the Dharma realm, and for all time in the future, protect the Dharma storehouse, expound the teaching of One Vehicle, and accomplish enlightenment. Their cultivation of the practices of Samantabhadra would expand to become as immense as the Dharma realm and as penetrating as space. They would vow to attain Buddhahood together with all sentient beings.

Yanshou believes that through practicing the Lotus Samādhi, people can have right mindfulness (zhengnian 正念), and have all of their evil karma eliminated before the moment of death, so that they may achieve rebirth in the Pure Land as they wish.

The reason why people can have right mindfulness through practicing the Lotus Samādhi is that this practice has the effect of eliminating evil karma. In the Manual of Lotus Samādhi Repentance, the seventh step of the Repentance consists of five parts: 1. Repenting of the offenses committed through the six senses (chanhui liugen 懺悔六根); 2. Petitioning the Buddhas to expound the Dharma (quanqin 勸請); 3. Rejoicing in the presence of virtue (suixi 隨喜); 4. Transferring one’s merits (huixiang 迴向); 5. Arousing the vow to save all beings (fayuan

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42 Zixing lu, X63, p. 163b21–c3.
The section on repenting of the offenses committed through the six senses deals in detail with repenting of offenses committed through the eyes, ears, nose, tongue, body, and consciousness.

Then, when the practitioner proceeds to the section entitled “Sincerely arouse the bodhisattva vows,” the practitioner needs to chant the following vow:

至心發願，願命終時神不亂，正念直往生安養，面奉彌陀值眾聖，修行十地勝常樂。

I earnestly vow that at the time of death I will not be agitated, but will maintain right mindfulness and thereupon be reborn in the peaceful comfort [of the Pure Land], where I can honor Amitābha directly and meet the holy ones. There I will master the ten bodhisattva stages and gain eternal bliss.

As we can see in the above passage, since having right mindfulness and elimination of evil karma are two important conditions for the vow of attaining rebirth in the Pure Land, the Lotus Samādhi is chosen by Yanshou to assist Pure Land practitioners to accomplish their vow.

Yanshou's incorporation of the Lotus Samādhi and Pure Land practice indicates the popularity of Pure Land practice in the Wuyue Kingdom. Pure Land practice is frequently mentioned in Yanshou's various works. Yanshou quotes extensively from sūtras, commentaries, and treatises relating to Pure Land Buddhism to explain the concepts and practices of Pure Land Buddhism. However, his attitude toward Pure Land Buddhism changes in his writings throughout the different stages of his life.

When Yanshou wrote the Zongjing lu, he was devoted to Chan. The theory of mind-only was his central tenet and main interest. At this time he saw Pure Land practice as an independent Buddhist teaching, but its practice does not occupy much space in this one-hundred-fascicle work and is, in general, considered to be a practice for people of inferior faculties. Yanshou's view of Pure Land Buddhism in the Zongjing lu also lacks the sense of devotional practice that we usually expect of Pure Land practice.

In the Wanshan tonggui ji, the theory of mind is still the main theme, but Yanshou becomes more open to other practices and encourages people to practice whatever will enable them to see their own minds, including Pure Land practice.

44 Paul Swanson, The Great Cessation and Contemplation, p. 171, with modifications.
We can also tell from his tone in the *Wanshan tonggui ji* that Yanshou had become more accepting of devotional Pure Land practice compared with his attitude when he compiled the *Zongjing lu*. In the *Wanshan tonggui ji*, Yanshou also adopts the concept of "the final stage of the Dharma" (*mofa* 末法) from Daochuo’s *Anle ji*. In the time of final Dharma and the evil age of five corruptions (*wuzhuo eshi 五浊恶世*), only Pure Land Practice can help people attain the path.\(^4\)

Thus, in the *Wanshan tonggui ji* and *Zixing lu*, we find that Yanshou’s attitude is quite open to many kinds of practice. Yanshou says in the *Wanshan tonggui ji*:

> 或因念佛而證三昧，或從坐禪而發慧門，或專誦經而見法身，
> 或但行道而入聖境。但以得道為意，終不取定一門，惟憑專志之誠。

Some people attain samādhi through the *nianfo* practice;
Some people gain access to the gate of wisdom through seated meditation;
Some people see the Dharma-body through attentively reciting Buddhist *sūtras*;
Some people enter a holy state through the practice of circumambulation.

All of them, however, share in their aim to achieve the Way.
There is no one practice that suits everyone;
Single-minded sincerity is the only factor.

In this passage, Yanshou emphasizes that every practice *in itself* can help the practitioner to achieve the *Dao*. The only important factor is single-minded sincerity during practice.

This more conventional and devotional attitude of Yanshou in the *Wanshan tonggui ji* and *Zixing lu* is a common phenomenon among Buddhist practitioners. When they advance in age and think more of death, they frequently become more interested in Pure Land practice, for Pure Land Buddhism offers more promises and comforts for the afterlife than other forms of Buddhist practice.

However, it is worth noting that, as we can see in the 78th event in the *Zixing lu*, rebirth in the Pure Land is not the final goal. Instead, Yanshou emphasizes that after attaining enlightenment in the Pure Land, the practitioner should continue to cultivate the practice of Samantabhadra; further, its ultimate goal is in


\(4\) *Wanshan tonggui ji*, T48, 964a6–8.
accordance with emptiness. The practitioner also needs to make a vow to attain Buddhahood together with all sentient beings.

Conclusion

Born sixty years after the Huichang Buddhist persecution and in a pragmatic country, Yanshou is well-known for his synthetic character and was definitely a sincere devotee of the *Lotus Sūtra*. Among the 108 daily events described as Yanshou’s self-cultivations in the *Zixing lu*, we find that the construction of Lotus halls, veneration, printing and distribution of the *Lotus Sūtra*, and cultivation of the Lotus Samādhi are all practices related to the *Lotus Sūtra*. What we need to note is that though well-known as a synthetic practitioner, while embracing the doctrines of different schools and engaging in various practices, Yanshou always endeavored to integrate them under the ultimate goal of attaining enlightenment.

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**PRACTICES RELATED TO THE LOTUS SŪTRA IN ZIXING LU**

_Zixing lu_ 自行錄, by Xingming 行明. X63, no. 1232.

**Secondary Works**


Apocryphal Treatment for Conze’s Heart Problems: “Non-attainment”, “Apprehension” and “Mental Hanging” in the Prajñāpāramitā Hṛdaya

Shi Huiféng

Conze’s critical editions, translations and commentary on the Sanskrit Heart Sūtra indicated three problematic statements: 1. “no attainment and no non-attainment” (§1.1); 2. “because of non-attainment(ness)” (§1.2); and 3. “without thought coverings” (§1.3). Utilizing Nattier’s theory of the text’s history (§1.7), we trace back these three phrases from the Chinese Heart Sūtra, to the Chinese larger Prajñāpāramitā texts, to the Sanskrit Pañcavimśati (§1.8). Subsequently, we generate new readings and incidentally a new structure for these three phrases, distinct from the Sanskrit Heart Sūtra, which is possibly apocryphal. Our new readings are: 1. “no attainment” as no realization (§2). 2. “due to engagement in non-apprehension” (§3). 3. “the mind does not hang on anything” (§4). The new structure ties the usage of the second phrase back to the first phrase within the Sūtra context of “Therefore, in emptiness there is no form, … no attainment; due to engagement in non-apprehension”, rather than at the start of the next section. The third phrase indicates the mind which does not take any object, a synonym for non-apprehension. While the readings and overall structure are new, they still reflect the core notions, i.e. the heart, of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā and Pañcaviṃśatisāhasrikā, the key Perfection of Wisdom texts (§5).

1. Conze’s Heart Sūtra Problems

Many years ago, Edward Conze established himself as the leading Western authority on the Prajñāpāramitā in the 20th century. This was achieved through
his prolific critical editions, translations and explanations of this range of literature. Among these, a translation and commentary on the Heart Sūtra in English. This work was based on his very comprehensive critical edition of the text, “The Prajñāpāramitāhṛdaya Sūtra”, originally published in 1948, and again in his Thirty Years of Buddhist Studies in 1967. This critical edition used no less than twelve Nepalese Sanskrit manuscripts, seven Chinese editions and another seven Chinese translations, two manuscripts from Japan, and the Tibetan. Conze identified two problems in the Sanskrit text, both related to variant readings that required some serious explanation. To facilitate an understanding of these problems, we would like first to reproduce Conze’s own translation of this part of the Heart Sūtra in English. Then we shall reproduce the relevant Sanskrit critical edition material, complete with critical apparatus.

For the translation, his commentary, and the critical edition upon which they were based, Conze analyzed the entire text of the Heart Sūtra into eight divisions, numbered from I to VIII. According to Conze, divisions II, III, IV-V, and VI-VII correspond respectively to the four holy truths of dissatisfaction (II), origin (III), cessation (IV-V) and path (VI-VII). Conze’s problematic material spans from his division V, “The dialectics of emptiness, third stage”, through to division VI, “The concrete embodiment of full emptiness, and its practical basis” (1958: 81). Thus, by Conze’s own analysis, the problematic material spans his division into the truth of cessation and that of the path.

The first passage in Conze’s translation of the Sūtra, in division V “The dialectics of emptiness”, reads as follows (Conze 1958: 97):

[Sūtra, V] Therefore, O Śāriputra, in emptiness there is no form [the five aggregates; the eighteen elements; the twelve limbs of dependent origination in forward and reverse order; the four holy truths.] There is no cognition, no attainment and no non-attainment.

It is in the next section of his divisions, section VI, “The concrete embodiment of full emptiness, and its practical basis”, that the passage in question continues as follows (Conze 1958: 101f):

[Sūtra, VI] Therefore, O Śāriputra, it is because of his non-attainment-ness that a Bodhisattva, through having relied on the perfection of wisdom, dwells without thought-coverings. In the absence of thought coverings he has not been made to tremble, he can overcome what can upset, and in the end he attains to Nirvana.
For reference, we here reproduce divisions V and VI from Conze's critical edition corresponding to the above English translation, in full, including the footnotes most relevant to our discussion in their original numbering (Conze 1967: 151f):


It is within these two divisions, V and VI, that the problematic variant readings occur. However, rather than Conze's point of view that these are two problems, we shall sub-divide the former into two distinct issues, making three in total. The reasons for the distinction will soon become apparent. In addition to Conze's position vis-à-vis the three, we shall also cite several other English translations and modern commentaries on these passages. In order to highlight the lack of consensus—if not outright confusion—over the understanding of this popular text, we shall draw from a range of modern works representing the Tibetan, Chinese, Korean and Japanese traditions.

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Conze 35 Nk adds: na-ajñānaṁ.
Conze 36 So Nbek Jcde J ChT 8, Ti. – J: na prāptitvam. – Ncdim ChT 1,2,5,6; na prāptih. ChT 9: na prāptitvam ca na-aprāptih. – C5 na prāptir na-abhisamaya.
1.1 The Problem of “na prāptir nāprāptih”

Conze’s first problem, our first and second problems, concerns “… 36na prāptir na-aprāptih. 37tasmāc Chāriputra 38aprāptitvād bodhisattvo ...”; translated as “… no attainment and no nonattainment. Therefore, O Śāriputra, it is because of his nonattainmentness that a Bodhisattva…”1 At footnote 36, we see that some editions only deny prāptih (attainment), where others also deny its opposite, aprāptih (nonattainment), at the end of this long standard taxonomic list of dharmas. Some versions also negate abhisamaya (direct realization). Conze states that (1967: 155)

the sūtra originally was content to deny in regard to emptiness all the main categories of Buddhist analysis. Later a part of the tradition thought to guard against misunderstanding by denying also the negation of those categories that easily form opposites. Thus Kumārajīva and several of the MSS. know nothing of the clause 36na vidyā 31na vidyākṣayo; and so with 36na-a-prāptih, which appears in the Chinese translations only quite late, after about 850, in ChT8.9.

It is the matter of “non-attainment” in particular, at the end of Conze’s Division V that we would like to draw to the reader’s attention. In our study here, this shall be our first problem. To this, Conze’s commentary to his English translation gives the following interpretation (Conze 1958: 100)

[Commentary:] Finally, (8) Attainment means the obtaining of ecstatic meditation, of the four Paths (of a Streamwinner, Once-Returner, Never-Returner, and Arhat), and of the enlightenment of Buddhahood.

While he describes “no attainment” thus, no description of the immediately subsequent statement on “no nonattainment” is given. One could argue, though, that if Conze refers to attainments in meditation and spiritual realization, then “no nonattainment” could simply mean that it is not the case that the bodhisattva is lacking such states.

1.2 The Problem of “aprāptitvād…”

Our second problem also derives from the latter half of Conze’s passage, that is, “… aprāptitvād bodhisattvo…”; translated as “… it is because of his non-attainment-ness that a Bodhisattva…”, etc., which appears as the opening statement of his Division VI. This is in turn explained in the commentary as (Conze 1958: 103)

[Commentary:] Non-attainment-ness sums up the “no attainment and no non-attainment” of no. 36, which in their turn summarized section V. It can be understood to mean that the Bodhisattva is “indifferent to any kind of personal attainment”, and so I have translated BT 146 and SS 54. Using an old English mystical term one can also say that the Bodhisattva is “devoid of any propriety”.

This is more explicit than the earlier commentary, which basically skips over the term “non-attainment”. This translated term is now glossed as meaning “indifferent” or without “propriety”. Note that Conze’s translation includes the suffix “-ness”, which, as we shall examine below, is due to his reliance on Sanskrit versions of the text.

In order to deal with the issue of negating both the term and its opposite, Conze resorts to what we may call a trans-logical or mystical explanation. In his critical edition he claims that “[o]bviously the rules of ordinary logic are abrogated in this sūtra. Contradictions exist in emptiness” (1967: 155); and “while the aprāpti is not a fact, a-prāptitva is the basis of the conduct of a bodhi-sattva… one of the paradoxes in which the sūtra gives expression to the laws of spiritual life” (1967: 156). While the overturn of logic and other conceptualization is not at all uncommon in religious and spiritual literature, and Conze himself refers here to Dionysius Areopagita and earlier to old English mysticism for authority, one must be wary of using such arguments to explain away all manner of textual and logical tensions and contradictions. Due to his manner of analysis, it is our overall impression that this matter is still somewhat unresolved and worthy of deeper examination.

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1.3 The Problem of “cittāvaraṇa” or “cittālambana”?

The third problem, Conze’s second, is that of “cittāvaraṇa”, for which there are several variants of “cittālambana”, in footnotes 40 and 41, again found in division VI (Conze 1967: 152). Conze favored the former term “cittāvaraṇa” for his later English translation of “thought coverings” (1958: 101). However, he acknowledged in the critical edition that haplography in the Nepalese Devanagari manuscripts could easily cause this variant (1967: 156)

We may suppose that originally there was चित्तारम्बन [cittārambaṇa]. Now ल [la] and र [ra], and ब [ba] and व [va] are constantly interchanged in Nepalese MSS., and the म [m] is represented by an anusvāra [ ‘m]. This would give “रञ्जन” [raṃvaṇa]. If the anusvāra is dropped, as often happens, a simple juxtaposition would lead to “वरण” [-varaṇa]. … The normal Chinese equivalent for अवरण is 阻 [zhān]. … The earlier versions … all have 心無罣礙 [xin wú guà’ài] … related to a meaning “hung up”, “suspended”, and therefore seems to have more affinity to अ-लब्ध-ना than to अ-वर-ना.

With no clear factor to decide between the received Sanskrit text before him and a fairly straightforward haplographic issue that really makes more sense, Conze was forced to admit that “Although the reading cittāvaraṇa makes sense it is perhaps not the original reading” (1967: 157).

In his commentary to the English translation, where he used “cittāvaraṇa”, Conze parsed “citta” as “either (a) ‘thoughts’, mental activities, or (b) ‘thought’, Spirit”; and “āvaraṇa”, from वरण, as either “obstruction”, “obstacle”, “impediment” or “covering”. The resultant English was “thought coverings”, of three kinds, namely karma-āvaraṇa, kleśa-āvaraṇa and jñeya-āvaraṇa. Noting that “cittāvaraṇa is very rare”, Conze “assume[s] it to be identical with the third kind of obstacles, the cognitive ones” (1958: 105). However, he gives no reason or supporting citations for this assumption, and we are still left with a feeling of vagueness about what the passage really means here. In his critical edition, Conze references the Chinese texts for a solution, texts for which he was by no means the specialist that he was vis-à-vis the Sanskrit and Tibetan, demonstrating the potential value of the Chinese translations which have often received rather scathing criticisms

from other scholars. The issue of the value of the Chinese texts will play a key role in our examination here, as we shall now demonstrate.

1.4 Textual History and Nattier’s “Apocryphal Text?”

No modern study of a religious text would be complete without an examination of the corpus of various sources, across the classical languages, in their appropriate historical order. With regard to the text-historical issue, our approach may differ from the expected, in that we shall use in particular Nattier’s article, “The Heart Sūtra: A Chinese Apocryphal Text?” (1992). This study in turn relies quite heavily on earlier research by Fukui Fumimasa, *Hannya shingyō no rekishiteki kenkyū* (“Research into the Composition of the Heart Sūtra”) (1987). Examining the various versions of the text in Chinese and Sanskrit, Nattier shows the following sequence of textual development. In her own words, the conclusion of her article is as follows (Nattier 1992: 198)

In this paper I have sought to demonstrate, primarily on the basis of philological evidence, that a flow chart of the relationships among the Sanskrit and Chinese versions of the *Large Sūtra* and the *Heart Sūtra* can reasonably be drawn in only one sequence: from the Sanskrit *Large Sūtra* to the Chinese *Large Sūtra* of Kumārajīva to the Chinese *Heart Sūtra* popularized by [Xüánzàng] to the Sanskrit *Heart Sūtra*. To assume any other direction of transmission would present insuperable difficulties—or would, at the very least, require postulating a quite convoluted series of processes, which (by virtue of this very convolution) seems considerably less likely to have taken place.

The argument for a back translation is well evidenced, particularly by the fact that while the meaning of the individual words in all these texts correspond, there is only strict equivalence between the Chinese large and Heart sūtras, whereas the Sanskrit *Pañcaviṃśati* and Heart Sūtra are quite distinct. The irregularity of the grammatical and other syntactic forms of the Sanskrit Heart Sūtra, quite different from any of the other Sanskrit texts of the genre, is very clear indeed.

This is naturally quite a provocative conclusion, which Nattier is well aware of. While this article was no doubt met with skepticism in the non-academic Buddhist world, perhaps it is the lack of well argued and presented articles to the contrary that really indicates how plausible and convincing her conclusions are. One of the few scholars that we are aware of who has attempted to counter or otherwise
critique Nattier’s position is Dan Lusthaus, in his article “The Heart Sūtra in Chinese Yogācāra: Some Comparative Comments on the Heart Sutra Commentaries of Wonch’uk and K’uei-chi” (2003). Note, however: Lusthaus’ examinations of Wonch’uk and Kuijī’s commentaries does not at all refute Nattier’s thesis that the text is a Chinese apocryphal creation, but merely shows very strong evidence that Xuánzàng’s version was not the first, as versions by Kumārajīva and others were also known during his time (Lusthaus 2003: 81-87). Therefore, one of Nattier’s key findings remains, namely, the very real possibility that the Chinese Heart Sūtra precedes the Sanskrit text. No doubt there are other criticisms of her thesis, but this paper has aims other than a comprehensive critique and review thereof, and we shall adopt it as a working hypothesis.

Having already introduced Conze’s critical Sanskrit text (§1), we may now turn immediately to the Chinese versions. Taking Lusthaus’ study as an amendment to Nattier, and thus including the possibility of a version at least attributed to Kumārajīva, we presently have six Chinese editions. In historical order and with reference to the portions equivalent to Conze's Divisions V and VI, the six editions are as follows: Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什), Taishō 250,4 from 402-412; Xuánzàng (玄奘), Taishō 251,5 from 649; Dharmacandra (法月), Taishō 252,6 from 738; Prajñā (般若), Taishō 253,7 from 790; Prajñācakra (智慧輪), Taishō 254,8 from 861; Făchéng (法成), Taishō 255,9 from 856. (All dates from Lancaster 1979, and Nattier 1992: 200 n1; 214 n65). These Chinese transliterations have already been included in Conze’s considerations for his critical edition of the Sanskrit text. Note, however, that the Taishō punctuation of periods, commas and so forth are modern additions.

There are thus very strong similarities and consistency through the centuries of Chinese versions of the text. While slight changes can be found, large changes

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4Kumārajīva 鸠摩羅什: Móhē Bānruòbōluómìduō Dàmíngzhōu Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜大明咒經》 (To8, no. 250, p. 847, c17-22).
5Xuánzàng 玄奘: Bānruòbōluómìduō Xīn Jīng 《般若波羅蜜多心經》 (To8, no. 251, p. 848, c11-17).
6Dharmacandra 法月: Pǔpiànzhìzàng Bānruò-bōluómìduō Xīn Jīng 《普誦智藏般若波羅蜜多心經》 (To8, no. 252, p. 849, b3-9).
7Prajñā 般若: Bānruòbōluómìduō Xīn Jīng 《般若波羅蜜多心經》 (To8, no. 253, p. 849, c9-15).
8Prajñācakra 智慧輪: Bānruòbōluómìduō Xīn Jīng 《般若波羅蜜多心經》 (To8, no. 254, p. 850, a24-29).
9Făchéng 法成: Bānruòbōluómìduō Xīn Jīng 《般若波羅蜜多心經》 (To8, no. 255, p. 850, c7-14).
are generally absent. In a recent paper, “Experimental core samples of Chinese translations of two Buddhist Sūtras analysed in the light of recent Sanskrit manuscript discoveries” (2010a), Paul Harrison demonstrates very graphically how later Chinese translators owed many of their lexical choices to previous translators, using the Vajracchedi & Vimalakīrtinirdesā as examples. The range of differences in our Heart Sūtra “core samples” above displays even less variation than that seen in Harrison’s study. Even Xuānzàng, who was no follower of translation fashion, barely varies from the version attributed to Kumārajīva.

Some comments on the structure and parsing of these Chinese texts are in order. While Conze’s divisions have been applied to the texts, the CBETA punctuation already indicated period breaks at the start of V; at the end of V to indicate the start of VI as a new sentence idea; and at the end of VI. The split between sentences between V and VI is more natural with the last, i.e. Fāchéng’s version, with the addition of “是故舍利子” (shēlìzǐ), but it is not the only possibility for the other versions. In terms of content, as Conze (1967: 155) and Nattier (1992: 193) have already shown, all versions before Fāchéng’s have at the end of V “無智亦無得” (wúzhì yì wúdé) or equivalent; only Fāchéng’s version has the extra negation of “…無不得” (wú bùdé). At the start of VI, all versions read from “以無所得故” (yĭ wúsŭodé gù) which starts the section. Fāchéng’s addition at the start does not detract from this basic meaning, however. We can now proceed to note clearly the basic lexical terms used by the Chinese editions for our three problematic passages.

One: the equivalent term for Conze’s “no attainment” (na prāptir), at the end of Division V, for all versions, is “無得” (wúdé), with Fāchéng’s addition as “無不得” (wúbùdé) being the only variant.

Two: for Conze’s “due to non-attainment-ness” (aprāptitvāt) at the start of Division VI, all versions use “以無所得故” (yĭ wúsŭodé gù). Grammatically, the structure “以…故” (yĭ…gù) functions as a Sanskrit instrumental, or less commonly as an ablative. The “所” (sŭo) usually turns the subsequent verb, in this case “得” (dé), into a past participle. The only remaining question then, is the meaning of “得” (dé), which we shall return to below.

Three: for the passage where Conze’s translation reads “without thought coverings” (cittavaranam), in the middle of Division VI, in all cases, the term “心” (xīn) is used, which corresponds well with the Sanskrit “citta”. This is fairly unremarkable. The first four Chinese versions, from Kumārajiva to Prajñā, then use “無罣礙” (wú guà’ài) and then “無罣礙故” (wú guà’ài gù); but Prajñācakra uses
“無障礙” (wú zhàng’ài) and “無障礙故” (wú zhàng’ài gù), while Fāchéng only uses the first expression, lacking the second. Thus Prajñācakra and Fāchéng have decided to change the lexeme “罣礙” (guà’ài) to “障礙” (zhàng’ài). Fāchéng is also the exception in using the term only once in Division VI. The other versions use the term twice, and add “故” (gù), to the second, which when alone after a verbal form is usually grammatically equivalent to a Sanskrit ablative form. This leaves us with the problem of what is meant by “罣礙” (guà’ài) or “障礙” (zhàng’ài).

1.5 Tracing the Sources Back To and From the Heart

As for the Chinese translations of the Pañcaviṃśati, a few caveats are in order before we delve into the literature. The first caveat is simply that the literature is massively extensive, not only in terms of individual texts, but in that most individual texts also have multiple translations. We must thus apologize that our examination here cannot be exhaustive, due to the time and space constraints involved. Nattier proposed that the source of the Chinese Heart Sūtra may have been Kumārajīva’s translation of the larger Prajñāpāramitā (1992). So we shall primarily rely on Kumārajīva’s Mōhēbānuòbōlómi Jing translation for parallels of our key phrases in the Chinese Heart Sūtra. A second caveat is due to working between multiple recensions of the text, which involve Chinese translations of different times and translators, while we really have no Indic version that any scholar would say comes even close to a very old, let alone “original” text. That is, when we examine an equivalent Chinese term and then the equivalent location in the Sanskrit text, can we be sure that the Chinese translator was looking at the same Sanskrit term? We simply cannot. Moreover, the use of standardized dictionaries to ascertain “original” Sanskrit terms behind translation idioms can be problematic. For example, the Chinese lexeme “得” (dé) was used by Kumārajīva to translate √bhū, prāpta / prāpti, √budh, √labh, and other terms. Paul Harrison’s recent paper entitled “Resetting the Diamond” gives an excellent account of how Kumārajīva “flattened” translation terminology through using the same Chinese character for multiple Indic terms in the Vajracchedikā (Harrison 2010b), reducing a broad Indic semantic range into a narrower Chinese range. We must be flexible, therefore, and not simply examine the exact string of Chinese characters as they appear in the Chinese versions of the Heart Sūtra alone, but also variants on these.

The first problematic passage concerns “The ‘No Attainment’ Problem”, which we shall first tackle in Section §2. This material is fairly straightforward, as it lies
within the textual content of the Heart Sūtra that is also found within the larger Pañca-Cavimśati Sūtra and equivalent Chinese translations thereof. The second is “The ‘Due to Non-attainment(ess)’ Problem”, in Section §3. While this issue follows immediately after the material paralleled in the larger texts, Nattier’s text-historical considerations are still valid. We shall thus attempt a reconstruction of how the passage in the Chinese Heart Sūtra follows a form similar to that in the Chinese translations of the larger text, and from there back to the Sanskrit Pañca-Cavimśati. Third and last is “The ‘Mind Without Mental Obstruction’ Problem”, to be covered in Section §4. The process here is the same as that for the second problem, though we shall discover that translation “flattening” means ascertaining a potential Sanskrit under-text is much more difficult. Having so reviewed Conze’s three problems, attempting to reconstruct not only the individual Sanskrit terms but also the broader ideas underlying them, we shall attempt a rereading of the Heart Sūtra. It is intended that this reading, an “Understanding from the Heart of Perfect Wisdom” in Section §5, will thus draw from the broader Prajñāpāramitā texts as a whole, in leading us back to the heart of wisdom.

2 The ‘No Attainment’ Problem

The first problem is that of “no attainment”, in the Sanskrit “aprāptiḥ”, and Chinese “無得” (wúdé) (§1.1). This term is the last of a long list of phenomena that are negated “in emptiness”. This lies at the end of Division V according to Conze’s analysis of the parts of the Heart Sūtra text. This is the portion of the Chinese Heart Sūtra, Divisions III, IV and V, that is no doubt directly drawn from Kumārajiva’s Chinese Móhēbānrōbōluōmi jīng. Nattier’s study already includes a useful comparison between the Móhēbānrōbōluōmi jīng and Xüánzàng’s version of the Heart Sūtra (Nattier 1992: 159f). While content on “no attainment” in Division V is present in the larger sūtra, the material on “due to non-attainment(ess)” and “mental obstructions” is not found in this particular part of the larger sūtra. How the terms for these latter two phrases in the Chinese Heart Sūtra do appear elsewhere in the Chinese sources for the larger text will be shown in subsequent sections (§3, §4).

2.1 Chinese Sources of the Larger Sūtras for Division V

In order to give an exhaustive account of the Chinese versions of the larger text, we must note all five translations. In the historical order of their translation and with
reference to the portion corresponding to Conze’s Division V, they are: Mokşala (無叉羅), Taishō 221,10 from 291; Dharmarakṣa (竺法護), Taishō 222,11 from 286; Kumārajīva (鳩摩羅什), Taishō 223,12 from 404; and Xüánzàng (玄奘), Taishō 220 (2) and (3),13 from 659-663.

Philological consideration of this material is fairly straightforward. Mokşala’s translation features “无所逮得” (wú sūodăidé), giving the impression of either a past participle or object encountered or attained. Dharmarakṣa, Kumārajīva and both Xüánzàng’s Assembly 2 and 3 feature “無得” (wú dé), the same term as found in the Chinese Heart Sūtra. Without considering the Sanskrit (we shall do this below), this could be understood as meaning “no reaching”, “no obtainment”, “no attainment”, and so forth. However, both of Xüánzàng’s versions also add “無現觀” (wú xiàn’guān), which by the Chinese would be read along the lines of “no direct observation”, “no present insight”, and so forth. Obviously, we need to examine the Sanskrit for these terms in order fully to appreciate their significance in the context of a translation of a Mahāyāna sūtra, and so the Sanskrit sources of the larger text, i.e. the Pañcaviṃśatisahāsrikā Prajñāpāramitā Sūtra, demand examination.

2.2 Sanskrit Sources of the Pañcaviṃśati for Division V

For the Sanskrit sources, again, Nattier provides a convenient synoptic tabulated layout of both the ancient Gilgit Manuscript (from circa 6th century) and a more recent Nepalese Manuscript (from circa 19th century) (Nattier 1992: 221ff). The former, ancient as it is, requires a few minor emendments, but these are rather unremarkable (1992: n20, n23, n24). However, it may be worth citing Conze’s translation of The Large Sūtra on Perfect Wisdom for an English rendition of these passages from the Sanskrit (Conze 1975: 60-62).

(C1) And that emptiness, … (II) There is no form in it, no feeling, etc.; no eye, etc. to: no mind; no form, etc. to: no mind objects; no

10Mokşala: Fāngguāng Bānruòbōluōmì Jīng 《放光般若波羅蜜經》〈3 假號品〉 (To8, no. 221, p. 6, a6-13).
11Dharmarakṣa: Guāngzàn Bānruòbōluōmì Jīng 《光讚般若波羅蜜經》〈3 行空品〉 (To8, no. 222, p. 153, c8-22).
12Kumārajīva: Mōhēbānruòbōluōmì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》〈3 習應品〉 (To8, no. 223, p. 223, a13-24).
13Xüánzàng: Dā Bānruòbōluōmì Jīng (2) 《大般若波羅蜜多經：2會》〈3 見照品〉 (T07, no. 220, p. 14, a11-26); ibid. (3) 《大般若波羅蜜多經：3會》〈2 舍利子品〉 (T07, no. 220, p. 435, b27-c12).
eye element, etc. to: no mind consciousness element; no ignorance, no stopping ignorance, etc. to: no decay and death, no stopping of decay and death; no suffering and no comprehension of suffering; no origination and no forsaking of origination; no stopping and no realization of stopping; no path and no development of the path; no attainment, and no reunion; no Stream-winner, and no fruit of a Stream-winner; etc. to: no Bodhi-sattva, and no knowledge of the modes of the path; no Buddha, and no enlightenment. (III) It is in this sense, Śāriputra, that a Bodhisattva, a great being who courses in perfect wisdom, is to be called “joined”.

Some critical observations can be made. For the entire content, the main differences between the two Sanskrit recensions are three in number: 1. The Gilgit features “yā notpadyate na nirudhyate..., na samkliṣyate na vyavadāyate, na hiyate na vardhate, nātītā, nānāgataḥ na pratyutpannāḥ”, which is a near repeat of the immediately preceding sentences, not repeated and thus absent from the Nepalese. 2. Almost immediately after this, the Nepalese has a list of the six elements “na pṛthividhātur... na vijñānadhatuḥ”, not found in the Gilgit. 3. Then, subsequent to this, the Gilgit negates a list of the twelve sense organs and objects, followed by the categories of the aggregates, senses and sense elements “na cakṣuḥ... na manāḥ; na rūpaḥ... na dharmāḥ; (na) tatra skandhā na dhātavo nāyatanāni”.

After negating lists of the eighteen elements and the twelve limbs of dependent origination in forward and reverse order, we then reach the negation of the four holy truths (āryasatyāni), and finally our key problematic terms. The key words are “na prāptir na abhisamayoḥ” and “na prāptir na abhisamayo” respectively, the only difference being merely external saṃdhi. This is rendered by Conze in his Large Sūtra as “no attainment and no reunion” (1975: 62). It is important to note that in the larger texts, these statements are not the end of this long passage of taxonomic lists, as they continue by negating the states and fruitions of the four stages of śrāvaka sanctity, and the states and fruitions of the pratyekabuddhas and fully awakened buddhas too. From the aggregates, through the senses, to the eighteen elements, dependent origination and then the truths, the appearance of “na prāptir na abhisamayoḥ” has the significance that the former categories are the objects of “attainment” and “direct realization” (Conze’s “reunion”). This is particularly so for schools such as the Sarvāstivāda, for whom the path of vision (darsanamārga) involved direct realization of the four truths. The result of this is the state and fruition of a stream entrant, gradually proceeding through the other
stages of sanctity. The end of the passage is: “So indeed, Śāriputra, the aspirant to awakening, the great hero, who is practicing engaged with perfect knowledge is said to be ‘engaged’” (evaṁ hi śāriputra bodhisattvo mahāsattvah prajñāpāramitāyām caran yukto yukta iti vaktavyah). The text continues in a similar vein with respect to the six perfections, and so forth. In addition to the Pañcaviṃśati here, the smaller Aṣṭa-sāhasrikā has a different but very similarly structured passage in Chp. 2 (refer Conze 1973: 97).

2.3 Reading: “No attainment” as “No direct realization”

All the material in both texts is largely taxonomic lists, Abhidharmic in content and structure, all of which are negated “in emptiness” (śūnyatāyām). The only difference is that the Heart Sūtra gives the lists in abbreviated format (saṃskṛtā), whereas the Pañcaviṃśati here gives the fully detailed schemas (vistareṇā). Because of the very clear correspondences between the Chinese Heart Sūtra, the Chinese versions of the larger text, and the Sanskrit larger text, the reading of these passages is not too problematic. That is to say, the Chinese Heart Sūtra’s “無得” (wú dé) appears to directly correspond to the Sanskrit “na prāptir”; and in this context means the “attainment” or “obtainment” of one or other of the holy stages of the path. We can deduce that this applies to either so-called śrāvaka, pratyekabuddha or sambuddha attainments from the larger text, even though this is not explicit in the Heart Sūtra itself.

However, the examination of these larger texts does pose another question for the Chinese Heart Sūtra. Whereas the larger sūtras run from the four truths to attainment (prāpti) to direct realization (abhisamaya), the Chinese Heart Sūtra has the four truths, then “無智…無得” (wú zhì … wú dé) (Prajñācakra has “無智證…” (wú zhìzhèng)). A simple and plausible explanation would be that the two terms “prāpti” and “abhisamaya” have been juxtaposed, and that the latter equates to the Chinese “無智(證)” (wú zhì(zhèng)). This, of course, differs from our purported Sanskrit Heart Sūtra, which has “na jñānam” at this point. The further negation of “無不得” (wú bùdé) by Fāchéng, a solitary variant in the latest of the Chinese Heart Sūtras, and also echoed in the Sanskrit Heart Sūtra with “na aprāpti”, may simply be as Conze originally argued when he wrote: “Later a part of the tradition thought to guard against misunderstanding by denying also the negation of those categories that easily form opposites” (Conze 1967: 155). The very fact that Indic Buddhist texts continued to grow, expand and change in the
hands of their editors is yet another timely warning not to assume that such an
Indic manuscript equals an “original Sanskrit” text.

3 The ‘Due to Non-attainment(ness)’ Problem

We may now move on to the second problematic statement, that of “Due to non-
attainment(ness)”, in the Chinese Heart Sūtra “以無所得故” (yì wú sūodé gù)
(§1.2). Located in Division VI of the Heart Sūtra, this is a more complicated mat-
ter, due to being outside the main body of the text—Divisions III, IV and V—
which corresponds to the larger Prajñāpāramitā, whether in Chinese or Sanskrit.
Thus, in order to establish the meaning of the terms in the Chinese Heart Sūtra,
we are forced to look not only at the same term within the larger Chinese and then
Sanskrit text, but more specifically at the same terms as they appear in a similar
context or structure. A brief review of some extant Buddhist lexical resources will
show just how much the Heart Sūtra and its accepted providence have influenced
our scholarly understanding. For example, in the Digital Dictionary of Buddhism
we find “無所得 Basic Meaning: nothing to be attained”, with—what we assume
to be a reconstruction—the Sanskrit of “aprāptitva”, the same as the purported
Sanskrit of the Heart Sūtra (DDB 2014). Granted, other potential Sanskrit sources
for this Chinese phrase are also given for this entry, but it is “aprāptitva” that is
given as the default Indic term. This is also the case in the recently published The
Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism, which only references “prāpti°” (Pāli “patti°”)
for “得” (dé) (2013: 636, 663, 1108).

3.1 Chinese “以無所得故” ← Sanskrit “an-upa√lambha(yogena)”?

Let us begin by searching for the exact phrase “以無所得故” (yì wú sūodé gù)
from the Chinese Heart Sūtra, as it appears in Kumārajīva’s larger sūtra. It also
so happens that this term appears often in the larger Chinese text. Given that the
“以…故” (yì…gù) construction is usually a translation for a Sanskrit instrumen-
tal case, another Chinese phrase, “用無所得故” (yòng wú sūodé gù) would also
appear to be a translation variant of the same original Sanskrit term. Together,
these two phrases appear over 40 times within the Chinese larger text, and, more
importantly, we are able to identify a source for these in the Sanskrit text. Here
we shall present only a few examples in any detail, merely providing textual ref-
ences for the remaining cases.
One excellent example is found in Chp. 15 of the Chinese Môhê text, with six uses of “用無所得故”. This is in a discussion of practices all of which are “said to be the bodhisattva mahāsattva’s going forth on the great vehicle.” Each practice lists some negated expression, often a kind of knowledge (智慧) or gnosis (智), an otherwise standard form of meditation or contemplation that the bodhisattva does not engage in (不行). For example, their gnosis does not engage in the past, present or future; their gnosis does not engage in the mundane or transmundane, conditioned or unconditioned phenomena, etc.; or in the contemplation of permanence or impermanence, etc. to self or not self. All of these negations which make up the bodhisattvas going forth on the great vehicle are performed as “用無所得故”, which from the Chinese alone could be rendered as “by application of non-attainment”, or something to that effect.

The Sanskrit equivalent of this passage can be found in Chp. 13, and in English translation from Conze’s Large Sûtra (1975: 134). The Sanskrit passage has some slight differences from the Chinese, but these appear insignificant for our purpose here. Without any exceptions, the clear equivalent of the Chinese phrase “用無所得故” is “anupalabhamānena”. Our analysis of the Chinese translation as an instrumental form proves to be correct, as the term is an instrumental singular of “an-upa√labh” as a present participle, suffix “-māna-”. In Conze’s translation, he renders this as “without taking them as basic facts”, and “that because there is nothing to apprehend” (Conze 1975: 134). It could also be rendered as “by way of not apprehending” the various phenomena which are the objects of gnosis or contemplation.

Another good example, which uses the exact phrase “以無所得故” (yĭ wú sŭodé gù), is found nine times in another long passage from the Môhê Chp. 27. This corresponds also to Chp. 2 of the smaller Prajñāpāramitā, where the gods request the teaching on perfect wisdom from Subhūti, concerning how to “stand” or “abide” (住) in Prajñāpāramitā. All contemplations are performed with a mind set upon omniscience (薩婆若心). The first contemplation is of the five aggregates in terms of being impermanent, unsatisfactory, empty and not self, like a disease, etc. to being a dart piercing the body. All this is to be carried out “以無所得故” (yĭ wú sŭodé gù), i.e. “by way of non-attainment”. The second con-

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14Môhêbānruōbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷4〈15 辯才品〉 (CBETA, To8, no. 223, p. 246, c28- p. 247, a18).
15Pañcaviṃśataviṃśatā (Kimura 1986: 1-1:144f)
16Môhêbānruōbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷7〈27 問住品〉 (CBETA, To8, no. 223, p. 273, c5-23).
temptation is of the various senses and elements in the same manner. The third
is of the aggregates as “neither arising nor ceasing, neither tainted nor pure”;
and the fourth is of the senses and elements in the same way. This is followed by con-
templations of the twelve limbs of dependent origination in forward then reverse
order. Next, the four establishments of mindfulness, up to the various unshared
powers of a fully awakened Buddha. Finally, the six perfections. All of these prac-
tices are described as being performed “以無所得故” (yĭ wū sŭodé gù), i.e. “by
way of non-attainment”, and this phrase appears at the end of each practice in
question.

In the Sanskrit text, this is found in Chp. 22 (refer Conze’s translation 1975:
204f). The Sanskrit equivalent term is again clear, and while it is also an in-
strumental, it differs from our earlier example, being “an-upa-√labh-a-yogena”.
Conze renders this as “without taking it / them as a basis”, though to emphasize
the term “-yoga-”, we could say “by way of engagement in non-apprehension”, or
“by way of non-apprehending engagement”.

For fear of being too verbose, we shall only cite the above two examples in
detail. However, examination of other examples reveals that the majority of the
appearances of the Chinese phrase “以無所得故” (yĭ wŭ sŭodé gù) directly corre-
spond to the Sanskrit “an-upa-√labh-a-yogena”. Others as a rule equate to some
or other Sanskrit term from the same root √labh with prefix upa, such as “upa-
labhyate”. Other uses of the character “得” (dé), in particular when in a negated
form, such as “不得” (bù dé), or “不可得” (bùkě dé), also regularly derive from
Sanskrit verbal or noun forms from the root √labh, such as “na … upalabhyate”,

17 Pañcaviṃśati- (Kimura 1986: 2-3:3).
18 Mōhēbānruobōluōmī Jing 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷5〈18 問乘品〉: (CBETA, To8, no.
223, p. 250, a9-b3); = Pañcaviṃśati- (Kimura 1986: 1-2: 44); Mōhēbānruobōluōmī Jing 《摩訶般若
波羅蜜經》卷8〈30 三問品〉: (CBETA, To8, no. 223, p. 280, a19-22); = Pañcaviṃśati- (Kimura
1986: 2-3:35); Mōhēbānruobōluōmī Jing 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷8〈30 三問品〉: (CBETA,
To8, no. 223, p. 280, b5-7); = Pañcaviṃśati- (Kimura 1986: 2-3:37); Mōhēbānruobōluōmī Jing 《摩
訶般若波羅蜜經》卷8〈31 三問品〉: (CBETA, To8, no. 223, p. 281, c6-10); = Pañcaviṃśati-
(Kimura 1986: 2-3:45); Mōhēbānruobōluōmī Jing 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷8〈31 三問品〉: (CBETA,
To8, no. 223, p. 282, b7-12); = Pañcaviṃśati- (Kimura 1986: 2-3:51); Mōhēbānruobō-
luōmī Jing 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷10〈37 法種品〉: (CBETA, To8, no. 223, p. 292, c29-p.
293, a2); = Pañcaviṃśati- (Kimura 1986: 2-3:99); Mōhēbānruobōluōmī Jing 《摩訶般若波羅蜜
經》卷10〈37 法種品〉: (CBETA, To8, no. 223, p. 293, a15-19); = Pañcaviṃśati- (Kimura 1986:
2-3:100); Mōhēbānruobōluōmī Jing 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷10〈38 法種品〉: (CBETA, To8,
no. 223, p. 295, a10-12); = Pañcaviṃśati- (Kimura 1986: 2-3:109); etc.
19 Mōhēbānruobōluōmī Jing 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷8〈30 三問品〉: (CBETA, To8, no.
223, p. 279, c24-27); = Pañcaviṃśati- (Kimura 1986: 2-3:35); etc.
In fact, in all the examples we have examined, none are found to derive from any other Sanskrit verbal root.

3.2 Chinese “無得” ← Sanskrit “aprāpti” or “abhisamaya”? At this point we may wonder what happened to Conze’s Heart Sūtra term “aprāptitvāt”, and the equating of the Chinese “得” (dé) with Sanskritric “prāpti” forms? For “無得” (wú dé) alone, without “以…故”, we do find that there are correspondences to negations of Sanskrit “prāpti”. However, these seem to mostly occur together with “abhisamaya”. This conforms to our findings at the end of Division V, but may have implications for our phrase here at the start of Division VI.

There is some inconsistency among the correspondences between the Chinese translations and the Sanskrit, however. For example, “無得無著” (wúdé wúzhuó) appears to be for “aprāpti … anabhisamaya”; or “… 然” (zhī … dé) for “prāpti … abhisamaya”; and in other examples the Chinese “得” (dé) is used with “道” (dào), “果” (guò), or “能” (néng-) etc., for some other combination of “prāpti” and / or “abhisamaya”. It would appear as if “prāpti” and “abhisamaya” were near synonyms for the compilers and later scribes of the text, so
that the two were nearly interchangeable. Note, however, that none of the corresponding Sanskrit passages appears in an instrumental form, which is a critical part of the Chinese passage in this second problematic phrase. While they are not verbs, the notions of “prāpti” and “abhisamaya” are used specifically with respect to particular holy fruitions and insights.

3.3 Reading: “Due to non-apprehending engagement”

Despite the appearance of “得” in this form, and the acceptance that at the end of Division V of the Heart Sūtra the correct sense is indeed that of “na prāpti” and / or “anabhisamaya”, the usage in our second problematic phrase “以無所得故” is substantially different here at the start of Division VI. The first difference is grammatical: our Chinese Heart Sūtra text strongly suggests a kind of instrumental semantic function. The second is structural: the Chinese Heart Sūtra phrase comes at the end of a list of various dharmas—either in the sense of phenomena or in the sense of practices to be undertaken. Neither is the case for the reading of “prāpti” or “abhisamaya” in the larger Sanskrit texts. A third difference is that our reading maintains consistency of meaning with later portions of the text. Division VI of the Heart Sūtra ends with “and in the end he [i.e. the bodhisattva] attains to nirvāṇa” (from Conze 1958: 102). Where most translators render the two statements as “no attainment” and then “attains to...” respectively, the contradictory tension demands a clear and appropriate explanation. Our reading here avoids this problem. The whole thread of the passages from the end of Division V to the end of VI would thus read that “due to not attaining (holy fruitions) he attains (holy fruitions)”, a logical contradiction which it requires a paradoxical interpretation to resolve. While we should not reject such an interpretation as intrinsically implausible, rather to say that “due to non-apprehension (of phenomena) he attains (holy fruition)” not only avoids direct contradiction, but also makes sense in a Buddhist epistemological cum soteriological world view, wherein holy fruitions are not phenomena in the manner in which the aggregates and so forth are. All our earlier versions of the Divisions V to VI still place our phrase here at the start of Division VI. But our discovery that the phrase “due to non-apprehension” usually lies at the end of a passage, not at the start, is a critical challenge to this. If we reposition “due to non-apprehension” to the end of Division V, the whole passage would read as: “In emptiness, there are no aggregates, etc.; no realization, etc.; due to non-apprehension.” That is to say, in the state of emptiness, one does not appprehend phenomena. The “In empti-
ness” is referring, not to the ontological status of phenomena, but to a subjective state—a meditative state if you will—which should rather be described as epistemological in nature. Therefore, we conclude that the phrase “以無所得故” (yī wú suǒdé gù) is more plausibly derived from “an-upavālamba-yogena”, i.e. “due to non-apprehending engagement”, than from the idea of “due to non-attainment-ness” of Conze, or other similar readings which imply the non-attainment of a spiritual realization or holy fruition in the classic Buddhist sense.

4 The ‘Mind Without Mental Obstruction’ Problem

We may now turn to our third problematic phrase, the “mind without mental obstruction”, in the Chinese “心無罣礙” (xīn wú guà’ai), and either “acittāvaraṇa” or debatably “acittālambaṇa” in Conze’s critical Sanskrit edition (§1.3). Immediately after its first appearance, the phrase reappears a second time in modified form, as “due to the mind being without mental obstruction”, that is, “無罣礙故” (wú guà’ai gù) in Chinese, Sanskrit “cittāvaraṇanāstītvāt” (or presumably “cittālambaṇanāstītvāt”). Both of these expressions are located in the middle of Division VI according to Conze’s analysis of the text. As mentioned previously, the first element of the compound, i.e. “心” (xīn) or “citta”, translated as “mind” or “thought”, is quite straightforward. It is the second part of the compound that is problematic and draws our attention.

Before we examine the broader range of Prajñāpāramitā literature in both Chinese and Sanskrit, it is again worth referring to some standard Buddhist studies dictionaries and other reference texts to see how the purported Sanskrit Heart Sūtra has influenced the reading and standard back translation of the terms in the Chinese texts. Unlike in our previous example, for our present problematic phrase, the Chinese “無罣礙” (wú guà’ai), we see a much greater range of possible Sanskrit forms. For example, in the Digital Dictionary of Buddhism, while the expression “āvaraṇa-nāstītvā” of the Sanskrit Heart Sūtra is given as an equivalent for the Chinese phrase, a range of other Sanskrit possibilities are also listed (DDB 2014: 無罣礙). A large range of other uses of the character “罣” (guà) within the Prajñāpāramitā literature when not in this particular compound is also provided from Karashima’s glossaries (2011, in DDB 2014). Drawing from such a broader textual basis to provide Sanskrit back translations for Chinese terms is far more reliable than a single, short text. It is worth noting that The Princeton Dictionary of Buddhism actually references Chinese “障” (zhàng) for “āvaraṇa” (Buswell &
Lopez 2013: 83), though this is of course not restricted to a Prajñā-pāramitā context.

Thus, with this term, there again appears to be some degree of translational “flattening” as described by Harrison (2010b): the same Chinese character is used to translate a number of distinctly different Indic terms. So while we may begin by examining the exact phrase from the Chinese Heart Sūtra as it appears in the larger Prajñā-pāramitā texts, we must also examine a broader range to avoid too narrow a focus.

4.1 Chinese “無罣礙” ← Sanskrit “a-√saṅga” / “a-√sañj”?

The direct phrase “無罣礙” (wú guà’ài), or simply “罣礙” (guà’ài) without the negation, appears only twice in Kumārajīva’s Mōhē text, in Chp. 65. We may translate the first passage in context as follows.24

Then, Śakra, Lord of the Gods, said to Subhūti: Whatever Subhūti has stated is only for the sake of emptiness, without being hung-obstructed (無罣礙). Just as an arrow shot up into empty space is not obstructed (無礙), so too is Subhūti’s Dharma teaching not obstructed (無礙).

As we can see, the term differs slightly between the first reading and the second and third instances, which are slightly abbreviated by using only the second character. We have rendered “罣” (guà) as “hung”, based partly on the Kāngxī Dictionary entry which gives as an alternative the character “絓” (guà, guī), explained as “掛” (guà), meaning “to hang up”, or “suspend”, as in “懸掛” (xüán’guà). The common glyph sans radical “圭” (guī), coupled with the similar phonetics “guà” of all three terms, may help draw together or conflate their otherwise nuanced meanings.

The Sanskrit for the corresponding passage in the Pañcaviṃśati uses a verbal form, identical in all three instances, “na kvacit sajjati”, i.e. “it does not hang anywhere”.25 The verb “sajjati” is from the root √sañj, meaning “to stick”, “to hang”, “to be attached”, and so forth. We may cite Conze’s translation of the full passage here (1975: 480):

24Mōhēbānruòbōluómì Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷19 〈65 度空品〉 (CBETA, To8, no. 223, p. 362, a1-3).
Śakra: Whatever Subhūti the Elder may expound, all that he expounds with reference to emptiness, and he does not get stuck anywhere [(na kvacit sajjati)]. Just as an arrow shot into the air does not get stuck anywhere [(na kvacit sajjati)], just so Subhūti the Elder’s demonstration of Dharma.

This metaphor of an arrow not getting stuck, hanging, or being obstructed in empty space appears earlier in the text, at Chp. 60 in the Chinese, and Chp. 54 of the Sanskrit. There, it is a metaphor for how the bodhisattva’s skillful arrow of insight upholds the merit of their virtuous deeds aloft in emptiness, without letting that merit prematurely fall to the ground of the two vehicles as opposed to the ground of a fully awakened Buddha (see Conze 1975: 426). However, this full explanation of the arrow metaphor in this earlier chapter does not use the terms “無(罣)礙” or “na kvacit sajjati” at all.

A possible explanation for the exact translation idiom of this singular appearance of the term “無(罣)礙” in Kumārajīva’s Móhē could be the influence of the earlier translation of the same text, the Fàngguāng Bānrūbōluómì Jīng (放光般若波羅蜜經). The wording in the Fàngguāng is nearly identical in the first case, with “無所罣礙” (wú suŏguà’aì). The subsequent second and third appearances use “無礙” (wú aì) and “無所著” (wú suŏzhú), i.e. “without any attachment”. This influence may be similar to Harrison’s explanation of the translation history of the Vajracchedikā (2010a), whereby later translators and translations borrow heavily from earlier efforts.

Both these passages from the larger texts are in turn also found in, and thus actually derived from, the earlier literature of the Aśṭasāhasrikā and Chinese equivalents. They are thus not new material added when the Aśṭasāhasrikā expanded into the Pañcaviṃśati. However, for the former shorter passage, while the Sanskrit Aṣṭa still uses “na kvacit sajjati”, Kumārajīva’s Xiaŏpĭn translation only uses “無礙” (wú aì), just like the second and third instances of this term in the Móhē.

A second appearance of “無障” (wúguà) is also present in the Móhē translation. This, however, appears to have undergone editorial emendation by the com-

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27Fàngguāng Bānrūbōluómì Jīng 《放光般若經》卷15〈66 牢固品〉 (CBETA, T08, no. 221, p. 104, a20-b2).
ilers of the Taishō, who have “corrected” the term “意無閡” (yì wúhé) to “意無罣閡” (yì wú-guàhé); where a variant of “罣” (guà, guī) is given as “絓” (guà) in the Sòng and Gōng editions. The Sanskrit for this in the Pañcaviṃśati is “apratihatacittair”, i.e. “who have unobstructed minds”. We shall return to the use of “a-prati-√han” below (§4.2). Since this second appearance in the Taishō may simply be due to modern critical editing, we cannot lay too much importance on it here for an attempted reconstruction and rereading of the classic Chinese Heart Sūtra.

While there are only the above two uses of “無罣” (wúguà) in the larger Chinese Móhē text, terms from the root √sañj or √saj, meaning “to stick” or “to hang”, are much more common, and worthy of examination. Several more examples can be mentioned in brief as follows:

1. In the same list of qualities of the bodhisattvas found at the very start of the text, which includes “an unobstructed mind” above, we also have “得無閡陀羅尼” (dé wú'aì tuóluóní), equivalent to Sanskrit “asaṅgdhāranīpratilabdhair”, meaning “have obtained unobstructed mnemonics”. This therefore translates “asaṅga”, from “a-√sañj”, as “無閡” (wúhé), and thus is like our earlier second case of the emendment from “意無閡” (yì wúhé) to “意無罣閡” (yì wúguàhé) in the Móhē text.

2. The large text continues the well known definition of “bodhisattva” that is found in the middle of the first chapter of the Asṭasāhasrikā and Chinese translations. This definition is based on the etymological similarities between what is most likely a Prakrit “(bodhi)satta” Sanskritized as either “sattva” (“living being”) or the past participle of “sañj”, i.e. “sakta” (“attached”). That is, the “awakening being” (bodhisattva) is both “not a being” (asattva, asatta) and also “unattached” (asakta, asatta). The expanded Móhē text of this definition states that the bodhisattva should train in and know “nonattachment toward all phenomena” (一切法無閡(相)中); in the Pañcaviṃśati this is “sarvadharmaṃ ... asaktatāyām”.

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31 Móhē-bānruòbōluómi Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷4〈12 句義品〉 (CBETA, To8, no. 223, p. 242, b28-c5).
The Xiaopin version of this gives “無障礙”; the Sanskrit, also “[a]saktatāyām”. The term “asaktatā” is the negative of the past participle from verbal root व्यङ्ग्य, in the abstract (-tā).

3. Another appearance of “na … sajjati” in the sense of “not hang” can be found in the Sanskrit Paṇcavimśati. The idea is that the bodhisattva engages in the full range of Mahāyāna practices, as well as teaching other living beings to engage in them, all without either himself or others “being attached” (नाभिनिविष्ट) or “hanging on anything” (na kvacit sajjati). This is just as a magical creation of the Tathāgata “does not hang” (i.e. get attached to) (na…sajjati) onto a donor, donation or recipient.34 So says the Sanskrit, but the Chinese Móhē only features “無所著” (wú suŏzhuó), which corresponds to “nābhiniṣṭa”.35 The Sanskrit “na … sajjati” may well be a later addition, though this association of terms still highlights its sense as “not be attached to” something.

4. There are other uses of “無(所)礙” (wú (suŏ)aì) to translate “व्यङ्ग्य”. For example, the notion of “being without obstruction (無所礙; asaṅga) through the power of skillful means”. It is worth noting that this passage in didactic question and answer style is punctuated with “The bodhisattva should perceive the mind (citta)”;36 combining the term with “mind” as in the Heart Sūtra, and also the “unobstructed (無礙; asaṅga) practice of perfect knowledge”.37

5. In a call and response litany section, from the Móhē translation, Prajñāpāramitā is also described as “unobstructed (無礙) gnosis”, “because of non-obstruction, non-hindrance (無障無礙) of gnosis with regard to all (phenomena)”.38 When we compare with the Sanskrit, it appears that the Chinese may have elided passages, for the Sanskrit is far more coherent. The Sanskrit states that it is an unobstructed perfection “asaṅgapāramitā” due to all phenomena having the same own nature as space (ākāśa); and that it is a direct penetrative wisdom (pratisamvid), due to “non-obstruction, non-hindrance of all gnosis” (sarvatrajñānāsaṅgāprati-

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33Xiaopjn Bānruōbōluómi Jing 《小品般若波羅蜜經》卷1〈初品〉 (CBETA, To8, no. 227, p. 538, c14-17); Sanskrit, Aṣṭasāhasrikā (Vaidya 1960: 9); cf. Conze (1973: 89).
35Móhēbānruōbōluómi Jing 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷24〈78 四攝品〉 (CBETA, To8, no. 223, p. 397, c28-p. 398, a1).
36Móhēbānruōbōluómi Jing 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷12〈42 歎浄品〉 (CBETA, To8, no. 223, p. 307, c15-20); Sanskrit, Paṇca-vimśati- (Kimura 1986: 2:3:168).
37Móhēbānruōbōluómi Jing 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷12〈42 歎浄品〉 (CBETA, To8, no. 223, p. 307, c29-p. 308, a3); Sanskrit, Paṇca-vimśati- (Kimura 1986: 2:3:168).
38Móhēbānruōbōluómi Jing 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷12〈44 遍歎品〉 (CBETA, To8, no. 223, p. 313, a18-19).
This echoes the arrow metaphor with respect to “empty space”. The use of “無礙智” (wú'ài zhì) for Sanskrit “pratisa.ṃvid” is prevalent throughout the entire Móhē translation. The Chinese translation idiom strongly suggests a reading of the root “vid” as meaning both “gnosis” (√vid), hence “智”, and also “penetrate” (√vidh), therefore “無礙”, combined as a binome.

From these multiple examples, we see that while there may be a number of grammatical and contextual variations, Sanskrit terms from √sañj or √saj and their translation into Chinese based around “礙” (aì) are very common throughout the larger Prajñāpāramitā text. While this Chinese matches the Heart Sūtra, the particular Sanskrit term is neither the standard phrase in the Sanskrit Hṛdaya, nor the common variant from “ālambana”.

### 4.2 Chinese “無礙” ← Sanskrit “a-prati-√gha” / “a-prati-√han”?

Our last example above combined “無障” (wúzhàng) and “無礙” (wú'ai) together, the former from a-√sañj, the latter from a-prati-√han with the sense of “not (a-) striking (√han) against (-prati-)”. The latter in turn derives from the same root as another expression which was often translated as the verbal form “不礙” (bú aì), in Sanskrit “na … prati-√han”. This is another potential Sanskrit source for the Heart Sūtra’s notion of “無礙” (wú guài) which is in need of examination.

One passage in Chp. 54 of the Chinese and Chp. 48 in the Sanskrit corresponds to the expansion of the central chapter of the Aṣṭasāhasrikā entitled “Suchness” (Tathatā; 如 rú). This passage refers to the Prajñāpāramitā in terms used much earlier in the Buddhist tradition to describe the Buddha’s reflections immediately after his awakening, in which he describes the Dharma he has realized as profound, difficult to know and comprehend, and “running against the entire world” (sarvalokavipratyanīkā) (cf. Conze 1975: 375). After the discussion within the larger Prajñāpāramitā, the conclusion is in fact the reverse of this. In the Móhē, “This Dharma is in accord with all dharmas” (是法隨順一切法; sarvadhammānulomiko ‘yaṃ … dharmah), and thus “It does not obstruct form” (不礙; na pratihanyate), or the other dharmas, up to omniscience itself. The

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40For example, Rhys Davids & Oldenberg (1881: 84-85); = Pāli Vinaya i 4-5; other Vinayas have equivalent passages. Also in Samyutta Nikāya, SN 6:1, i 136; Bodhi (2000: 231); etc.

conflicting points of view of being against or in accord with the world are largely
due to the respective senses of Dharma as teaching and fundamental law, but the
rhetorical effect of “shock” is still striking.

Another use of Chinese “無礙” (wú aì) for Sanskrit “prati-√han” later in the
same chapter appears to be a case of a confused attempt at translation standard-
ization possibly brought about by the earlier passage. In the Sanskrit, referring
to the altruistic ideal of the bodhisattva, it states how they “should develop an
attitude of benefit” (hitacittatotpādayitavyā) toward all beings, “an attitude of
nonaversion” (apratihatam cittam), and likewise for “an attitude of non-harm”
(aviheṭhanācittam) (cf. Conze 1975: 385). These are precisely the three posi-
tive attitudes that are the traditional defining features of right intention (samvak
saṅkalpa) within the eightfold path. The Chinese translation of the Mōhē has “安
隱” (ānyín), “無礙” (wú’ai), and “無腦” (wú’naō), respectively. The first and last
translation maintain the original sense, but the use of “無礙” (wú’ai) for “apra-
ティhata” really does not convey the notion of “nonaversion” or “non-aggression”.
The choice of translation lexicon may be due to the earlier passages on “non-
obstruction”, and perhaps a perceived need for consistency of idiom between the
Sanskrit and Chinese. This reading is thus more an exception than the rule, and
carries little interpretative weight for our present purposes.

Other translations in the Mōhē of “無礙” (wú’ai) for “aprati-√gha” appear to
be significantly different from our intended meaning here. An example is within
the formulaic Abhidharma expression describing phenomena as “without form,
invisible, non-obstructing (apratighā; 無礙)”. The variants outside the Taishō of
“無對” (wú’duí) is often the more standard translation term. “Obstructing” in
this sense is the defining characteristic of material form (rūpa) for the Abhid-
harma systems.

Above we have provided ample evidence for the use of “無障礙” (wú guà’aì) as
a translation in the Mōhē for Sanskrit terms derived from the verbal “na … √sañj”
or noun forms “a-√saṅga”; and also from the verbal form “a-prati-√han” or noun
“a-prati√gha”. The reader may recall, however, that in the textual passage we are
examining, the Sanskrit text had neither of these terms.

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43Mōhēbānruōbōluōmí jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷16〈54 大如品〉 (CBETA, To8, no.
jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷22〈74 遍學品〉 (CBETA, To8, no. 223, p. 382, b10-16).
4.3 Chinese “無礙” ← Sanskrit “an-ā-√vr” (anāvaraṇa)?

Conze’s critical text of the Heart sutra has “cittāvaraṇa”, though he conceded that “cittālambana” was another possibility (see §1.3). Neither of these terms appears in a compound with “citta” in the Sanskrit Pañcaviṃśati or Aṣṭasāhasrikā texts. This is yet another hint at the language correspondences between Sanskrit and Chinese in the Heart Sūtra that underlie Nattier’s thesis (§1.4). However, there are numerous cases where either “āvaraṇa” or “ālambana” alone, or prefixed, do feature.

One of the passages featuring “anāvaraṇa” appears at the end of Chp. 54 of the Chinese, Chp. 48 of the Sanskrit, on Suchness (Tathatā; 如 rú). We have already discussed the start of this chapter, which features “不礙” as a translation for “not obstruct” (na prati-√han) (see §4.2). Conze’s translation from the Sanskrit reads “When he thus trains and abides, then form, etc. to: the stability of the Good Dharma, will be uncovered (anāvaraṇa) to him” (1975: 387). Kumārajiva’s Mōhē reads “When the bodhisattva thus trains, thus practices, he shall attain unobstructed form (當得無礙色) … attain unobstructed stability of Dharma (得無礙法住)”. The sentence construction in either Sanskrit or Chinese could also potentially be rendered “shall attain non-obstruction [with respect to] form”.

Another passage at the end of the text brings in the notion of the “essential emptiness” (prakṛtiśūnyatā) of phenomena as the manner in which the bodhisattva “contemplates all phenomena without any obstruction” (na kasyacid dharmsavyāvaraṇaṃ samanupaśyati). Without apprehending a living being, they teach the Dharma to living beings, just as if there were illusory creations. This statement is rendered into Chinese in the Mōhē as “知一切法無礙” (zhī yīqièfă wúài), i.e. “knowing all phenomena without obstruction”. In both cases, the use of “without obstruction” is used to describe—adjectivally or adverbially—a form of practice or contemplation. With only a couple of appearances, we note that this is a rare phrase in the larger Prajñāpāramitā text.

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46Mōhēbānruōbòluōmǐ Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷16〈54 大如品〉 (CBETA, To8, no. 223, p. 338, c29-p. 339, a2).
48Mōhēbānruōbòluōmǐ Jīng 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》卷24〈78 四攝品〉 (CBETA, To8, no. 223, p. 397, a3-8).
4.4 Chinese “無礙” ← Sanskrit “an-ā-√lamb(h)” (anālambana)?

There are, in addition, several examples in the Sanskrit text of terms from “an-ā-√lamb(h)”, either in verbal or nominal forms. The term is also uncommon, however, and mainly appears in the latter half of the text, where the material may have been added as the text expanded over time. In our present commonly used late manuscripts and critical editions of the Pañcaviṃśati, the term appears frequently within the section headings of the embedded Abhisamayālāṃkāra. As they were unknown in the classic Chinese Buddhist sphere, and likewise in Chinese translations, we rightly ignore such section headings here. Even more curiously, the term is far more prevalent in the Aṣṭasāhasrikā than in the Pañcaviṃśati, which runs against our usual texthistorical notion of the relation-ship between the two, namely that almost the entirety of the smaller text is preserved intact within the larger. We shall only focus on the Pañcaviṃśati here, however, for its direct connection with the Heart Sūtra.

A prosaic non-technical use of the verb “adhy-ā-√lamb” as “get hold of” appears in Chp. 45 of the Sanskrit and Chp. 51 of the Mōhē. This is “get hold of” a log or plank from a shipwreck in the ocean in order to avoid death, as a metaphor for how the practitioner “gets hold of”, i.e. takes as an object, this Prajñā-pāramitā to escape the ocean of saṃsāra. The Chinese translation uses “取” (qū), i.e. “seize upon”, rather than the more technical translation “所緣” (suŏyüán) for “ālambaṇa” (refer Buswell & Lopez 2013: 83). Other appearances of the term are also translated in a non-technical sense in the Chinese. For example, “to seek” (求 qíü) supreme awakening, for “adhy-ālambhate”; and also that the bodhisattva does “not desire” (不貪 bù tān) the grounds of the two vehicles, for “na … adhyālambate”. Note that only one of these non-technical uses of the term is a negation, and both are prefixed in the Sanskrit with “adhi°”, which distinguishes them from the term under examination in the variant Sanskrit reading of the Heart Sūtra.

The only technical uses of the term in the sense of an object of cognition or contemplation in the Sanskrit are near the end of the text. The first is that of

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“purity of the object” (ālambanapariśuddhiḥ), the second item on a list of four “purities”. The context is an explanation of technical lists; this list of four is merely one of many. In the second appearance, according to Conze’s translation, the bodhisattvas “obtain the sovereignty of thought through a cognition which has the indiscriminate realm for its object” (avikalpadhātvālambanena) (1975: 651). We have unfortunately been unable to uncover the parallel textual passages in the Chinese Mōhē translation, suggesting that perhaps it is an addition in our late Sanskrit recension. This, plus the fact that the wider context is a discourse involving Maitreya, are strong indications that the appearance of these terms from “ā-влamb” are not useful for our study here.

4.5 Reading: “Mind without hanging on anything”

Applying Nattier’s theory of the textual history of the Heart Sūtra, there are no passages in the Sanskrit that offer clear and obvious equivalents to the Chinese phrase of our third problematic statement, “心無罣礙” (xīn wú guà'ai). Granted, this statement itself comes from Conze’s Division VI of the text, which lies outside the body of Division V taken directly from the larger Sūtra, and, if Nattier’s theory is correct, it is thus as much a creation of the compiler as a reworking of established textual terms, passages and ideas.

Still, some observations can be made, and a cautious thesis presented. We examined four possible Sanskrit sources for our phrase: 1. The first was “a-वsaṅga” or “a-वsañj”, “to hang”. This was the only one that directly corresponded to the Chinese phrase from the Heart Sūtra. It is widely used throughout the text, and the arrow in empty space metaphor indicates that it had greater philosophical depth of usage. 2. The second “a-prati-वgha” or “a-prati-वhan”, “to strike against” or “to obstruct”. This was also fairly common, though it had a broad semantic range, parts of which differed somewhat from our Heart Sūtra usage. Between these first two potential sources is an overlap of their broad range of meaning: the idea of being obstructed, stuck to, hitting up against. Subjectively, the bodhisattva’s mind is so freed in his meditation on the gnosis of emptiness; and objectively, the Dharma itself is not in conflict with anything. 3. The third “an-ा-वvr” (anāvaraṇa), “to cover”, which together with the fourth and last, 4. “an-ा-влamb(h)” (anālambana), “to grasp at” or “to take as a mental object”, were both

rarely used, and often in a manner quite dissimilar to that of the Heart Sūtra. Despite “an-ā-√vṛr” being the term Conze eventually opted for, and his theory of a possible scribal error from “an-ā-√lamb(h)”, these two seem to be the least likely matches for our problematic statement.

Comparing and weighing these possible sources, we thus read “心無罣礙” (xīn wú guà’ai) in the Heart Sūtra in the sense of “na … sajjati”, but also containing the shared sense of non-attachment also found in “a-prati-√han”. Thus, the mind of the bodhisattva “does not hang on anything”.

5 Understanding from the Heart of Perfect Wisdom

We began this essay with the importance of the Heart Sūtra in the Mahāyāna tradition, both past and present. Conze’s critical edition of the Sanskrit, and his translation thereof into English, have—along with a vast plethora of other English translations—also pointed the way for the future of this text in the ever growing Western Buddhist tradition (§1). Conze noted three problematic elements of his Sanskrit text, that of “na prāptir nāprāpti.h” (§1.1), “aprāptitvād” (§1.2) and “cittāvaraṇa” or “cittālambana” (§1.3). Subsequent translations, whether also from Sanskrit, or from Chinese or Tibetan, have done little to resolve these problems. Many popular books on the Heart Sūtra in English use the text as little more than a cypher to plug in sectarian or favorite Buddhist systems for commentary, rather than attempting to explain the text in its own context and thought world.

Nattier’s theory (§1.4) of an apocryphal Chinese source for the Heart Sūtra provides a possible avenue for examination. This avenue may lead to an authentic and contextualized reading of the Heart Sūtra, despite the claim of “apocryphal” that may alarm more traditional readers. In her thesis of the text’s history, the Sanskrit text of the larger Pañcaviṃśati Prajñāpāramitā was translated into Chinese, e.g. Kumārajīva’s Móhē text; from this a core passage of text was extracted, and a head and tail appended, to create the first Heart Sūtra in Chinese, not Sanskrit. Only subsequently did this Chinese compilation become translated, perhaps rather idiosyn-cratically, into Sanskrit. Her theory provides an approach to resolving Conze’s problems, by reading not the Sanskrit Heart Sūtra variants, but by taking the problematic passages in the Chinese of the Heart Sūtra, tracing their appearance and usage in the larger Chinese Prajñāpāramitā, and from there delving back into the Sanskrit of the larger Pañcaviṃśati Sūtra (§1.5). We repeat that our readings here take Nattier’s basic thesis as a working hypothesis.
This is the process that we have followed for each of the three problematic passages in the body of this essay. Our basic results are as follows: 1. For “無得” (wúdé), we followed the part of the Heart Sūtra extracted directly from the larger text to adopt a reading of “no attainment”, in the sense of realization of spiritual fruitions. This is still in conformity with the majority of modern readings (§2). 2. Regarding the phrase “以無所得故” (yǐ wú sūodé gù), we concluded that it most closely corresponds to the notion of “due to engagement in non-apprehension”. This clearly differs from the common notion that it is the same basic term as the first phrase, i.e. “attainment”, and means the non-apprehension of an object of the senses or of a contemplative practice. The term is more likely from “an-upa-√labh(-yoga)” in the instrumental, and not from “prāpti(tva)” in the ablative. Moreover, we also considered that this phrase not only does not start the next section of the Heart Sūtra, but clearly concludes the early part of the text, from “Therefore, Śāriputra, in emptiness...”. The notion of “non-apprehension” of a mental object matches well with the opening of this portion of the text (§3). 3. Lastly, the term “心無罣礙” (xīn wú guà’ài) does not seem to correspond to either of the terms from the Sanskrit text. Rather than referring to “mental obstructions” as one of a range of specific “obstructions” as suggested by Conze—karma, kleśa and jñeya—it seems to refer to the mind which does not get hung up, i.e. attached, to any phenomena. Thus, the term “心無罣礙” bears closest association with the usage of terms from the Sanskrit root √sañj in the larger texts, particularly where the semantic range of this term overlaps with prati-√han (§4).

Finally, we would like to take our new readings of these passages in the Heart Sūtra, and return them to the context of the two divisions of the text, V and VI. In addition, some reflections about each of the two divisions as a whole, and also their mutual relationship, can be given.

[V] Therefore, Śāriputra, in emptiness
there is no form, no sensation, perception, volitions or cognition;
no eye, ear, nose, tongue, body or mind;
no sight, sound, aroma, flavor, tactile or mental object;
no eye, sight, visual cognition, up to, no mind, mental object,
mental cognition;
no ignorance, no extinction of ignorance, up to, no aging and death,
no extinction of aging and death;
no dissatisfaction, origin, cessation, path;
no gnosis, no realization;  
due to engagement in non-apprehension.

While many have focused on this part of the text as indicating that the various standard taxonomies are negated, our new reading brings attention back to the framing of these lists and their negation. The key difference in this framing is that here, division V ends in the statement which is otherwise commonly placed at the start of division VI. The frame is “In emptiness, … due to engagement in non-apprehension”. It is our view that this shifts emphasis from an ontological negation of classical lists, i.e. “there is no X”, to an epistemological stance. That is, when the bodhisattva is “in emptiness”, i.e. the contemplative meditation of the emptiness of phenomena, he is “engaged in the non-apprehension” of these phenomena. “Engagement” can be seen as a broad term covering practices, meditations, contemplations and so forth of perfect wisdom. Such a reading thus does not run counter to the notion that when not “in emptiness”, such phenomena may still be apprehended, perceived to exist and function as objects of contemplation.

The next division, VI, now shorn of the statement which most editions and translations place at the start, therefore reads as follows:

[VI] The bodhisattvas, due to being supported by transcendental knowledge, have minds which do not hang on anything;  
due to their minds not hanging on anything, they are without fear;  
removed from perverted perceptions and views, they ultimately realize nirvāṇa.

The bodhisattva, who at V was said to be “engaged in non-apprehension”, i.e. meditating on emptiness, is here “supported by transcendental knowledge”, i.e. prajñāpāramitā. The two phrases are basically synonymous. Therefore, due to not apprehending phenomena, the mind of the bodhisattva does not hang up on anything at all. They are “not hung up”, possibly from “asakta” (or “asatta”), and thus a bodhi- “sattva” (or “satta”) is freed of views of a living being “asattva” (or “asatta”) by his non-apprehension, his engagement in the contemplation of emptiness.

We have based our reading of Conze’s problematic portions of the Heart Sūtra on an approach which takes Nattier’s theory of an apocryphal source for the text as a working hypothesis, with a little help from Harrison. However, our conclusions are not at all radically opposed to traditional readings. Rather, we hope to reconstruct as much as possible the ideas of the terms in the mind of the text’s com-
piler(s), i.e. the Heart of the Perfection of Wisdom, the Pañca-vaṃśati-sāhasrikā. By this, we obliquely seek to point those interested in the Heart Sūtra to draw from the larger body of this genre in their readings and understanding. We welcome all comments, corrections and criticisms from the learned readership.

Bibliography

Classical Language Sources

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T220 《大般若波羅蜜多經》 Da Bānruòbōluómiduō Jing (2), (3), (≈ Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā)
T221 《放光般若波羅蜜經》 Fàngguāng Bānruòbōluómi Jing, (≈ Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā)
T222 《光讚般若波羅蜜經》 Guāngzàn Bānruòbōluómi Jing, (≈ Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā)
T223 《摩訶般若波羅蜜經》 Móhē Bānruòbōluómi Jing, (≈ Pañcaviṃśati-sāhasrikā)
T227 《小品般若波羅蜜經》 Xiǎopǐn Bānruòbōluómi Jing, (≈ Aṣṭasāhasrikā)
T250 《摩訶般若波羅蜜大明咒經》 Móhē Bānruòbōluómi Dàmíngzhōu Jing, (≈ Hṛdaya)
T251 《般若波羅蜜多心經》 Bānruòbōluómiduō Xin Jing, (≈ Hṛdaya)
T252 《普遮智藏般若波羅蜜多心經》 Pǔzhānzhàng Bānruòbōluómiduō Xin Jing, (≈ Hṛdaya)
T253 《般若波羅蜜多心經》 Bānruòbōluómiduō Xin Jing, (≈ Hṛdaya)
T254 《般若波羅蜜多心經》 Bānruòbōluómiduō Xin Jing, (≈ Hṛdaya)
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Modern Language Sources


On the Buddha’s Use of Some Brahmanical Motifs in Pali Texts

Brett Shults

Many Pali texts portray the Buddha in the act of expressing his teachings through Brahmanical motifs. They are “Brahmanical” motifs because for readers today they are visible in Brahmanical texts, even if we cannot be sure how composers of Pali texts came to use such motifs. The aim of this paper is to consider and hopefully to advance our understanding of how some of the same motifs are used in Brahmanical and Pali texts.

Introduction

Since the days when T. W. Rhys Davids and other pioneering scholars labored to understand Pali texts in light of evidence external to them, many terms, phrases, ideas, myths, and structural or stylistic devices common to Brahmanical and Pali texts have been identified. Sometimes these motifs have been taken as evidence that the Buddha or early Buddhists had some knowledge of Brahmanical lore, such as verses of the Rgveda (e.g. Lindtner, 1998) or teachings found in the Upaniṣads (e.g. Nakamura, 1955; Ghosh, 1969; Dutt, 1970). But it also has been argued that motifs common to Brahmanical and Pali texts only show that some Brahmins and Buddhists drew from a common fund of ideas and figures of speech (Chandra, 1971; Bronkhorst, 2007), that is to say from what Patton (2008) has called “an early Indian imaginaire” (p. 54). Richard Gombrich (2009), on the other hand, has argued that the best available explanation for certain passages in Pali texts is that they are meant to refer to Brahmanical teachings, visible to us in Brahmanical texts. Indeed, in several publications Gombrich has found the recognition of Brahmanical motifs in Pali texts to be the key to contextualizing
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and therefore understanding early Buddhist teachings. In this Gombrich has built on the work of his teacher K. R. Norman, who among other scholarly feats has developed a scheme for categorizing “the Buddha’s use of Brahmanical terms” (Norman, 1991, p. 193). Norman’s scheme is primarily concerned with how the Buddha or his followers responded to various expressions used in the Brahmanical tradition, but the scheme also includes “ideas” (p. 199), and a few examples of “structures” such as “myths and fables” (p. 194). Thus, Norman’s scheme is actually an underutilized framework for classifying a range of motifs common to Brahmanical and Pali texts. Classification is not the aim of this article, but exploring the possibility that early Buddhists employed a variety of Brahmanical motifs is very much the concern of what follows. I shall endeavor to contribute to this line of thought by first briefly surveying a number of motifs common to Brahmanical and Pali texts, and then by focusing on a few motifs common to Brahmanical and Pali texts in more detail. My concern in this article is not necessarily with the historical individual known as the Buddha, but with words attributed to him: herein “the Buddha” means the Buddha portrayed in Pali texts.

In some of the Sanskrit passages below sandhi effects have been removed fully or partially so that individual words may be better identified, and compared where appropriate with Pali words. Unless otherwise stated, Pali quotations are from the Burmese Chaṭṭha Saṅgāyana Tipiṭaka edition, but in lower case, with punctuation marks removed, and in a few cases with sandhi effects removed.

A Spectrum of Motifs Common to Brahmanical and Pali Texts

Motifs common to Brahmanical and Pali texts can be imagined as lying along a spectrum of increasing evidence that Brahmins or Buddhists knew something of the others’ teachings. At one end of the spectrum and outside the scope of this paper are words or phrases in identical or analogous forms common to Brahmanical and Pali texts, but devoid for our purposes of comparative interest: water is wet and fire burns in Brahmanical and Pali texts alike. More interesting are expressions which suggest a borrowing has occurred, perhaps from an organized composition, from the vocabulary of a sect, or from an imaginaire of common cultural tropes and figures of speech whose further study might help us better appreciate a bygone world. Pali texts often mention “divine sight” (dībbā cakkhu), for example, a kind of special ability also mentioned at CU 8.12.5 (daiva cākṣus). Pali texts frequently employ the term nāmarūpa (“name and appearance”), a term used in several Brahmanical texts. Other well known motifs common to Brah-
manical and Pali texts include the way bodies of water symbolize life’s difficulties, watercraft symbolize teachings and practices, and “crossing over” and the “other side” symbolize deliverance, variously conceived (Shaw, 2012). Also well known is the way Pali texts employ the Brahmanical motif of the triple refuge, found e.g. at RV 9.97.47 (śarman trivarūtha) and RV 6.46.9 (tridhātu śaraṇa), and the going to three entities for refuge (śaraṇa), found e.g. at CU 2.22.3-4 (Weiler, 1962, p. 241). Probably less well known is that both PU 1.6-8 and Vv #647 (Be) call the sun “thousand-rayed” (S. sahasrāsmi / P. sahasra.msī), and speak of it shining in the ten directions or what amounts to them. Wynne (2007) has pointed out that the description at Ud 80 of a state “where there is no earth, water, fire... no sun or moon” (p. 115) is very like a description at KaU 5.15: “There the sun does not shine, nor do the stars; lightning does not shine...” (pp. 115, 155, n. 22). The similarity of a description at Ud 9 equally suggests a borrowing: “There the stars do not shine, nor does the sun give light, There the moon does not glow... ” (Ānandajoti, 2008, p. 38).

The common use of the expression “above, below, and across” (P. uddham adho ca tiriyaṃ / S. ārdhva.m adha.h ca tiryak) also suggests a borrowing. It is used as a rhetorical flourish which signifies completeness in a given context, at e.g. SN i 122 and SU 5.4. The Buddha uses variations of the motif, such as uddham... adho... tiriyaṃ at AN i 141; variants are likewise found in the epics and other Sanskrit works. The Buddha’s variation at Sn 202 (uddham adho tiriyaṁcāpi ma- jjhe) involves the word “middle” (P. majjha / S. madhya) and is close to a negative formulation in the Sa.mhitā of the White Yajurveda at VS 65.5 (na... ārdhva.m na tiryācām na madhye), also found at SU 4.19. These examples appear to be related to expressions such as that found at RV 1.24.15, TS 1.5.11.3, and elsewhere, including AV 7.83.3 (Whitney, 1905, p. 450):

ūd uttamaṃ varaṇaḥ pāsāṃ asmād ēvādhanāṃ vī madhyāmaṃ śrathāya
Loosen up the uppermost fetter from us, O Varuṇa, [loosen] down the lowest, off the midmost

Metaphorical talk of fetters, snares, etc. – sometimes using the term pāsa (Rhys Davids, 1907, p. 111) – is itself a significant motif in Pali texts. One wonders if Buddhists who used the motif were aware of what we call the Rgveda. We can liken the situation to the use of certain English expressions in our own day: some people deliberately echo and thereby evoke the King James Bible, others speak its idioms unawares, and still others may use an idiom and know an its bibli- cal providence, but attach no situational significance to that providence. Thus,
when the Buddha at SN i 229 refers to Sakka (Indra) as one who (Bodhi, 2000, p. 330) “thinks of a thousand matters in a moment” and as “Thousand-eyed” (sahasakkha), one wonders if the Buddha means to evoke the verse at RV 1.23.3 in which Indra is called a “lord of thought” and “thousand-eyed” (sahasrākṣa). One wonders why at Sn 76 the Buddha’s foe Māra is called “Namuci”, the name of Indra’s foe at e.g. RV 8.14.13 (Thomas, 1997, p. 146). At Sn 82 the Buddha uses the phrase cando va rāhuggaṇā pamuttā. Applied to a plural subject, this means: “freed, like the moon from Rāhu’s grasp.”1 CU 8.13.1 contains nearly the same phrase: candrāḥ iva rāhoḥ mukhāḥ pramucya, i.e. “freeing myself, like the moon from Rāhu’s jaws” (Olivelle, 1998, p. 287). We may never know if the Buddhist composer of Sn 82 was trying to endow his composition with explicitly Brahmanical overtones, or if he simply used a phrase like one which happened to be used in a Brahmanical composition.

In some Pali texts the Buddha speaks explicitly of what he calls brāhmaṇa-dhamma, a word suggestive of what Brahmins believe and do in accordance with their beliefs.2 And there are indeed many motifs in Pali texts related to the doctrines and practices of Brahmins. For example, in the Ambattīha Sutta (DN 3) the Buddha asks at DN i 97 if a certain kind of person would obtain a seat among the Brahmins, or water, if he would be fed, and if he would be taught holy utterances (manta = S. mantra). This is virtually identical to the sequence of events starting at BU 6.2.4 when a Brahmin arrives at the court of Pravāhaṇa Jaivali. The Brahmin is offered a seat, given water, provided with “refreshments” (Olivelle, 1998, p. 147; Black, 2007, p. 116), and finally instructed. Black (2007) has shown how this BU passage is related to ideas advanced in other Brahmanical texts, his point being that the passage depicts the sequence of events in accordance with Brahmanical ideas about proper relationships and behaviors involving Brahmins (pp. 114-119). The Ambattīha Sutta at DN i 91 depicts a Brahmin who is rather touchy about just what those behaviors should be, upset that the Buddha’s countrymen did not receive him properly. When the Buddha continues to ask that same Brahmin how certain kinds of people would be received, he varies his questions in a manner which implies that the ways to treat a Brahmin and a member of the war-

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1The phrase also occurs at Sn 89. Kochhar (2010) describes Rāhu’s career in ancient Indian texts; the Pali texts Kochhar cites are the Candima Sutta (SN i 50) and the Suriya Sutta (SN i 51).

2The PED defines brāhmaṇa-dhamma as the “duty” of a Brahmin. Freiberger (2009, p. 63) translates brāhmaṇa-dhammā at AN iii 221 as “principles of Brahmins”; Bodhi (2012, p. 800) as “brahmin practices”. Norman (2001, p. 35) translates brāhmaṇa-dhamma at Sn 50 as “brahmanical lore”. The number of possible translations for dhamma is notorious.
rior class are epitomized differently, though these stereotypes are not the target of his teaching.

Wijesekera (1945) has elucidated a motif common to Brahmanical and Pali texts which shows that early Buddhist involvement with the Brahmanical thought-world might well have been quite complex, in so far as Brahmanical teachings on certain matters were not monolithic and were themselves complex. Many have written about Sāti’s misguided views on consciousness (*viññāṇa*) and the Buddha’s scathing response as set forth in MN 38. Norman (1990) and Gombrich (2009, pp. 119-120) helpfully have placed the episode in an Upaniṣadic context, but it was Wijesekera who revealingly juxtaposed Sāti’s views and certain Upaniṣadic passages with MN i 8, CU 3.14.2-4, and ŚB 10.6.3.2. To put it simply: Sāti and certain Upaniṣadic passages appear to express a view which is opposed by the Buddha (MN i 8, MN i 258), CU 3.14.2-4, and ŚB 10.6.3.2. When Sāti explains his view of consciousness at MN i 258 he says it is *vado vedeyyo*, this “speaking, feeling one”. This same phrase is uttered by the Buddha at MN i 8 as he gives an example of a misguided view. Wijesekera has shown that the phrase *vado vedeyyo* is a way of referring to something essential about a person which is allied with a number of statements in the Upaniṣads, and that these represent a teaching opposed at least in form by a teaching which calls the self (*Śātman*) “speechless and indifferent” at CU 3.14.2-4 (*avākī anādaram*) and ŚB 10.6.3.2 (*avākkam anādaram*). I say “at least in form” out of respect for Wijesekera’s wish to argue about the subtle differences in Brahmanical doctrines and what exactly is affirmed and denied in the relevant Brahmanical passages. Wijesekera’s arguments need not detain us here, for what is important for our purposes is that MN i 8, CU 3.14.2-4, and ŚB 10.6.3.2 in their own ways deny a self which “speaks” and in some sense experiences or reacts to the world.

Part of what makes the study of Brahmanical motifs in Pali texts rewarding is the potential it holds for shedding light not only on what early Buddhists knew of Brahmanical beliefs and practices, but on what they knew of how Brahmins actually spoke of their beliefs and practices. Scholars including Jayatilleke (1963), Bhattacharya (1980), and Gombrich (1990) have discussed how BU 4.5.6 and MN i 135 refer to the identification of the self with a string of past participle meanings “seen, heard, considered, recognized” (*S. drṣṭa śruta mata vijnāta / P. diṭṭha*

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1Wijesekera refers to passages including BU 4.3.26 “where the Ātman is held to be the ‘speaker’ (i.e., agent) *par excellence*” (p. 92). The “speaker” in BU 4.3.23-25, 27-30 retains the capacity to think and to experience through the senses (see Olivelle, 1998, p. 517, n. 3.23-31).

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More recently, use of the rare term añjasāyana (“straight” or “straight way”) in the Tevijja Sutta (DN 13) and in three Brahmanical texts has prompted y own claim that the composer of the sutta portrayed Brahmins using the technical ritual vocabulary of Brāhmaṇa-style texts (Shults, 2013). These seem to be instances where Buddhists have successfully referred to actual Brahmanical [oral] teachings; I mention them here because as such they might be thought of as occupying the strong end of our evidential spectrum. But there are many other motifs in Pali texts which may reflect some knowledge of what Brahmins believed and said. We now turn to the examination of some of these motifs.

**Refining Gold**

The Brahmanical composer of PB 17.6.4 refers to a process of refining gold – Dube (2001, p. 173) regards the reference as credible – and likens it to a purifying ritual act. So too does the composer of PB 2.17.2, and the composer of JB 2.136 (Caland, 1931, p. 462). The Buddhist composer of AN i 257, on the other hand, likens the refining of gold to what happens to the Buddhist follower applying himself to higher thought (adhicitta). The composer of MN i 38 uses a gold-refining simile to illustrate his conception of ethical and mental achievement: “just as gold becomes pure and bright with the help of a furnace...” (Bodhi & Ñānamoli, 2005, p. 120). The composer of AN i 253-254, which Dube (2001, pp. 171-172) also regards as metallurgically credible, uses the motif of refining gold to make a point about purifying one's defilements. The composer of AN iii 16-17 employs a gold-refining motif to make a point about purifying mental defilements. In his account the “defilements” (upakkilesa) which defile gold are iron, copper, tin, lead, and silver. The composer thus identifies six of the so-called “seven metals of antiquity”, a list reminiscent of lists of metals in Brahmanical texts. But unlike the authors of e.g. VS 18.13 and TS 4.7.5.1, the Buddhist author sees iron, copper, etc. as impurities in gold, and in this he appears to display some fairly accurate metallurgical knowledge. According to Dube (2001, p. 174): “Native gold is invariably...”

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Footnotes:

4 Buddhist tradition has long felt the need to explain muta as “sensed” other than by sight and hearing (Bhattacharya, 1980, p. 11). While aware of this, the PED primarily defines muta: “thought, supposed, imagined”. Geiger (2000, p. 13) explains that muta as a “dialectal side-form” of mata simply means “thought”. Norman (2001, p. 107) translates diṭṭhaṃ va sutam mutam at Sn 157 as “seen, heard, or thought”.

5 The other is mercury. See Cramb (n.d.) A Short History of Metals. The Buddhist author needs, structurally, to name five defilements of gold.
by no means a pure metal. It contains up to 20% silver, copper, iron, lead, bismuth, platinum group metals, and other metals; as impurities. How much the composers of Brahmanical and Pali texts actually knew about metals, however, is less important for our purposes than what they did with such knowledge as they possessed. A preliminary consideration of gold-refining motifs common to Brahmanical and Pali texts yields the following observation: Brahmins enriched their discussions of what was important to them by relating the refining of gold to ritual, and Buddhists did the same except that they related the refining of gold to forms of mental training.

The motif of refining gold shows that some Brahmins and Buddhists drew upon similar ideas to construct and wield similes. It cannot be proved, but it is possible that the Buddhist versions of the motif are reworkings of Brahmanical usages into similes for mental purification. If so, we might say that here the Buddhists have borrowed not a word or a phrase, but ready-made templates for teaching by analogy.

Treating Gold with Salt

If the idea of working with gold to improve its quality captured the imagination of some Brahmins and Buddhists, one of the more intriguing manifestations of their shared interest in the topic is the idea of treating gold with salt. A metallurgical simile at JUB 3.17.3 begins:

tad yathā lavaṇena suvarṇaṃ samaddhyāt...

Just as one would fix gold with salt...

According to Monier-Williams (2005, p. 1144) the verb saṃdhā (above as saṃdadhyāt) carries a range of meanings including “hold” and “mend”, such that it is difficult on purely linguistic grounds to say what exactly the metallurgical operation is supposed to accomplish. The Greco-Roman world of antiquity knew techniques for refining gold with salt (Healy, 1999, pp. 283ff.; Dube, 2001, p. 178), as did the Indian world of antiquity (Dube, 2001, pp. 173ff. cites the Kautiliya Arthaśāstra). The JUB passage above continues: “silver with gold, tin with silver, copper with tin, iron with copper...”. Here again is the rhetorical collocation of several “metals of antiquity”, and one suspects that the refining or purification of metals somehow informs the passage. But whatever the composer of the passage

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6Cf. Healy (1999, pp. 283ff.)
meant by the verb *saṃvṛdhā*, it is clear from the larger context that the composer above all had in mind the rectifying of mistakes made in the performance of ritual. One might initially think that a sense of purifying the ritual is meant, but the composer takes the simile in another direction, more of repair or healing than purification. This is brought out by Oertel’s translations in the longer JUB passage (Oertel, 1896): just as one “would mend” (*samdadhyāt*) gold with salt, etc., so one “cures” (*bhisaḥjyati*), in effect, the ritual (p. 177). In a similar passage at CU 4.17.7 which speaks of gold, salt,7 and other “metals of antiquity”, Olivelle (1998) translates *saṃvṛdhā* as “binds”, the same verb being used later in the text to suggest the treatment of “an injury done to a sacrifice”, as in the binding of a wound (p. 229). One difficulty in fully appreciating the poetic vision of these passages is that additional materials have been listed, incongruously, with the salt and metals. The CU list continues with leather and wood; the JUB list with wood, leather, and śleśman, i.e. “cord” or perhaps “glue”. With these additions the passages seem to be hybrids between the purely metallurgical version of the motif at GB 1.1.14 (gold, salt, metals) and the “organic” forms of the motif found elsewhere. For example, AB 5.32.6 likens the way one would unite (*samdadhyāt*) “an object of leather” (*carmanya*) with a cord” (śleśman) to the way one “unites” (*samdadhāti*) “whatever in the sacrifice has come apart” (Keith, 1920, p. 257). In its discussion of rectifying errors in the sacrifice, KB 6.7.4 (= KB 6.12 in Keith, 1920, p. 381) speaks of cord (śleśman) or a strip of leather (paricarmanya) fastening together wood. We get the point: the ritual is “fixed” as certain materials are “fixed”.8 But does one really do to gold with salt what one does to wood with cord or a strip of leather? Is it possible that a reference to refining metals, to refining gold with salt, has become mixed up with the motif of repair? Is it possible that the Brahmanical authors of JUB 3.17.3 and CU 4.17.7 mixed their metaphors, so to speak? If they did, perhaps due to a lack of metallurgical expertise, we should not be much surprised. For the great geographer Strabo was apparently confused about certain gold processing techniques, as was Pliny the Elder (Healy, 1999, pp. 286-287). But again our concern is less with the metallurgical techniques known to the composers of these Brahmanical passages, and more with how they deployed a motif. For it seems the composers of these passages thought of what was most prized in their

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7 Roebuck (2000, p. 183, n. 129): “Said to mean borax”; cf. Radhakrishnan (2012, p. 420). Olivelle (1998, p. 552, n. 17.7) thinks the meaning of *lauṇa* in this context is “uncertain”, and that “it must refer to some chemical used to mend gold”.

8 See also SB 11.5.8.6 and JB 1.358.
system – ritual – and they thought of how in spite of procedural imperfections the ritual could be treated and made to yield true results. Among the things that powered their articulation of this vision was the idea of treating gold with salt.

Treating gold with salt also powered the Buddha’s articulation of his vision. But of course in the Buddha’s system it is not ritual which needs to be treated, but the human mind. Like the composers of GB 1.1.14, JUB 3.17.3, and CU 4.17.7, the composer of AN i 210 refers to treating gold with salt. In this passage the Buddha asks rhetorically about the purification of impure gold by a treatment (upakkiliṭṭhassa jātarūpassa upakkamena pariyodapanā), and his subsequent explanation begins with the words:

\[ \text{uttañca paṭicca lōnañca paṭicca...} \]

Based on a furnace and based on salt...

The larger passage mentions tongs (saṇḍāsa) and other items, thereby providing details about a physical gold refining process. But like the Brahmanical passages, the Buddhist passage employs the motif of treating gold with salt as a way of talking about something less tangible. It is noteworthy that the composers of these passages should have thought alike of treating gold with salt to articulate their vision of improving what was most important in their respective systems.

Three Lines, Twenty-four Syllables

The Sundarikabhāradvāja Sutta (Sn 79-86) begins with a Brahmin named Sundarikabhāradvāja performing the agnihotra, a kind of fire sacrifice. He exchanges words with the Buddha, who then says in verse (Norman, 2001, p. 55):

\[ \text{brāhmaṇo hi ce tvāṁ brūsi mañca brūsi abrāhmaṇam} \]
\[ \text{tam tam sāvittīṁ pucchāṁ tipadaṁ catuvisatakkharam} \]

If you call yourself a brahman, but call me a non-brahman,
then I ask you about the Sāvittī, with three lines and twenty-four syllables.

The Sāvittī is a famous verse about which more will be said below. Oddly, nothing further is said about it in the sutta. Despite what the Buddha says, he does not seem actually to ask a question.\(^9\) Nor does the Brahmin give any sort of answer;

\(^9\) According to Lang (1994), in this passage “The Buddha rejects the notion that birth and knowledge of the Sāvitrī mantra makes one a brahmin” (p. 150).
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...he asks a question. Given that the opening and some other parts of sutta occur in other Pali texts (Tam, 2006), and that the meter of the above lines is “strange” (Norman, 2001, p. 255), it is possible that the passage is out of place. But as it stands the passage holds considerable interest. It undoubtedly refers to what in Sanskrit is called the sāvitrī. The Sāvitrī is a celebrated verse from RV 3.62.10 (Roebuck, 2000, p. 1):

We meditate on the lovely
Glory of the god Savitṛ
That he may stimulate our minds.10

This famous verse is known as the Sāvitrī because it is a prayer addressed to Savitṛ, a name for the sun. Everyone initiated into Vedic learning – theoretically this means in particular every male Brahmin – is supposed to recite this verse at sunrise every day. In order to fully grasp the significance of what the Buddha says about this verse we must briefly review a few basic points on Indian meters. The commonest Sanskrit meter is called the anuṣṭubh, each verse of which is usually formed of four pada or “quarters”, each of eight syllables. A standard anuṣṭubh verse has all four pada and 32 syllables. There is also an old meter called the gāyatrī, which consists of only three quarters of the standard anuṣṭubh. The gāyatrī thus has three pada (sometimes translated as “line”) and 24 syllables.

We can now recognize that when the Buddha refers to the Sāvitrī with the adjectives tipada (“having three lines”) and catuvīsatakkhara (“having 24 syllables”), this is a specification of the gāyatrī meter. In the Sāvitrī itself the word which Roebuck translates as “lovely” is váreṇyam, and taking into account the Vedic pronunciation váreṇiyam, the classic Sāvitrī indeed has three pada of eight syllables each for a total of 24 syllables,11 just as the Buddha says.

The question is why he says it. Which is another way of asking not only why the Buddha mentions the Sāvitrī, but why he refers to its metrical structure, i.e. why sāvittim is qualified the way it is. As we shall discover, the Buddha’s words in the Sundarikabhāradvāja Sutta above are more typical of what is found in Brahmanical texts than Pali texts, and so is the interest the Buddha’s words are a sign of. For unlike Pali texts, Brahmanical texts show a prodigious interest in meter and things to do with meter, and in making summary statements about meter. A typical passage at KB 12.4.13 states:

10Cited in Roebuck (2000, p. 1) as Rgveda III.57.10
11See e.g. The Rigveda: Metrically Restored Text by Thomson & Slocum, at: http://www.utexas.edu/cola/centers/lrc/RV/RVo3.html#Ho62
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...caturviṃśatyaśkarā gāyatrī
the gāyatrī has twenty-four syllables

The same phrase (sometimes with the emphasizing particle vai inserted) occurs in many passages in the Brāhmaṇa-style texts of the three main Vedas. Because the word gāyatrī is sometimes used to refer to the classic Sāvitrī, the preeminent verse set in that meter, it is possible that in some Brahmanical contexts the word caturviṃśatyaśkarā in the phrase caturviṃśatyaśkarā gāyatrī actually refers to the Sāvitrī, just as the Buddha’s equivalent Pali term catuvīsatakkhara (i.e. catuvīsati + akkhara) does in the Sundarikabhāradvāja Sutta. But by using the word “three” (P. ti) the Buddha (with the word ti-pada) is actually closest to certain passages in Jaiminiya texts of the Sāmaveda in particular. For example, JUB 1.17.2 features “three” (S. tri) and a convoluted use of “syllable” (S. aksara = P. akkhara) to accomplish what is accomplished in the Sundarikabhāradvāja Sutta, i.e. the specification of the gāyatrī meter (Oertel, 1896, p. 96):

aṣṭākṣarā gāyatri ākṣaram-ākṣaram tryākṣaram tat caturviṃśatīḥ sam-padyante caturviṃśatyaśkarā gāyatrī
Of eight syllables is the gāyatrī; each syllable is a triple syllable. Thus they amount to twenty-four. The gāyatrī has twenty-four syllables.

We also find an expression very like the words of the Sundarikabhāradvāja Sutta at JB 3.6.11-12:

tripadā gāyatri... caturviṃśatyaśkarā gāyatrī
the gāyatrī has three lines... the gāyatrī has twenty-four syllables

As far as I am aware, catuvīsatakkhara in the Sundarikabhāradvāja Sutta occurs in no other Pali text, excepting commentary. The term tipada quite possibly occurs in no other sutta. Some of what the Buddha says in the Sundarikabhāradvāja Sutta is therefore not typically “Buddhist”, at least by Pali standards. It is much closer to the utterances of the priests in the Jaiminiya lineage of the Sāmaveda, who as udgātry priests had the responsibility for singing ritual chants during sacrificial rituals.

A Question of Meter

There may be another level of narrative significance to the Buddha’s reference to gāyatrī meter in the Sundarikabhāradvāja Sutta. The passage above appears to be
a sort of gambit. It seems to be or to presage a challenge, a way of questioning or ascertaining the knowledge of a Brahmin to whom one speaks. Such challenges are seen in Brahmanical texts, as at ŚB 11.4.1.4-8 when a Brahmin is told that only those who know certain things – the gāyatrī is one – can go around seeking to engage in debate. Knowledge of the Sāvitrī and its gāyatrī meter is also important in the BU. For at BU 5.14.5 there is a reported controversy to do with recitation of the Sāvitrī. It is a question of meter. Some people recite the Sāvitrī as an anuṣṭubh. But this is wrong, we are told. One should recite the Sāvitrī as a gāyatrī. We have seen above what these terms mean, thus we perceive that the controversy is about how many lines and syllables a performance of the Sāvitrī should have. It is important to note, as Roebuck (2000) points out, that besides the classic Sāvitrī there are “several alternative Sāvitrī verses, including some in other metres” (p. 102, n. 208). Roebuck’s note implies that CU 5.2.7 might contain the kind of alternative Sāvitrī in the anuṣṭubh meter that the author of BU 5.14.5 rejects; Olivelle (1998) calls the verse at CU 5.2.7 a “variation of the Sāvitrī verse” (p. 554, n. 2.7). Based on Olivelle’s translation (p. 233) this alternative Sāvitrī at CU 5.2.7 is as follows:

We choose that [food] of Savitṛ,
[that] food of the god [Savitṛ],
the greatest, the best creator of all.
Bhaga’s rich bounty would we create for ourselves.

We also find at BU 6.3.6 an expansion of the classic Sāvitrī in which each of its three lines is followed by other lines from the Rgveda, and this too is a kind of variation or alternative form of the Sāvitrī. Alternatives there may have been, but when it comes to the Sāvitrī, the Buddha of the Sundarikabhāradvāja Sutta is evidently a gāyatrī man, like the author of BU 5.14.5.

The author of BU 5.14.5 does not tell us who the erring ones are that recite the Sāvitrī as an anuṣṭubh. We are told, however, that they argue for doing so by saying: “the anuṣṭubh is speech” (vāg anuṣṭup). There are indeed a number of statements saying exactly that the anuṣṭubh is speech in Brahmanical texts (e.g. AB 3.15.1, JB 1.272.13, ŚB 3.1.4.16). There are also passages which glorify or promote the anuṣṭubh. TS 5.4.12.1, for example, refers to “this” [anuṣṭubh] as the

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12The message is delivered by a Brahmin chosen by other Brahmins to go on their behalf. The motif of choosing and sending forth a Brahmin “champion” is also seen in Pali texts, e.g. at MN ii 147-148.
“best of meters” (paramā vā eśā chandasām). BU 5.14, on the other hand, is a long promotion of the gāyatrī meter, and against the background of rival claims for the anuṣṭubh to which the text alludes we can see that the way to recite the Sāvitrī – anuṣṭubh or gāyatrī – is apparently for those involved a matter of some import.

Black (2007) insightfully shows how the teachings of the Upaniṣads are often situated in important but overlooked situations of dialogue and challenge. Thus, after BU 5.14.1-7 expounds at length on the gāyatrī meter, including the matter of how to recite the Sāvitrī, we gather that at BU 5.14.8 it is a kind of challenge when King Janaka says to a Brahmin: “Hey! Did you not claim to know the Gāyatrī? So how is it that you...” (Olivelle, 1998, p. 141). Coming where they do, the words of the king serve to highlight the text’s teachings on the gāyatrī, including the proper way to recite the Sāvitrī.

BU 5.14 links its teachings to King Janaka, presumably the same Janaka who in ŚB 11.3.1.4 presents cows to Yājñavalkya “as a reward for his deep knowledge of the Agnihotra ritual” (Cohen, 2008, p. 68). These associations bring us back to the Sundarikabhāradvāja Sutta, replete with the same Brahmanical associations. As we have it the text presents the Buddha (from the warrior or ruler class) seeming to challenge or about to challenge a Brahmin (who has just performed the agnihotra) on his knowledge of the Sāvitrī or its gāyatrī meter, just as King Janaka at BU 5.14.8 challenges a Brahmin on his knowledge of the gāyatrī meter.

BU 5.14 indicates that Brahmins differ on the right way to do things connected with their religion, and it ends with the implication that one who really knows the gāyatrī becomes clean (śuddha), pure (pūta), not subject to old age (ajara), and immortal (amṛta). In the Sundarikabhāradvāja Sutta the Brahmin will ask about the right way to do something connected with his religion (i.e. sacrifice), and the Buddha’s reply will include talk of being clean (śuddha = S. śuddha) and the end of birth and death (jāti māraṇassa anta). Like BU 5.14, the Sundarikabhāradvāja

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13 Some editions follow paramā vā eśā chandasām with yadanuṣṭuk (i.e. yat anuṣṭuk, the latter being a variant spelling used in the TS). A passable translation might be: “as for the anuṣṭubh, this is certainly the highest of meters”. Keith (1914, Part 2, p. 439) translates the passage as: “The Anustubh is the highest of metres”.

14 Smith (1986) explains how according to some texts the Sāvitrī “was to be recited in different metres by the different classes. Brahmins were to learn the verse in the gāyatrī metre, Kṣatriyas in the triṣṭubh, and Vaiśyas in the jagati” (p. 72). Can it be that the passage has the Buddha signaling his own knowledge of how Brahmins are supposed to recite the Sāvitrī, and therefore his own credentials as a kind of expert?
Sutta relates the Śāvitrī and its gāyatri meter to a context in which experts confront each other on matters of Brahmanical religion. Both texts then move on to speak of higher spiritual goals, expressed partly in terms of being clean and being immortal or beyond death.

The Foremost Sacrifice, The Foremost Meter

Gombrich (1990, p. 16) points out that in the Ādittaparīyāya Sutta some Brahmans who are convinced by the Buddha give up the agnihotra ritual of fire sacrifice (Vinaya i 33). But this does not prevent the Blessed One from elsewhere praising the agnihotra – and the Śāvitrī. At Sn 111 and Vinaya i 246 the Buddha says in verse:

\begin{quote}
agghuttamukhā yañña śāvitrī chandaso mukhām
Sacrifices have the agnihotra as foremost; of meter the foremost is the Śāvitrī.
\end{quote}

The Buddha continues in verse, and his poem is similar to a poem which appears in some versions of the Mahābhārata. There the poem begins with the words agnihotramukhā vedā gāyatri chandasāṃ mukham. After noticing this similarity I learned that Bodewitz made the same point in 1976; he furthermore suggested that the latter might be a “wrong version” of the Pali verse (Bodewitz, 2003, p. 5). More interesting for our purposes is how the Pali verse in particular resembles portions of the TS which claim that a certain meter (TS 5.2.1.5) or sacrifice (TS 7.1.1.3) is highest or best. Indeed the Pali verse seems to provide an alternative to the view expressed in TS 5.4.12.1, which holds the “three-nighter” (trirātra) to be the best of sacrifices (paramas trirātro yajñānām) and, as noted above, the anuśṭubh to be the best of meters (parama... chandasāṃ). The Buddha’s poem ends as a sort of paean to the Buddhist religious order, “foremost for those who sacrifice looking for merit” (Norman, 2001, p. 76). The poem as a whole is said as a form of blessing after the Buddha and his monks have been fed. The Mahābhārata version, on the other hand, ends as a paean to Keśava (a name of Viṣṇu

\[\text{Notes:}\]
\[15\text{See also in MN 92 in Bodhi & Nāṇamoli (2005, p. 761).}\]
\[16\text{See e.g. the translation by Ganguli, Book 2, Section 37. Smith (2001) explains the lines of the poem to be “short fragments of text attested in one or more manuscripts but not accepted into the constituted text of the Critical Edition”. The Mahābhārata version of the poem will also employ the phrase ūrdhvaṃ tiryag adhaś caiva, a variation of the “above, below, and across” motif mentioned above.}\]
or Kṛṣṇa). Both versions, I speculate, are derived from forms of praise occurring in earlier Brahmanical [oral] texts.

Some Brahmanical motifs in Pali texts merely establish a link with the deeds and beliefs of Brahmans, or at least to ideas shared by Brahmans. But as we will see in what follows, other Brahmanical motifs in Pali texts serve to evoke and in various ways oppose, unfavorably compare, supplement, or supplant Brahmanical beliefs and behaviors.

Women and Vehicles

Black (2007) cites ŚB 11.6.2.5, JUB 3.2.4.8, ŚB 2.4.1.6, and DN 3 as instances where Brahmans are depicted in chariots or carriages, and he reminds readers of Bodewitz’s suggestion that the chariot represents the “luxury car” of the Vedic elite (pp. 109, 188-9, n. 7). More examples and variations are not lacking. BU 4.3.10 features the dream of vehicles and roads on which to drive, followed by elaborating verses which refer to “dallying with women” (Olivelle, 1998, p. 113). KaU 1.25 speaks of “lovely maidens with chariots” (rāmāḥ sarathāḥ). Variations of a prayer repeated at e.g. TS 4.2.5.6, ŚB 7.2.2.11, VS 12.71 and AV 3.17.3 ask for a kind of vehicle or related equipment (rathavāhana) and a “plump wench” (Whitney, 1905, p. 115). In CU 4.2.4 the sage Raikva is presented with gifts including a carriage and a man’s daughter. At CU 5.13.2 the “dazzling” things listed include a “carriage drawn by a she-mule” (aśvatārīratha) and a “slave-girl” (Olivelle, 1998, p. 241). CU 8.12.3 imagines the pleasures to be had with women and vehicles (p. 285):

\[
\text{sa tatra paryeti jakṣat krīḍan ramamāṇah strībhir vā yānair vā}
\]
\[
\text{jinātibhir vā}
\]

He roams about there, laughing, playing, and enjoying himself with women, carriages, or relatives.

In a passage at DN i 7 which is repeated in other Pali texts, talk of relatives, carriages, and women (and other topics) is seen as low. More interesting for our purposes is the Buddha at Sn 52 telling how Brahmans were affected by gazing upon “women adorned, and chariots yoked to thoroughbreds, well-made, with variegated coverings” (Norman, 2001, p. 37). The Buddha then tells how the Brahmans obtained said women and chariots. In these Sn passages other sources of pleasure are mentioned, but as in several Brahmanical passages, the women and vehicles are mentioned together. In DN 3 the Buddha refers (DN i 105) to
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Brahmins amusing themselves with “women dressed up in flounces and furbelows” and riding around “in chariots drawn by mares with braided tails” (Walshe, 1995, p. 121). Again the women and vehicles are collocated. In some Pali texts the collocation of females and vehicles is presented on a truly glorious scale, as at SN i 211 with its “hundred [thousand]¹⁷ mule-drawn chariots” (assatarīratha) and “hundred thousand maidens bedecked”. But the human spectacle of Brahmins with fancy women and vehicles envisioned at Sn i 52-53 and DN i 105 is above all blameworthy, whereas in Brahmanical texts such pleasures are wholly positive. Brahmanical conduct might have been the basis for the motif in Pali texts, but one wonders if Buddhists did not also know of, and to some degree fashion their discourses in response to, Brahmanical religious sanctions of the pleasures Brahmins enjoyed.

Thinking About “I”

Another motif common to Brahmanical and Pali texts is the activity signified by the word ahaṅkāra, i.e. conceiving one’s individuality. CU 7.25.1 presents a sort of example or instruction (ādeśa) for how to think about “I”, which it calls an ahaṅkāradeśa and which goes like this: “It is I who am below; I am above; I am to the west; I am to the east; I am to the south; I am to the north. It is I who am this whole [world]” (aham eva idaṁ sarvam). The text will go on to say the same of the self (ātman). The Buddha at AN iii 444 seems to refer to this sort of teaching when he says that acts (note the plural) of conceiving of one’s individuality (ahaṅkāra) shall be stopped (uparujjhissanti), as will conceivings of “mine” (mamaṅkāra). This is just after he speaks of being sabbaloke atammayo, “without identification [with anything] in the entire world”.

The Inner Fire Sacrifice

Like the Sundarikabhāradvāja Sutta, the Sundarika Sutta (SN i 167-170) portrays a Brahmin named Sundarikabhāradvāja “offering to the fire, carrying out the fire oblation” (aggiṁ juhati aggihuttaṁ paricarati). The word aggihutta is the Pali version of S. agnihotra, sometimes simply translated as “fire sacrifice”. Over time agnihotra seems to have become synonymous with “fire-ritual in general” (Bodewitz, 2003, p. 5), but the agnihotra proper was a twice-daily ritual featuring an

¹⁷Bodhi explains that in the context the word “thousand” is to be imputed (Bodhi, 2000, p. 482, n. 586).
oblation or offering (S. *hotra*) of milk or other substances placed in a fire (S. *agni*). The precise actions involved in performing the *agnihotra*, as well as the purpose of the sacrifice, are the subject of much discussion in Brahmanical texts. In the *Sundarika Sutta* the motive of the Brahmin for performing the *agnihotra* is not given, but it is worth noting that the Brahmin seems to be alone. That is, there is no mention of a patron on whose behalf the Brahmin carries out the *agnihotra*. Is this omission a mistake? Bodewitz’s research on the *agnihotra* as depicted in Brahmanical texts may show that in fact the Pali text portrays the lone Brahmin accurately (Bodewitz, 2003, p. 116):

Several formulas to be recited by the priest and several comments in the brāhmaṇas on actions of the priest make sense only in connection with a sacrificer who performs the rite himself... The performance on behalf of someone else... points to a later development.

Some Brahmanical texts purport to explain the origins of the *agnihotra* or tell related myths. KS 6.2 tells how Prajāpati “poured that oblation into the water” and “placed the oblation in the plants” (Bodewitz, 2003, p. 30). These are the two ways the oblation is disposed of in KS 6.2, and these are the two places – water and plants – the Buddha mentions in the *Sundarika Sutta* when he tells the Brahmin to dispose of the remains of the sacrifice.18 The Brahmin does so, in water, whereupon the remains “sizzled and hissed and gave off steam and smoke” (Bodhi, 2000, p. 263). In KS 6.2, after Prajāpati puts the oblation in water, “that oblation started to burn the water” (Bodewitz, 2003, p. 30).

The *agnihotra* has been described as “one of the most important” Vedic sacrifices (Dumont, 1964, p. 337), but it also has been noted for its role in the interiorization of ritual in the Brahmanical tradition. Bentor (2000) has noted how “brāhmaṇa texts” taught that “the *agnihotra* is, in fact, breathing or life” (p. 596). Deussen (1906, pp. 124-125) noted how the ideas of fire sacrifice were extended to interiorized practices which “replaced” the *agnihotra*, as evidenced by KU 2.5 with its reference to the *āntara* (“inner”) *agnihotra*, a kind of practice nominally associated with the wise man Pratardana, and one whose mastery the text says prompted the ancients to forgo [external] fire sacrifice.19 The expert Yājñavalkya

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18The word used in the Pali text to refer to vegetation or “greens” is *harita*, in the compound (in the locative case) *appaharite*. Bodhi (2000, p. 263) translates this as: “in a place where there is sparse vegetation”.

19Appeal to religious practices of the past is itself a significant motif in Brahmanical and Pali texts, but there is no room here for further comment.
teaches in ŚB 11.3.1.4 that even with no materials for the agnihotra (Eggeling, 1900, p. 46): “yet there would be offered – the truth in faith”. ŚB 11.3.1.5-6 explains the importance of the mind for the offerer of the agnihotra. Brahmanical texts such as BŚS 29.5 speak of other ways to interiorize the agnihotra (Bentor, 1997, 2000). We can scarcely doubt that the agnihotra featured in the development of interiorized fire sacrifice in the Brahmanical tradition. What we want to know is how much the early Buddhists knew of this development, and if they participated in it.

We return now to the Sundarika Sutta, in which the Buddha says (SN i 169) to the Brahmin who has just performed the agnihotra (Bodhi, 2000, p. 264):

> Having given up the fire made from wood,
> I kindle, O brahmin, the inner light alone.
> Always ablaze, my mind always concentrated,
> I am an arahant living the holy life.

I suggest that these and following verses represent a Buddhist version of an attempt to interiorize the fire sacrifice. What Bodhi translates as “inner light” (ajjhatta joti) might be better translated here as “inner fire” (Cone, 2010, p. 246, citing this passage), but in any case the positive sense of the passage is somewhat unusual because the imagery of burning in Pali texts often symbolizes what should be brought to an end. If this signals a willingness to adopt a rhetorical stance toward fire in keeping with Brahmanical sensibilities, the following verses leave no doubt that the Buddha or composer of the text is willing to engage the Brahmanical thought world on its own terms. But to see why we must first briefly examine another aspect of interiorization.

Bentor (2000) and others have pointed out that the interiorization of fire sacrifice in the Brahmanical tradition took different forms, some traceable to ideas in texts which homologize body parts or faculties with the components of fire sacrifice. For example, in TS 2.5.11.7 the large ladle used in the sacrifice is said to be the body (ātma dhruvā). In CU 5.18.2 the vedi (i.e. sacrificial area) is identified with the chest (ura eva vediḥ). In BU 6.2.12 and CU 5.7.1 man is likened to the sacrificial fire, his breath the smoke, his speech (CU: tongue) the flame. According to AB 5.25 (Keith, 1920, pp. 249-250):

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21 See e.g. Bodewitz (2003, especially p. 143).
Their offering spoon was thought.
(Their) butter was intelligence.
(Their) altar was speech...
(Their) oblation was breath...

In the Sundarika Sutta the Buddha continues with what can only be seen as a simulacrum of Brahmanical speech (Bodhi, 2000, p. 264):

Conceit, O brahmin, is your shoulder-load,
Anger the smoke, false speech the ashes;
The tongue is the ladle, the heart the altar,
A well-tamed self is the light of a man.

Whatever the meaning of the final line – and it is possible that the author of the sutta uses joti as “fire” or “light” depending on the context – what is expressed in the Pali text itself (attā sudanto purisassa joti) is remarkably like what Yājñavalkya in BU 4.3.6 says about a man (puruṣa), and what in the context must be light:

ātmā eva asya jyotiḥ bhavati
The self indeed is his light

Parts of the Sundarika Sutta clearly seem to be working with forms of expression and homology attested in Brahmanical texts. But the sacrifice is interiorized further into purely ethical dimensions. Brahmanical experts taught that in some sense the sacrifice lies within, but the Buddha in effect says that Brahmins with their conceit, anger, and lying are getting the sacrifice wrong.

In some Brahmanical texts certain actions of the agnihotra ritual are said to be done for śuddhi, i.e. “purity”, as at TB 2.1.4.8 (Bodewitz, 2003, p. 101; cf. p. 62). The Buddha seems to be aware of this concern, for the above verses from the Sundarika Sutta come after the Buddha says (Bodhi, 2000, pp. 263-264):

When kindling wood, brahmin, do not imagine
This external deed brings purity;
For experts say no purity is gained
By one who seeks it outwardly.

The implication is that the purity (P. suddhi) desired by Brahmins is really an internal matter, to be addressed by a properly internal sacrifice. The Buddha is no doubt an expert on the topic, but by “experts” (kusalā) could these lines also refer
to Brahmanical sages? Yājñavalkya at BU 4.4.23 teaches the importance of inner knowledge rather than outer action: through knowledge one becomes “free from impurity” (viraja). An accompanying verse says that one “is not stained by evil deeds” (na lipyate karmanā pāpaka). We have seen above how Yājñavalkya in the ŚB preaches the importance of the inner dimensions of the agnihotra, and that KU 2.5 teaches the “inner agnihotra” as superior to the external rite. We can see that the Brahmanical promoters of interiorization worked by reinterpreting forms of Brahmanical sacrifice, and this is just what the Buddha does in the Sundarika Sutta. I am not suggesting that the Buddha knew of Yājñavalkya or Pratardana, but it is at least possible that the composer of the Sundarika Sutta was aware of interiorization within the Brahmanical community. For the Sundarika Sutta appears to build on what Brahmanical experts had started, moving the interiorization of fire sacrifice beyond interiorization as such and towards typically Buddhist ethical concerns.

Reinterpreting Vedic Ritual Fires

Gombrich has repeatedly considered the Buddha’s reinterpretation of the three Vedic sacrificial fires as portrayed in Pali texts (Gombrich, 1985; 1990, pp. 16-19; 1996, p. 66; 2006, pp. 81-82; 2009, pp. 112-113), and here it is necessary to begin by virtually reprising parts of Gombrich’s work. We commence with the observation that in Pali texts the Buddha sometimes refers to a well-known triad of Vedic ritual fires – but in a “Buddhist” way. These fires are in Sanskrit the āhavanīya, i.e. the offertorial or eastern fire; the gārhapatya, i.e. the householder’s or western fire; and the daksināgna, i.e. the southern fire, also known as the anvāhāryapacana. For reference, the diagram below shows a stylized Vedic sacrificial arena and the placement of the three fires:
In AN iv 45 the Buddha will refer to these fires when he tells a Brahmin that the three fires to be maintained are (Bodhi, 2012, p. 1030):

āhuneyyaggi gahapataggi dakkhineyyaggi

The fire of those worthy of gifts, the householder’s fire, and the fire of those worthy of offerings

Here āhuneyya (in the compound āhuneyya + aggi, the latter meaning “fire”) is the grammatical equivalent of S. āhavanīya, both being gerundive forms of ā√hu. The Pali words for the two other fires are also relatable to their Sanskrit counterparts (Gombrich, 1990, p. 19). This same phrase also occurs at DN iii 217 and AN iv 41, but only at AN iv 45 does it come with an explanation. As Gombrich (2009) points out, the explanation “metaphorically reinterprets” (p. 112) the fires: the eastern fire is one’s parents; the western fire is one’s wife, children, and other dependents; the southern fire is worthy renunciates and Brahmins. One should maintain the fires, but it turns out this means: supporting people. The fires are thus ultimately explained in terms of how one should behave towards others, as Gombrich emphasizes. This is similar to how the Buddha in DN iii 188-192 allegorizes a ritual of honoring the directions in terms of classes of people and how one should support them.

Gombrich (1990) identifies other facets of Brahmanical religious culture to which composers of Pali texts may have responded. But I suggest that reinterpreting the three sacrificial fires was itself a Brahmanical practice to which the composer of AN iv 45 is responding. A classic Brahmanical reinterpretation of the fires at TS 1.6.7.1 identifies the āhavaniya as the abode of the gods (devānām āyatana), the gārhapatya as that of men, and the anvāhāryapacana as that of the fathers, i.e. ancestors. In so far as it is possible to discern from the text, these “fires” have significance only in relation to the sacrifice and its objectives. Moody (1980) notes a similar example at ŚB 12.4.1.3 in which the fires are identified as the “yonder world”, “this world”, and the “world of the middle region” (p. 85). We will soon have more to learn from Moody’s 1980 study of the agnyādheya ritual in which the three (or sometimes five) sacred fires are established; for now we note that the above examples are typical of the way Brāhmaṇa-style texts explain components of Vedic sacrifice. The early Upaniṣads also often present their teachings by variously explaining elements of Vedic religion, as at CU 4.11-14, in which “the three sacrificial fires are explained as forms of the ātman’s manifestation” (Deussen, 1906, p. 63). In AN iv 45 the Buddha will try his hand at explaining the fires in order to aid the reception of his teachings.
The Brahmanical passages noted above, and others not shown here, indicate that reinterpreting the fires was an established Brahmanical practice. Individual interpretations varied, however. At JUB 4.26.15 the three sacrificial fires are reinterpreted in terms of human conduct:

\[ \text{karma iti gārhapatyaḥ śamaḥ iti āhavaniyāḥ damah iti anvāhāryapacanaḥ} \]

“rite” is the gārhapatya, “tranquillity” is the āhavaniya, “restraint” is the anvāhāryapacana

The key to understanding the passage is to be found in what is said earlier in the text, and indeed in other Brahmanical texts. At JUB 4.21.8 it is said about a particular “hidden connection” (upaniṣad):

\[ \text{tasyai tapaḥ damah karma iti pratiṣṭhā vedāḥ sarvāṅgāni satyam āyatanaṁ} \]

austerity, restraint, and rites are for it the foundation, the Vedas are all the limbs, truth is the abode

JUB 4.25.3 proclaims (Oertel, 1896, p. 222):

\[ \text{vedāḥ brahma tasya satyam āyatanaṁ śamaḥ pratiṣṭhā damah ca} \]

The Veda is the brahman, truth is its abode, tranquillity and restraint its foundation

These passages are similar to many other passages in Brāhmaṇa and Upaniṣad texts in that they refer to and uphold a polythetic class of Brahmanical ideals – or better, ideal behaviors. But in identifying the three fires with ideal behaviors, JUB 4.26.15 departs from the more typical Brahmanical reinterpretations of the fires noted above. Much the same can be said for AN iv 45. That is, JUB 4.26.15 identifies the fires with idealized behavior, and in AN iv 45 the fires are linked with – become the objects of – idealized behavior. A closer look at how the two texts identify the fires reveals further points of interest:

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22In similar contexts Olivelle (1998) translates upanisad as “hidden connection”, and the singular karman as “rites”. I adopt these usages from Olivelle’s translation of the duplicate passage at KeU 4.8, itself part of the JUB (see Olivelle, 1998, pp. 21, 24, 25, 171, 363, 371).
BUDDHA’S USE OF BRAHMANICAL MOTIFS

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>gārhapatya</th>
<th>āhavaniya</th>
<th>anvāhāryapacana / dakṣīṇāgni</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>householder's fire</td>
<td>offertorial fire</td>
<td>southern fire</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>west</td>
<td>east</td>
<td>south</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>JUB rites (karman)</td>
<td>tranquillity (śama)</td>
<td>restraint (dama)</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AN household, dependents</td>
<td>parents</td>
<td>renunciates, Brahmins</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

In both texts there is intuitive sense in the identification of the gārhapatya, for the householder has a duty to look after the members of his household and to perform actions including religious rites. Gombrich (1990, p. 19) and Bodhi (2012, p. 1778, n. 1511) have remarked on the wordplay which evidently accompanies the Buddhist identification of the fires, but there seems to be no obvious reason why in the JUB the eastern fire should be “tranquillity” (śama), or why the southern fire should be “restraint” (dama) – understood here and elsewhere to mean “self-restraint” or “self-control”. Apart from any wordplay, it is interesting that the Buddha identifies the southern fire with renunciates and Brahmins, for in many Pali texts self-control is said to be one of the hallmarks of the true renunciate or Brahmin. Indeed the Buddha explains the meaning of the southern fire by referring to renunciates and Brahmins who “tame” (damenti) themselves, using a verb related to the JUB’s dama. But he also says that such renunciates and Brahmins “calm” (samenti) themselves, using a verb related to the JUB’s śama.

In any case, JUB 4.26.15 and AN iv 45 have to be seen in light of what Moody (1980) has revealed to be the layers of meaning attached to the ritual fires – and the directional axes along which they are constructed. One of Moody’s key findings is just how selfish the establishment of the three sacrificial fires was for the sacrificer. Moody summarizes (p. iii):

Within the spatial organization of the firehall is found an emphasis on the individual and independent life of the sacrificer as against social ties, the former represented along an axis extending toward the gods in the east and the latter along an axis extending toward one’s ancestors in the south.

Moody elaborates (p. 87):

...we have seen that in setting up his fires the sacrificer attains a greater degree of autonomy. Even the shy sacrificer is thrust forth to carve out for himself a secure niche. There he creates his own world in
which the conflicts and dependencies of his social nexus are mini-
mized and his personal aims furthered.

Moody has examined many Brahmanical texts in order to reach this conclusion. If Moody is correct about what I am calling the selfishness which pervades the sym-
bolism of the three sacrificial fires, this should register as the opposite of what the
Buddha teaches in AN iv 45. Indeed it appears to be exactly what the Buddha is
teaching against, for according to the Buddha’s teaching we might say it is exactly
social dependencies which are increased and the welfare of others which is fur-
thered by him who, lessening his autonomy, properly maintains the [redefined]
fires. Moody helps us recognize just what levels of meaning AN iv 45 may be ex-
ploring as it presents the Buddha following the attested Brahmanical practice of
reinterpreting the fires. Moreover, the evidence allows us to contemplate how the
Buddha or the sutta might be advancing efforts to allegorize the fires in terms of
conduct already recommended by Brahmins, like that visible to us in JUB 4.26.15.
That is, the Buddha or the composer of AN iv 45 not only reinterprets the fires,
it may be that he reinterprets Brahmanical reinterpretations of the fires, agreeing
that the fires are to be understood ultimately in terms of conduct, but going
the Brahmins one further and linking the fires to specifically altruistic conduct
because, as Moody has shown, they are emblems of consummate selfishness.

**Meaningful Directions**

In the Siṅgāla Sutta (DN 31), briefly alluded to above, the Buddha teaches a man
how to properly honor the directions. But here again this really means taking care
of people: at DN iii 188-189 the Buddha says one’s parents are the east, teachers
are the south, etc. In his account of the Siṅgāla Sutta, Gombrich (2006) remarks:
“the Buddha constantly slips new ethical wine into old brahminical bottles: pre-
tending to interpret traditional ritual, he in fact abolishes it” (p. 81). To this deft
observation I would like to add the suggestion that with respect to Brahmanical
references and the traditional beliefs they represent, there is more to the sutta than
at first meets the eye, and that in the sutta the Buddha or the composer skillfully
makes use of some traditional Brahmanical ideas even as he abolishes others.

First we note that the Buddha’s directional scheme in the Siṅgāla Sutta is un-
like the directional scheme we have found to be implicit in AN iv 45 above, in
that the former has six actual directions (disā) to account for: the four cardinal
directions plus a zenith and a nadir. To cover all six the Buddha adds categories
of people to the three we have seen above, and he divides one's household and dependents into two categories. The placement of categories of people in the Siñāla Sutta again shows a prior understanding that directions have meaning apart from what the Buddha says they mean: he exploits directional meaning rather than creates it where none existed. For in the three dimensional scheme of the Siñāla Sutta, Brahmins and mendicants are shifted not to a random direction, but to the zenith. Menials get what is low, where they belong: the nadir. And the Buddha maintains key elements of a similar east-west axis as in AN iv 45: parents to the east, wife and offspring to the west. I doubt this is a meaningless coincidence. The Buddha’s directional schemes are like directional schemes in the Upaniṣads in that they carry on with an apparently older Brahmanical practice of equating or relating directions to something else. But compared to most Upaniṣadic directional schemes, the Buddha’s scheme in the Siñāla Sutta is in certain respects closer to the directional schemes of the Samhitā and Brāhmaṇa texts studied by Moody (1980), which identify the directions with types of beings (or their worlds). Another similarity is that the Samhitā and Brāhmaṇa directional schemes also tend to consistently identify the eastern direction; a large difference is that they identify it with the gods (e.g. TS 6.1.1.1). The Buddha does not allow supernatural beings to have a direction in his directional schemes, and I suggest that the Buddha’s consistent identification of the east with parents has another reason alongside the wordplay suggested by Gombrich and Bodhi (noted above). The Buddha elsewhere identifies parents with no less a god than Brahmā (e.g. AN i 132, AN ii 70). Who better than parents, then, to assign to the direction of the gods, in directional schemes which have no place for gods?

There is more evidence that the Buddha or the composers of Pali texts knew how to make use of Brahmanical directional schemes. The Buddha’s directional scheme in the Kūtadanta Sutta at DN i 142 is somewhat different from those mentioned above in that it cannot for structural reasons of the story accommodate e.g. parents or wife. But it does associate directions with classes of people. The scene is one in which different classes of people attend a king’s great sacrifice and place their gifts to the east, south, west, and north of the “sacrificial pit” (yaññavāta).

One could of course put it from the other perspective: that in AN iv 45 he subtracts and combines.

Cf. BU 1.2.3; BU 3.9.19-24; BU 4.2.4; CU 3.1.2-5.1; CU 3.13.1-6; CU 3.15.1-2; CU 4.5.2; CU 7.25.1

They are also consistent on the southern direction (the “fathers”), but not west and north (Moody, 1980, p. 73).
This is of course the traditional order of directions as given in e.g. TS 6.1.1.1. At DN i 142 a class of people analogous to teachers – here the king’s advisors – again gets the south. But is it also significant that members of the warrior class, Gotama’s class, get the east at DN i 142, while Brahmins get the west? The latter is the direction not only of women and children (and menials at AN iv 45) in Buddhist directional schemes, but of demons and snakes in some Brahmanical schemes, and of humans at TS 6.1.1.1 in which humans are the least respectable of the beings mentioned (Moody, 1980, p. 73). Trained Brahmins whose traditional texts show a fascination with directional schemes would not have failed to observe and draw conclusions from the directions allotted in the Kūtadanta Sutta.

Conquering Both Worlds

In the Singāla Sutta one who is correctly “covering” the six directions (chaddisā-paticchādin) is said at DN iii 181 to be ubholokavijayāya patipanno, i.e. “on the way to conquering both worlds”. Talk of two worlds such as this world and the next is common enough in Pali texts, but talk of “conquering” two worlds is not. The idea of “conquering both worlds” is thoroughly Brahmanical, seen e.g. at TB 1.3.4.3-8; at JB 1.21.4 in which it is said that one who sacrifices “knowing thus” conquers both worlds (ubhau eva lokau abhijayati); at ŚB 13.2.4.1 in which Prajāpati says: ubhau lokau abhijayeyam (“may I conquer both worlds”); at TS 6.1.1.2 with its dative construction ubhayo lokayo abhijityai (“for the conquering of both worlds”). The Singāla Sutta’s dative construction is particularly reminiscent of the latter. But what is more, talk of conquering both worlds in the Singāla Sutta is thematically joined with identifying the directions with other beings, and this is exactly what happens in TS 6.1.1.1-2.

Conclusion

If the study of Brahmanical motifs in Pali texts does nothing else, it reminds us that there is a large population of terms, phrases, ideas, myths, and other devices which are common to Brahmanical and Pali texts – far more, I would venture, than is generally recognized. But of course it does more than this. It provides a window into the world that preceded classical Theravāda Buddhism. And it invites us to confront anew the questions of how and why certain motifs visible to us in Brahmanical texts came to be present in Pali texts. At issue is the flow

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26See however AN iv 269-270.
of words and ideas between religious communities in ancient India, a topic still contested and poorly understood.

“Who can tell what routes ideas travel by...” (Clark, 2013, p. 45). The question must haunt the student of early Buddhism. The motifs mentioned in this paper are but a fraction of the motifs common to Brahmanical and Pali texts which have been documented. It is my hope that in the continued discovery, study, and debate of motifs in Brahmanical, Buddhist, Jain, and other texts, a way forward will be found between the complacent acceptance of generalities which “explain” early Buddhism on the one hand, and overreaching revisionist claims about what we know of early Buddhism, or skeptical claims about what we can know about it, on the other.

Abbreviations

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Abbreviation</th>
<th>Description</th>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>AB</td>
<td>Aitareya Brāhmaṇa</td>
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<tr>
<td>AN</td>
<td>Āṅguttara Nikāya</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>ĀŚS</td>
<td>Āpastamba Śrautasūtra</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>AV</td>
<td>Atharvaveda</td>
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<td>Be</td>
<td>Burmese Edition</td>
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<td>Baudhāyana Śrautasūtra</td>
</tr>
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<td>BU</td>
<td>Brhadāraṇyaka Upaniṣad (Kāṇva recension)</td>
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<td>CU</td>
<td>Chāndogya Upaniṣad</td>
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<tr>
<td>DN</td>
<td>Dīgha Nikāya</td>
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<td>GB</td>
<td>Gopatha Brāhmaṇa</td>
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<td>JB</td>
<td>Jaiminīya Brāhmaṇa</td>
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<tr>
<td>JUB</td>
<td>Jaiminīya Upaniṣad Brāhmaṇa (Talavakāra Brāhmaṇa)</td>
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<td>Kaṭha Upaniṣad</td>
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<td>MS</td>
<td>Maitrāyaṇi Saṃhitā</td>
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I have in some cases transcribed Oertel’s Roman script into letter forms more widely accepted in our day. Words in parentheses or brackets in the indented quotations above are the translator’s.

Bibliography


Buddha’s Use of Brahmanical Motifs


Japanese Influence on Buddhism in Taiwan

Yu-Shuang Yao

So far as can be discovered, before 1919 there were no Buddhist nuns in Taiwan. Now, however, Taiwan is famous for its nuns, who far outnumber monks. How did this come about? Between the two World Wars, several Japanese Buddhist sects proselytized in Taiwan. The Rinzai Zen was particularly active; they ordained some men but more women, and took some of those women to Japan for education. In particular, this was done by a monk called Gisei Tokai, who also established a (now defunct) Buddhist charity in Taiwan called Tzu Chi, like the current movement. Another link between this and today’s Tzu Chi is a nun called Xiu Dao, now in her nineties; in 1961–2 she was the companion of the young lady who was later to found Tzu Chi and become known as the Master Cheng Yen. Perhaps because of this influence from Japan, Tzu Chi has adopted some features of the Japanese religion Risshō Kōsei-Kai.

This article sets these discoveries in a broader framework: the invention of “humanist” Buddhism by Tai Xu in the 1920s; the influence of Japanese Buddhism on him and of Japanese culture on Taiwan; and the role of the reformist Yin Shun.

The historical context: Japan in Taiwan

The current population of Taiwan is slightly over 23 million. The 2005 census found just over 8 million Buddhists, 35% of the population. Though classification of religious adherence in Chinese populations is notoriously contentious, this is accurate enough for my present purpose.
At the end of the First Sino-Japanese War, in 1895, China had to cede Taiwan to the Japanese; but in 1945, at the end of the Second World War, Taiwan was returned to the Republic of China. On the Chinese mainland the Nationalists under Chiang Kai-Shek were then losing their struggle against the advancing Communists; they were finally defeated in 1949 and in the December of that year Chiang made Taipei his capital. Some 2 million people fled China during 1945–9 and settled in Taiwan, where they then constituted about a quarter of the population.

On 28 February 1947 there began what is known as the “2/28 Incident”. A soldier from the mainland killed a local civilian, and this led to a spontaneous rebellion against the rule of the Chinese Nationalists. “Over the next several months, untold numbers of people suspected of involvement with Taiwan independence movements were rounded up and were executed, or disappeared. The victims came from all levels of society, from workers to scholars and county magistrates.”

The records were long sealed and the number of dead may never be known, but is estimated between 18,000 and 30,000, and that includes a disproportionate number of members of the Taiwanese elite. This notorious episode has a bearing on the topic of this article.

“Around 1935, the Japanese began an island-wide assimilation project to bind the island more firmly to the Japanese Empire and people were taught to see themselves as Japanese; … Taiwanese culture and religion were outlawed and the citizens were encouraged to adopt Japanese surnames. During World War II, tens of thousands of Taiwanese served in the Japanese military.” In 1938 there were over 300,000 Japanese settlers in Taiwan; most of them were repatriated to Japan in 1945. Meanwhile, however, Taiwanese had been receiving their education in the Japanese language. As a result, early in the present century there was still a substantial number of elderly Taiwanese who were as fluent in Japanese as in Hokkien, the local form of Chinese.

In the era of Japanese control, the Japanese opened a large number of Buddhist temples, many of them converted from Chinese temples and other buildings. When they had to leave in 1945, local governments were supposed to return these temples to their former owners; but it is recorded that nearly 20 years later

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2 Wikipedia article “Taiwan”.
3 Wikipedia article “Taiwan”.
4 In Taiwan many people call this language “Taiwanese”.

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66 of them had not yet been disposed of according to this law. This too illustrates how Japanese influence lingered after their rule ended.

What is even more important for my theme, though it is difficult to illustrate succinctly, is the affinity that many Taiwanese feel for Japan and the Japanese – something in which they contrast with the mainland Chinese. Indeed, Taiwan is probably the only country to have been occupied by the Japanese where the sentiment towards Japan is now predominantly positive. This may well be due in large measure to the 2/28 Incident, mentioned above, and the harsh period of martial law which followed it. The result was that many Taiwanese came to feel that the Japanese treated them better than did the hordes of mainland Chinese who arrived almost as soon as the Japanese were expelled.

Though it may not be politically tactful to say so, the result has been that many Taiwanese like Japan better than mainland China, even if one discounts Communism. Though it is expensive, Japan is the favourite destination for an overseas holiday. After the March 2012 earthquake and tsunami hit Japan, the Taiwanese public contributed more money for disaster relief than any other nation, including even the United States. And a surprising number of Taiwanese go to Japan for their higher education.

**Tai Xu and Buddhist modernism**

Almost all Taiwanese Buddhists now follow religious leaders who consider themselves part of the movement which in English is usually known as humanistic Buddhism. This movement was founded in China by the monk Tai Xu (1890 - 1947). He did not have very much success in his homeland, but travelled a lot and had considerable influence internationally. Indeed, it is his “humanistic Buddhism” which, under the name of “Engaged Buddhism” (coined by Thich Nhat Hanh), is the form of Buddhist modernism most widely espoused by Buddhists in much of Asia and even further afield.

“Humanistic Buddhism” (Chinese: ren shen fo jiao, literally “Buddhism of the human realm”) is so called because Tai Xu wanted to make Buddhism far more relevant to life in this world, in reaction to its focus on the afterlife, the cult of ancestors, etc., and its concomitant preoccupation with ritual. He considered the Saṅgha too much concerned with meditation and the study of ancient texts, and thus remote from daily life and its problems. Accordingly he also wished to shift

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the balance between clergy and laity and to give the laity a far greater role. Obviously this all reflects an impulse to modernise, and to modernise in accord with an idea of modernity derived from contact with the West, and in particular with Protestant Christianity.

Though the main theme of this article is Buddhism in Taiwan, readers may wonder what part Japanese Buddhism has played on the Chinese mainland. It was on Tai Xu's initiative that the Chinese and Japanese governments both approved his holding the first conference of the World Buddhist Federation in Lu Shan in 1924. The conference discussed “the future exchange of Buddhist teachers and students between China and Japan”, and how by stages to unify Buddhists throughout the world; it also arranged to hold the next conference in Tokyo in November 1925. Holmes Welch writes:

“This was perhaps the first international Buddhist conference of modern times. Small delegations of three members each came from Taiwan and Korea. Twenty came from China. Most of them were close to Tai Xu or shared at least some of his views about the modernization of Buddhism. Seventeen were laymen …

“Tai Xu, literally and figuratively, took the center of the stage. He pointed out that, whereas the Chinese excelled in religious cultivation, the Japanese excelled in organizing, propaganda, and community service. A Sino-Japanese liaison committee was set up to put these complementary talents to work … and resolutions were passed for action in the fields of education and social welfare. Also included in the conference was a symposium on Buddhist doctrine, at which Tai Xu gave papers on the [Yogācāra] theory of ālaya-vijñāna and on the secularization of Japanese Buddhism. Plans were made to hold the next East Asian Buddhist conference in Peking – plans that never materialized.”

The organization then petered out, but it can be seen as the precursor, after various vicissitudes, of the still extant World Fellowship of Buddhists, which Dr. G.P. Malalasekera, a Sinhalese, founded in 1950, after Tai Xu's death, declaring that he was inspired to do so by Tai Xu.

The main reason why Sino-Japanese co-operation in Buddhist matters collapsed was that the Japanese government pursued a policy of sending Buddhist missionaries to China and even setting up temples with the aim, partially realised from 1937 on, of conquering China. Such attempts as they made to convince

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7 Welch, *op.cit.*, pp.166-7.
Chinese Buddhists of the excellence of their own Buddhist tradition also failed because their priests married and were not vegetarian.  

Against this unpromising background, it is perhaps rather surprising that Taiwanese Buddhists have been at all susceptible to Japanese influence. In general, one may note that, as Tai Xu indicated in 1925, Japan has led the way in East Asia in adopting various forms of modernity and secularization, and this has led to superior organization and a great rise in the importance of the laity. This increase in lay involvement has also fed back into emphasising concern with practice in daily life, sometimes – as Tai Xu would have wished – at the expense of ritual and the study of texts. We find, however, that there are points at which the influence has been more specific.

Buddhism in Contemporary Taiwan

The largest and best known Buddhist movements in Taiwan today are three: Fo Guang Shan (meaning “Buddha’s Light Mountain”) founded by Hsing Yun (b. 1927); Tzu Chi (meaning “Compassionate Relief”) founded by Cheng Yen (b. 1937); and Dharma Drum Mountain, founded by Sheng Yen (1930-2009). Though these three movements differ in many ways, all three consider themselves to preach humanistic Buddhism.

However, it would not be quite accurate to say that they all closely follow Tai Xu. Yin Shun (1906 – 2005), a monk of exceptional depth and breadth of Buddhist learning, cannot be quite left out of the picture. Early in life he became convinced “that Buddhism had become corrupted … in its transmission from India to China” and boldly set about trying to explain and see beyond later accretions to the Buddha’s message. He criticized the view of Pure Land Buddhism currently dominant in China and Taiwan, which made him quite unpopular. He also edited Tai Xu’s collected works. He escaped from China to Hong Kong in 1949 and moved to Taiwan, where he then stayed, in 1952.

Yin Shun was a propagandist for Tai Xu’s reformism, but reformulated part of it. He replaced Tai Xu’s ren shen fo jiao, which literally means “Buddhism of the human realm”, with ren jian fo jiao, which literally means “Buddhism of human life”. “The primary difference between these two theories consists in their diagnosis of what constitutes Chinese Buddhism’s main impediment to meeting modern

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9 Ibid., pp.169-171.
10 Jones, p.125.
Tai Xu had emphasised that Buddhism was focusing too much on rites for the dead and placating spirits; his proposed remedies were rational re-organization of the Saṅgha, purging superstitious practices and promoting social welfare activities. Yin Shun, by contrast, thought that the problem had deep historical roots in Buddhism’s admission of theism (under other terms) and treating Buddhas like gods. For example, he argued that the Pure Land was nothing like a heaven but should be created on earth through social welfare, environmental awareness, etc.  

Yin Shun was fearlessly untraditional. He took the unheard of step of ordaining the Master Cheng Yen as a nun, though she had none of the traditional ritual qualifications. He simply met her and was impressed. Had he not done this, it is not likely that she could have gone on to create Tzu Chi as she did. Cheng Yen treated her “master” with great respect, visiting him regularly until the end of his life; but it is hard to say that she was much influenced by his doctrinal views.

I have written above that the great majority of Taiwanese Buddhists are adherents of three movements. The closest Christian equivalent would probably be sects, but Christian sects have boundaries which are clearly defined by doctrine and often by other criteria as well. Christian terms simply do not fit the Buddhist situation. A major reason for this is that the criteria for membership in a Buddhist group have traditionally applied only to the Saṅgha. A member of the Saṅgha is formally ordained and remains a member unless formally expelled. Moreover, grounds for expulsion are not doctrinal belief or philosophical school, but matters of conduct which affect morality or decorum. With the laity, things are looser; we may however summarise a rather complex situation by saying that in practice it is a donor to the Saṅgha who is acknowledged as a lay follower. Thus a layman may well be considered a follower of more than one group, and it is less misleading to call the groups “movements”.

It may in fact better describe Chinese Buddhism to say that someone attaches themselves to a master (traditionally always a male monastic) and may follow that master either as an ordained or as a lay disciple; and the master’s soteriological beliefs and philosophical views become those of his followers. Identity is thus determined by the master and his pupillary lineage, on a patriarchal model.

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11Jones, p.133.
12Jones, pp.134-5.
The movement in which Japanese influence is most important is Tzu Chi. This also happens to be the one which I have studied intensively, so it is quite possible that there are traces of Japanese influence in the other two movements of which I am as yet unaware. Tzu Chi’s Master is a native Taiwanese, and a woman, while the founders of the other two movements are men, born in mainland China, who arrived in Taiwan as refugees from the Communists. Hsing Yun, founder of Fo Guang Shan, is from Jian Su in Southern China and speaks the dialect of that area, which is not intelligible to ordinary Taiwanese, so that he needs interpreters, but this has done surprisingly little to impede his progress. Thus the movements founded both by him and by Sheng Yan use Mandarin as their liturgical language and main medium, whereas Tzu Chi mainly uses the local Hokkien.

Fo Guang Shan, much the largest of the three movements both within Taiwan and internationally, is a kind of broad church and the one with the fewest obvious breaks with mainstream Chinese Buddhist tradition. It is led by a Saṅgha, who relate in much the traditional manner to an enormous lay following. Outsiders tend to find that its most salient feature is that a very high proportion of the Saṅgha are nuns.

However, this is typical of Taiwan as a whole: it has for some time had more Buddhist nuns than any other country in the world, maybe even ten times as many nuns as monks. The reasons for this have been much discussed; though this article shows that there are deeper roots, I believe that the main reason nowadays is quite simply the shortage of male vocations. In fact Fo Guang Shan may be using its high reputation and influence to attract more monks than is possible for other monasteries in Taiwan.

The Japanese creation of Taiwanese nuns

My research suggests that it is the Japanese who were originally responsible for the preponderance of nuns in Taiwan. The Rinzai Zen sect instituted a campaign of ordaining Taiwanese. In 1917 in Kai Yuan temple in Tainan in southern Taiwan there was held the first ordination ceremony for monks in Taiwan; Tai Xu officiated.

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15 Tzu Chi now claims to have about ten million members world wide, but this figure apparently includes all those who take part in their charitable projects, and they themselves say that many of these are not Buddhists.

16 Elise Anne De Vido, *Taiwan’s Buddhist Nuns*, Albany, 2010, is disappointing, in that she gives hardly any statistics. It appears that the censuses count Buddhists, but not Buddhist nuns.
ciated. In 1919 the same temple held the first ordination ceremony in Taiwan ever to include women. We have the following figures for ordinations in Taiwan, which were performed under Japanese auspices:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Monks</th>
<th>Nuns</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1919</td>
<td>84</td>
<td>79</td>
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<tr>
<td>1923</td>
<td>83</td>
<td>58</td>
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<tr>
<td>1924</td>
<td>8</td>
<td>50</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1934</td>
<td>31</td>
<td>83</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1940</td>
<td>16</td>
<td>41</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

These figures show that while initially the sexes were fairly evenly matched, the number of male candidates then declined severely, but female candidates were not in short supply. The Japanese said, according to my source, that Taiwanese women had very hard lives and should realize that they would be better off as nuns.

In the 1930s there were 120 Rinzai Zen temples in Taiwan funded by Japanese. Most of these seem to have housed nuns. There was also a Japanese Rinzai hospital in southern Taiwan.

In 1937, the Japanese counted 170,000 lay followers of Japanese Buddhism in Taiwan, and 56 Japanese Buddhist temples. Twelve Japanese sects were preaching in Taiwan, the Zen sects Rinzai and Sōtō prominent among them.

One Japanese Rinzai monk was particularly notable in this period. Gisei Tokai learnt Hokkien. He supervised more than one hundred preaching centres, which

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18 Fai-yan Shih, “The study on Social Status Development of Taiwanese Buddhist Nuns”, *Hsien Chang Bulletin of Buddhist Studies*, vol.8, January 2007, p.60. This article reports that according to a Japanese government report dated 1919, there were at that time no Buddhist nuns in Taiwan.
19 Once the Japanese had set the ball rolling, others too made successful efforts to recruit and educate nuns. In particular, Jue Li, a monk from the Chinese mainland, but ordained into the Japanese Sōtō sect, played a major part (see Jones, *op.cit.*, pp.51-2). It is noteworthy that Jue Li was a Taiwanese delegate at the Tokyo conference organized by Tai Xu in 1925.
21 Unfortunately Li-man Lin does not make it clear how many temples housed nuns or how many nuns there were, even approximately. But evidently there were hundreds.
22 Wang Jian Chuang, “Attempt to study the Japanese monk Gisei Tokai and his preaching career in Taiwan”, *Bulletin of Yuan Kuang Buddhist Institute*, vol.3, March 1990, pp.357-382. Most of the information in the next five paragraphs is from Wang; the rest is from Lin (see 20 above).
paid annual fees to the Rinzai headquarters in Japan, and he received an award from the headquarters for his activities. He also was advisor to the Taiwanese Buddhist vegetarian association. He founded a college in Taipei, called Zhen Nan Xiu Xin, for Buddhists (both clergy and lay), and was its warden and professor; the syllabus included Mandarin and other languages, mathematics, history and geography. In 1918 the college was taken over by the Sōtō sect. In 1934 it recruited 120 students, and 30 more joined in the second semester, so that the college decided to employ three more teachers.

Tokai founded a hospital in southern Taiwan and was chairman of its board; the hospital included a department for teaching Mahayana Buddhism and correcting wrong beliefs. He also founded a Buddhist charity called Tzu Chi, like the modern movement. It raised funds through members called “commissioners” (mu kuan wei yuan), who went round with begging bowls to collect donations; that today’s Tzu Chi uses the same name for fundraisers, who operate in the same way, can hardly be a coincidence.

It is also of particular relevance to my theme that he recruited nuns whom he sent to Japan to be given their monastic education by the Rinzai sect, who gave them scholarships. In 1933, of the 29 graduates from the college in Taipei half went on to study in Japan, where they were ordained; though the college was in Sōtō hands, one gathers that it was the Rinzai sect which taught and ordained them in Japan.

After 1945, when the Japanese were for the most part replaced by mainland Chinese, many of the nuns who had been educated in Japan were re-ordained into traditional Chinese sects by BAROC, the organization which then had sole control of Taiwanese Buddhist institutions. They continued however to be in charge of nunneries, though they are unlikely to have discarded all that they had learnt in Japan.

Ironically, Japan has very few Buddhist nuns, and they are still struggling to gain any kind of parity with monks. However, in the vast arena of Japanese “new religions”, which covers roughly the past two centuries and millions of adherents, female leadership is a conspicuous feature. For instance, the religion Tenrikyō was founded in 1838 and led by a peasant woman. Helen Hardacre writes that in the world view of Japanese new religions, the concept of pollution, including

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the pollution of women, is in general downplayed, and this gives women more scope to be religiously active.\textsuperscript{25}

Thus it fits well into my general picture that some of the leading nuns of Fo Guang Shan have received their university education, or higher degrees, at Japanese Buddhist universities.\textsuperscript{26} Since the Master Hsin Yun is now very old, we shall no doubt find out before very long whether any of these nuns, who are probably abler than his leading monks, will succeed to the leadership.

Sheng Yen, founder of Dharma Drum Mountain and the Chung-hwa Institute of Buddhist Studies, had some difficult years after arriving in Taiwan. Then in 1968, “at the age of 38, he began doctoral studies in Buddhist literature at Risshō University in Japan and received his LLD in 1975. He has more formal education than any other major Buddhist leader in Taiwan.” \textsuperscript{27} He studied Chan/Zen under both Taiwanese and Japanese masters, and has a clear Zen identity, but has about 300,000 regular followers, spanning Taiwan and New York, where for many years he spent about half his time.\textsuperscript{28} His Saṅgha I believe to be quite small, and again to contain more nuns than monks. I do not know how his movement has been affected by his death, but I have heard that the movement has recently built a new temple in Taipei which is utterly Japanese in style.

**Japanese influence on the current Tzu Chi movement**

On Tzu Chi I have far more significant data. It is almost entirely a lay movement, founded and headed by a woman, and at least its first generation of membership was preponderantly female – though the balance is now shifting. I have published a rather long book\textsuperscript{29} on this remarkable organization; here I must confine myself to matters of Japanese influence.

The personnel and structure of Tzu Chi recall Japanese new religions. If we hark back to the remarks of Tai Xu, we may also detect Japanese influence in the fact that Tzu Chi is both tightly organized and extremely regimented, down to matters of personal appearance. There have been lay Buddhist movements in China, but surely none of them were ever so smartly turned out.


\textsuperscript{26}It is relevant to remark at this point that Fo Guang Shan is reticent about the personal details of its members, so that to come by precise information is by no means easy.


\textsuperscript{28}Madsen p.85.

\textsuperscript{29}Yu-Shuang Yao, *Taiwan’s Tzu Chi as Engaged Buddhism*, Leiden and Boston, 2012.
In 1960, the father of Jin-yun (who later became Master Cheng Yen) died, which gave the first impetus for her to leave the household life. She took to visiting a nearby temple called Ciyun Si. There she became friendly with a resident nun called Xiu Dao. “Xiu Dao had been trained in Japan by Japanese Buddhists and she disagreed with some of the practices in Taiwanese Buddhist temples, which relied for their upkeep on revenue from services rendered. … [She] also claimed that there was a lack of discipline within temple communities.” She thought that the Chinese Chan principle that a day without work is a day without food should be restored, and decided to follow it herself. 30

In 1961 Jin-yun and Xiu Dao secretly left together and tried to lead an austere life by themselves in a remote area. In the end, Xiu Dao’s health started to give way and she returned to her old temple. Now in her 90s, she is still living as a nun in that temple, with three followers.

Before meeting Jin-yun, Xiu Dao had studied in a Rinzai nunnery in Aichi Prefecture in Japan, near Nagoya, for six to seven years. She has told me that she was one of the recruits of Gisei Tokai, who took nuns to Japan for education in the 1930s (see p.18 above). I deduce that she had a considerable influence on Cheng Yen – though Cheng Yen has never visited Japan. 31 For example, she taught Cheng Yen that monks and nuns should live on alms collected daily; this original Buddhist tradition had been lost in China.

Though it is nowadays rarely if ever mentioned, I believe that Cheng Yen has been influenced by the Japanese lay Buddhist movement Risshō Kōsei-Kai, one of the “new religions” which gives central importance to the Lotus Sutra. 32 Attaching such importance to the Lotus Sutra is more typical of Japanese than of Chinese Buddhism. It is probably significant that in Tzu Chi the name of the Lotus Sutra is Miao-fa Lien-hua Ching, as is normal in Japan. Miao-fa means “Mystic law” and the Chinese never use this expression as part of the text’s name. For Cheng Yen the Lotus Sutra is so important that every morning from 4 to 6 she gives a class on it; the movement is planning to publish the teaching given in those classes in a multi-volume work.

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31 She has never been abroad because she has a weak heart and doctors tell her not to fly.
32 In Tzu Chi’s yearbook for 1992-6 a photo of the chairman of Risshō Kōsei-kai and the Master Cheng Yen was taken while the Japanese chairman visited the movement’s headquarters, and a very senior member of Tzu Chi has told me that the Master took a correspondence course with Risshō Kōsei-kai in her early days.
Another point at which we may discern Japanese influence is this. We have mentioned that some Japanese new religions are headed by women and that Ten-rikyō was founded by a woman. That lady was believed to be permanently possessed by a divinity and so was herself considered a goddess. In Chinese Buddhism no woman can ever be a goddess in any sense. However, there is ambiguity in Tzu Chi about the ontological status of Cheng Yen, and in some ways she is treated as a kind of goddess, an incarnation of Guan Yin.

In Risshō Kōsei-Kai, “an applicant for entry … needs to be introduced by a ‘god-parent’, and the new member is called ‘godchild’. As parent and child have ties of blood, those who join the society, as a group of fellow believers in the Buddha, are bound by the dharma-relationship. Therefore, the godparent not only introduces a newcomer, but “just as a parent brings up his child, continues to be the guardian and adviser of the godchild, a guide in the faith, and labors for his sound growth. The new member is introduced to the fellow members by his godparent, and gets new brothers, sisters and friends in the faith.”

An analogous system to this exists in Tzu Chi. Cheng Yen has introduced a new concept, fa yuan, meaning “dharma relationship”, which is a bond between members of Tzu Chi. It is more important than su yuan, “worldly relationship”. The latter ends at death but the former is eternal. The same applies to the pair of concepts fa-qin and su-qin: qin means “blood affection”, and that created by kinship in dharma is more valuable than that arising in the normal secular way.

Though it is normal in Buddhist monastic communities for monks and nuns to regard each other as brothers and sisters, and senior teachers etc. may be considered to stand in loco parentis, this idea of dharma relationships among lay followers seems to go further than anything found elsewhere in contemporary Chinese or Taiwanese Buddhism.

There are similarities between how Tzu Chi and Risshō Kōsei-Kai carry out the recruitment and socialisation of new members. I have described how new converts to Tzu Chi are “invited to the local informal group gathering called chahui (tea party) held every fortnight at the converter’s home or a neighbouring household … The meeting is normally led by the testimony of the senior members [to] the positive effects experienced after their conversion: the resolving of personal problems and weaknesses. Within this confessional atmosphere, the isolated new

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34 Yao p.88.
convert would be encouraged to disarm their self-protection and guardedness.”

Risshō Kōsei-Kai has a similar practice.

There are further similarities between Risshō Kōsei-Kai and Tzu Chi. For example, the former has its own hospital, established in 1952, whereas Cheng Yen decided in 1966 to create a hospital in Hualien in eastern Taiwan, thus launching Tzu Chi as a medical charity. Similarly both movements have their own school system. Another feature that Tzu Chi may have borrowed from Risshō Kōsei-Kai is that in its early days one of its chief methods of publicity was to distribute cheap printed leaflets. These features are more widely shared among modern Buddhist movements; but they do add up to a pattern of greater similarity than can be due to coincidence.

A striking similarity between Tzu Chi and some of the largest Japanese new religions is that there is no role for any clergy in the rituals and events surrounding death. Everything is done by laymen. Moreover, death is not regarded primarily as an occasion for mourning, but is given a comparatively optimistic interpretation. This too I have described in detail in my book.

The “Silent Mentor” programme

However, in my book I make no mention of the remarkable way in which Tzu Chi encourages people to donate their bodies for dissection by medical students, and how all this is carried out. The cadavers are known as “Silent Mentors”. The whole “Silent Mentor” programme is described in a fine article by Rey-Sheng Her. Rey shows that although it has taken the whole matter much further, Tzu Chi has built on something started in Japan by what was called the White Chrysanthemum Society. This article seems so far to have attracted little attention, so I take the liberty of quoting Rey at some length.

“In 1870, under the Meiji Restoration, Japan’s medical world decided to adopt Germany’s medical science, including its study of anatomy. From the late 1930s to the 1950s, Japan used “dead travellers”, people who fell sick and died by the roadside, for dissection. Many medical schools were reluctant to rely on such

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36Yao p.66.
37Yao pp.94-8.
38It had hardly begun when I was writing my book.
material for the practice of anatomy, as the wishes of the deceased could not be ascertained.

Then in this century, just when the medical world in the West began to consider the issue, Japan too started to adopt “respect for dead bodies” as the core value in anatomy education. The White Chrysanthemum Society (Shiragikukai) was established in Japan in 1971, with over 20,000 registered donors/members, who are recruited by appeal through various channels. Professor Tatsuo Sato, a leader of that society, commented on current practice: “They might wish not to be dissected, or on the contrary, they might be willing to. I assume most of them don’t wish so. Though they are just lifeless bodies, they should still be shown respect. Such use would create a bad impression on the students, so this practice is not welcome. It would be hard to teach students ethics with those bodies. The bodies now used have all been willingly donated with the implicit message that ‘this is to help you to become a good doctor, please use my body’. Such a message has a very good influence on the students.”

This is how the White Chrysanthemum Society operates. Whenever a member passes away, the family notifies the Anatomy Teaching Department. The professor on duty will then put on a funeral black robe, which is kept on the premises, and rush to the funeral. A token contribution of 20,000 Yen towards the funeral costs will be handed over along with a body donation agreement. After that is signed, the body will be delivered to the medical school for study.

Respect for the donors is emphasised. Before the start of each class, the students must observe a moment of silence as a tribute to the donors’ contribution. In the classes, the teachers and students must hold the donors in high esteem. On the first day of anatomy practice, some of the society’s members are invited to attend and explain why they wish to donate. The students bring a bunch of white chrysanthemums to the first class. White symbolizes mourning, the chrysanthemum denotes nobility. Led by the teaching staff, the students place the flowers at the monument to body donors on the campus. At the beginning and the end of each class, all present must stand in silent tribute. At the completion of the course, each student team places the body they have dissected in a coffin covered with flowers. At some medical schools, the students also help to collect the bones after the cremation. At the end of the course, the students summarise their experience in a book which they send out to the donors’ families and society’s

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3rd April, 2007; interview with Professor Tatsuo Sato of Tokyo Medical and Dental University.
members; they write of their feelings during dissection, whether their attitudes have been changed, etc.

In its early days, Japan’s medical community was influenced by the Western way of thinking. Natural science was embraced with the belief that matter was the centre of the universe and that science education was to advocate rationalism. They deeply believed that rationalism in exploring the physical world was the ultimate value in the quest for truth as well as the highest human quality. But by the end of the 20th century, the White Chrysanthemum Society began soul-searching. They proceeded to merge the rational thinking of science with Japan’s traditional etiquette. Gradually, body donation is being accepted as a virtue by Japanese society. But the White Chrysanthemum deliberately removes all religious connotations and bases its belief on science. Its aim is not to help deal with death, nor to provide guidance in overcoming the fear of death. It also does not seem to emphasise the sublimation of grief through the donation process. Instead, its aim to maximise the effective use of bodies is based purely on practicality: in the spirit of Jeremy Bentham, the British founder of utilitarianism, they hold that the aim of all social and political institutions should be the greatest happiness of the greatest number. Not only do the students show respect; through donation the bodies have become objects useful to society.”

In his impressive article, Rey shows how, without detracting from the rational, scientific spirit here described, Tzu Chi has added to the proceedings, often at the Master’s personal suggestion, features which indeed help those involved to “deal with death and provide guidance in overcoming the fear of death”. This noble cultural edifice is built on Japanese foundations.

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Yao, Yu-Shuang: Taiwan’s Tzu Chi as Engaged Buddhism, Leiden and Boston, 2012.
Having struggled to understand Zen Buddhism, I have found it a great pleasure to read a book about one of its foremost practitioners. Although a deceptively slim volume, this book is a real treasure trove of material about Takuan Soho, a Jack of all trades and Master of them all. He was a monk with a slapstick (maybe very appropriate in Zen) sense of humour, with legendary culinary talents, a skilled wielder of both sword and calligraphy brush (his calligraphic skills beautifully presented in the frontispiece of the book) and a frequenter of poetry parties. One gets a vivid sense of the all-pervasive nature of Zen Buddhism from this book.

Takuan Soho (1573-1645) lived in turbulent times and Nobuko Hirose’s opening chapters provide a detailed description of how he navigated those times and the people he met and befriended. He was at the beck and call of many a Japanese nobleman and had to use all his diplomatic skills in an attempt to prevent his beloved Buddhism being used as a political tool. I would recommend reading the opening two chapters in one sitting, to get an overview of the Master’s long and distinguished life and the setting in which he flourished. The following chapters would, in my opinion, be better savoured … like Japanese pickles … a small amount at a time. The Master himself gives excellent advice at the beginning of the book: “Dwell on the sage’s words. Do not swallow at one gulp.” There are translations of Takuan Soho’s famous texts, which would particularly appeal to any practitioners of martial arts. Chapter 5 comprises short, pithy tales about Takuan Soho. My favourites are a tale about a painter asked to paint the sound of a drum, and a cheeky tale where our intrepid monk misbehaves and blames a nobleman in order to challenge the nobleman’s poor attitude to life. We learn how
Takuan tackles bandits, makes the most of the therapeutic properties of poetry to cure a madman and displays his versatility and infamous immoveable wisdom in many situations and at different stages of his life.

In the translations of Takuan Soho’s evening Dharma talks, the monk’s metaphors helped me, a dusty layperson, to have a glimpse of the more complex, philosophical ideas of Zen Buddhist teachings. There are helpful endnotes providing further explanation of the more complex terms. Occasionally, I would have preferred more detailed explanation of some of these ideas. For a layperson not terribly familiar with Zen teachings, there are aspects of the teachings that can shock and confuse on first encounter. I’m comforted by Takuan Soho’s remark to one student faced with a bamboozling poem, who begs Takuan for an explanation … “I don’t understand it either”!

The occasional juxtaposition of English and Japanese in the same sentence made for challenging reading at times. As I am not familiar with Japanese terminology, this style slowed me down considerably. It forced me to re-read many paragraphs and encouraged a more reflective style of reading.

Immoveable wisdom comes ready packed with a health warning to all academic Buddhist scholars: beware too much textual study and analysis! I would recommend this book to any overworked Buddhist Studies academic. Perhaps, in time, the OCBS could be renamed as the Oxford Centre for Buddhist Non-studies in honour of Takuan Soho. Nobuko Hirose has done an admirable job of bringing this monk to life through her translations and re-tellings and I find myself wishing to return to re-read and savour this wise monk’s take on life.

Amanda Anderson
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Donald S. Lopez, Jr. once again clarifies the West’s formation of, and in some cases fascination with, Buddhism. This time he does so by demystifying the connection (rather disconnection) between Buddhism and modern science. *The Scientific Buddha* is a short book with profound, long lasting and far reaching impacts. As the title suggests, it is a biography of the Scientific Buddha who was born in a study room in 1844 in Paris, travelled to Asia and then back to the West. He has made Buddhism a world religion known for its peace and reason. Lopez suggests, “It is now time for him to pass into nirvana.” With constant clarity and occasional humour, Lopez lays out the story of the Scientific Buddha in five chapters.

The first chapter, “A Purified Religion”, sets the scene. As the book is a product of a series of Terry Lectures delivered in 2008 at Yale University, this chapter explains how Buddhism, particularly that which has emerged in association with science, meets the Terry Foundation’s lecture theme of “purified religion.” Whatever this purified Buddhism tends to claim in connection to science, asserts Lopez, is nothing but limited, partial and in some cases misleading (8-9). Then he briefly mentions the socio-political (i.e., colonial) cultural (science vs. religion) and inter-religious (Buddhism vs. Christianity) contexts of the mid 19th century, in which so-called Scientific Buddhism emerged. Perhaps the most poignant moment in this introductory chapter is when Lopez asks, “If Buddhism was compatible with the science of the nineteenth century, how can it [with timeless truth] also be compatible with the science of the twenty-first [century]?” (13).

In the second chapter, “The Birth of the Scientific Buddha,” Lopez argues that this particular buddha emerged not from the hearts and minds of living Buddhists but out of the 19th century orientalists’ philological efforts to make sense of ancient Buddhist texts. He locates the birth of the scientific buddha in Eugène Burnouf’s long introduction to the *Lotus Sutra* in 1844, in which “Buddha was a man who reached a degree of intelligence and of virtue” (38). The core of this chapter is Lopez’s observation of an evolution in the West’s portrayal of the Buddha “from an idol into a man, indeed, into a philosopher” (38). These diverse portrayals of the Buddha, according to Lopez, derived from experience as Westerners encountered living Buddhists, antique statues and ancient texts respectively. That historical account is the core of this chapter.
I find Lopez’s meticulous historical analysis fascinating; however, his explanation of why the Buddha was humanized by the 19th century orientalists is disappointing at best. For example, referring to the Buddha as a philosopher and Buddhism as a philosophy, Lopez explains, “This Buddhism would be built largely from texts. Because there were no Buddhists living in India during the colonial period, [Pali] Buddhism...became the domain of European and later American and then Japanese scholars” (39). I wonder about the correlation between textual construction of the Buddha/Buddhism and the absence of Buddhists. Early orientalists who constructed “humanized” Buddha/Buddhism were mainly philologists; therefore, texts rather than Buddhists were their sources. Yes, Buddhism ceased to be a dominant force in India long before the 19th century; however, it remained as a living religion of minorities in fringe areas like the contemporary Katmandu Valley in Nepal and Chittagong in Bangladesh. These fringe communities may have been unknown to the 19th century philologists, but would that have been the case with 19th century colonial subjects like the Sinhalese Buddhists? I would argue rather that philologists’ textual construction of “humanized” Buddha/Buddhism derived from their scholarly paradigm defined by 19th century historicism, Eurocentric and colonial ideologies that resulted in prioritizing texts over the colonized, living Buddhists.

The third chapter, entitled “The Problem with Karma”, is the core chapter of the book. In it Lopez makes the strongest case to delineate how Buddhism in fact contradicts science, here represented by Charles Darwin’s theory of evolution. First, he denies the historical claim that Buddhism in fact influenced Darwin. After a brief discussion of Buddhist doctrines of karma and rebirth, the ideas used to establish compatibility with the theory of evolution, Lopez argues that karmically determined, consciousness driven rebirth in Buddhism contradicts Darwin’s theory of natural selection by the random mutation of matter (68-69). The pursuit of pleasure, the driving force of the intergenerational existence of species in the theory of evolution, is in Buddhism perceived as suffering. The existence of species in the evolution theory, even if prolonged by adaptation, leads to eventual extinct. But the existence of sentient beings in Buddhism continues forever, unless it is consciously stopped (nirvana) by following the Buddhist path. Lopez also underscores how Buddhism and science differ in their theories of truth. Truth in science remains undiscovered and constantly changing; in contrast, the truth that the Buddha claimed to realize had been already discovered by previous buddhas and would remain unchanged for the future buddhas (75). Thus remembrance
of truth rather than discovery of it characterizes Buddhism. A Buddhism that is squeezed into being compatible with science would be nothing but “materialistic Buddhism” deprived of its other-worldly (lokottara) aura. Therefore, Lopez suggests, we would be better off allowing “Buddhism to remain a religion, and to be a pre-scientific religion” (78) and “the Buddha to remain beyond the world, completely at odds with the world, and with science” (79).

Lopez names his fourth chapter “A Primer on Buddhist Meditation,” and he calls it “interlude.” The purpose of this chapter is to remind the readers “what meditation has meant in the history of Buddhism” (81). Lopez reminds us that the enquiry of what exact meditation practice led to the Buddha’s enlightenment has generated many Buddhist texts delineating many conflicting theories and a plethora of practices. Some of them are discussed in this chapter. Challenging popular conceptions, Lopez argues that “all forms of meditation over the long history of Buddhism are ritual practices” (84), and some of them can easily be categorized as “myth” (85). Lopez ends the chapter with a brief history of contemporary mindfulness based practices initiated by a Burmese monk (Ledi Sayadaw) in the late 1880s in colonial Burma and popularized by a German monk (Nyanaponika Thera) in the 1950s in Sri Lanka. Particularly the latter’s reinterpretation of ancient Buddhist meditation as a universal and non-religious practice, says Lopez, has contributed to the mindfulness movement since the early 1980s. The crucial point in this chapter is when Lopez criticizes the current mindfulness movement. He says, “it is inaccurate to assume that Buddhist meditation is encompassed by something called mindfulness” (92). The technical term “sati/smrti” originally meant memory, and “mindfulness” is a recent rendering of the term (79).

Lopez acknowledges that sati (smrti) has both meanings, namely memory/recollection and mindfulness; however, his overemphasis on the former has led him to find fault with contemporary mindfulness circles. Bhikkhu Bodhi, the well-known Pali text translator, argues that it is not “memory” but the meaning of mindfulness, contemplation and awareness that separates the Buddha’s distinct use of the term from other non-Buddhist thought in ancient India. He says, “To designate the practice that became the main pillar of his meditative system, he [the Buddha] chose the word sati. But here sati no longer means memory. Rather, the Buddha assigned the word a new meaning consonant with his own system of psychology and meditation. Thus it would be a fundamental mistake to insist on reading the old meaning of memory into the new context” (emphasis added, Bodhi 2012: 22).
Furthermore, Lopez dumps three interconnected terms into one; in doing so, he overlooks their nuances. The early Pali Suttas provide three interconnected terms: \textit{sati}, \textit{anussati} and \textit{anupassana}. Although \textit{sati} implies memory, it is the second term, \textit{anussati}, that is more connected with memory. As Analayo, another prolific translator of Buddhist texts, says: “The connotation of \textit{sati} as memory becomes particularly prominent with the recollections (\textit{anussati})” (46). Lopez refers to “the memory or recollection of death” and “the memory or recollection of the Buddha” to highlight the importance of memory in Buddhist meditation. In fact, in all these cases it is not \textit{sati} but \textit{anussati} that is used, i.e., \textit{Buddhanussati}, \textit{Maranānussati}, etc. Perhaps more importantly, the term \textit{anussati} appears nowhere in the \textit{Satipatthāna Sutta}, the Pali discourse commonly used in the circles of Buddhist meditation and science. Instead, what we find in the discourse is \textit{sati} (i.e., \textit{Ānāpānasati}) and \textit{anupassana} (i.e., \textit{Kāyanupassana}) which connote “mindfulness” and “contemplation” respectively. Neither of these two terms directly renders the meaning of memory/recollection.

The final chapter, “The Death of the Scientific Buddha”, contains a few new punches to knock down the Scientific Buddha. Lopez reminds us that since the mid 19th century, first Theravāda, followed by D. T. Suzuki’s Zen in the 1950s, and then in the 1960s and 70s Nagarjuna’s Madhyamaka philosophy represented Buddhism in its dialogue with science. However, for the last few decades Tibetan Buddhism has dominated the contemporary discussion on neuroscience-meditative experience. Challenging the rhetoric of similarities between science and Buddhism, Lopez argues that they in fact belong to two opposing categories. Buddhism, unlike science, induces stress to get out of Saṃsāra. It prioritizes morality over scientific facts. It celebrates altruism, which science identifies as the obstacle to evolutionary survival. Unsatisfied with on-going scientific experiments, Lopez suggests that the Buddhism-neurology discussion should focus on the centuries old descriptions of meditation to unpack their connections to Buddhist doctrines. For that, one should use neurology to answer questions posed in Buddhist meditation, not the other way around (113). This may clarify the relation between meditation and doctrine (115). Lopez also challenges the idea that a fruitful science-Buddhism dialogue is conceivable only through two-fold translation, i.e., translation of doctrine into meditative states and then the latter into scientific data (120).

\textit{The Scientific Buddha} is a thought-provoking book for a wide audience. It may find an audience among Buddhist meditation enthusiasts; however, it may disil-
lusion them. It is a must read for academics who are interested in religion/Buddhism and modernity/science. Particularly Buddhist scholars of contemporary Buddhism would find it quite enlightening. It is a strong case study that would fit well in senior undergraduate or graduate syllabi on religion and modernity. Particularly religious studies students would benefit tremendously not only from its science-Buddhism discussion but also its instruction about, perhaps illustration of, the job of religious studies scholarship. For example, Lopez instructs, “It is not the role of the scholar to protect, preserve, and defend the religion that he or she studies. Religions, or at least their adherents, have done that themselves over the centuries. It is the task of the scholar to document and analyze those efforts. Religions change over time. It is the task of the scholar to document and analyze that change. To understand what a religion is, it is essential to understand what it has been at other points in space. It is essential to remember. And it is the task of the scholar to aid in that remembering” (78-79).

The scholar’s job in remembering and reminding what religion was and has been is admirable. This admirable job, I would add, should not be clouded by one’s (be it personal or institutional) wishful thinking. I wonder whether Lopez is inadvertently making that connection in his following statement: “I suggest that we honor the Scientific Buddha for all he has done over his short life of 150 years… and that we then allow him to pass away, like a flame going out” (xi). Accordingly, he entitles his last chapter “The Death of the Scientific Buddha.” I wonder who we are, as scholars of Buddhism, to suggest or wish any buddha (scientific or not) dead? Instead, what we can, perhaps should, do is to document how the religious Buddha demands due respect, recognition and credit for the non-religious (scientific) use of his dharma. Here is an example. An authoritative voice within the Buddhist tradition expresses: “I feel that if psychotherapists can draw upon Buddhist mindfulness practice to help people overcome anxiety and distress, their work is most commendable. If clinicians find that mindfulness helps patients accept pain and illness, that is wonderful…. They [however] should recognize that while the Dhamma bids everyone come and take what they need, they are drawing from *an ancient well of sacred wisdom* [emphasis added]” (Bodhi 2012: 36). Obviously the Scientific Buddha has not yet passed into nirvana, and neither does he intend to do so soon. Instead, he seems to be more interested in extending his life span, as Lopez would say, with a “post-scientific” spin.
**BOOK REVIEWS**

**Bibliography**


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Erik Braun's book is about how a remarkable man's leadership came to the rescue of Burmese Buddhist identity and how a very modern Buddhism was born. Around the turn of the twentieth century, colonial power was devastating Burmese institutions of state and religion. The Dharma itself was under threat and the reality of change demanded adaptation.

An ambitious Burmese Monk, Ledi Sayadaw, born in 1846 of humble origins, applied his considerable intelligence to a career within the corridors of the Sangha's power. This required excellence in study combined with political judgment. His character was forged and a leader was made.

When the time came and millenarian fears justified decisive action, Ledi Sayadaw could see that democratisation of power through making Buddhist learning accessible to the laity was the means to preserving the Dharma and renewing hope in a broken Burma. This task required simplification of theory and practice. As a result he created the blueprint for a new expression of Buddhism that could travel to the West.

Of course, nothing exists in isolation and everything depends heavily on its context. This seems obvious, but perhaps we should remember the Buddha's advice to Ananda when he exclaimed:

"It's amazing, lord, it's astounding, how deep this dependent co-arising is, and how deep its appearance, and yet to me it seems as clear as clear can be.”  

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[The Buddha responded:] "Don't say that, Ananda. Don't say that. Deep is this dependent co-arising, and deep its appearance. It's because of not understanding and not penetrating this Dhamma that this generation is like a tangled skein, a knotted ball of string, like matted rushes and reeds, and does not go beyond transmigration, beyond the planes of deprivation, woe, and bad destinations.” (DN51, Online Translation, Thanissaro Bhikkhu, 1997.)

So let me explain a little about the context in which this review is written: A mixture of surprise and pride came over me when Richard asked me to review this book. I have little by way of the academic credentials that one might expect of someone asked to write such a review for an academic journal, but Richard assured me that I was the person he wanted to do the job.

Not being an academic, I cannot treat Braun's book as an academic object whose merit stands outside the context of its comprehensibility and usefulness to me.

I apply what I understand of the Buddhist tradition in my life and work. I am looking for credible sources or evidence which provide the foundation for clearly explained ideas. Ideas which interest me are ideas that make sense of the world in which I live and give me a rationale for action. The quality and clarity of writing, well researched source material and the ideas he expresses have made Braun's book a pleasure for me to read.

I teach mindfulness, and what I teach draws on an evidence-based understanding of how “Buddhist insight meditation” can prevent depression. What I teach in my workplace applies a cognitive behaviourist theory of how an “active ingredient” of “insight meditation” prevents recurrent depression to general stress and work related performance. In the therapeutic context the “active ingredient” is delivered in an eight-week teaching programme, Mindfulness-Based Cognitive Therapy (MBCT). MBCT is a secularized, reproducible intervention that has provided opportunities for experimental testing. It was found it to be effective at reducing the rate of relapse of depression by 40-50.

MBCT represents a bridge between an epistemology with Buddhist roots and scientific epistemology. In the scientific context, causes become independent variables, conditions are controlled and effects are dependent variables. All the elements of the processes of a phenomenon under scientific study need to be defined and measurable or controllable. The subject of scientific study becomes an object, which exists independently of the context in which it is studied; hypothesis becomes theory and theory becomes fact.
When it comes to the scientific study of therapy, subjective experience is taken as objective data. On the other hand, Buddhist knowledge is based entirely on examining subjective experience subjectively. Here, it could be argued that Buddhist knowledge is more about the nature of experience of things than about the nature of things that exist independently of experience.

Braun explains how Buddhism morphed in Burma during the colonial period to meet the needs of its people, state and identity. He charts the life of an exceptional man who played a key role in reshaping Burmese Buddhism to meet the needs of the times.

By his own ingenuity, Ledi Sayadaw took on the role of bridge between a pre-colonial traditional Burma and modernity in his country. He rose to eminence in the precolonial Sangha by means of his ambition, application and intelligence. He then applied what he had learnt in his early life to translate traditional structures of power into a more democratic sense of responsibility and identity during times of colonial upheaval. He led a popular movement to safeguard Burmese identity and Buddhism when the traditional institutions of King, court and Sangha crumbled.

What I am interested in is how this process adapted Buddhism into a form that then spread to the West. The Abhidhamma needed to be simplified to make it possible to teach to the lay population. In turn, this enabled lay teachers to become the guardians of the teachings and stewards of the Dhamma and Burmese identity. Not only did the theoretical foundations of the Dhamma need exegesis, but the understanding of the function of meditation also needed to shift away from a focus on profound states of concentration, only possible after prolonged practice, to an exercise that could be cultivated by less intensive practice.

A short cut to experiential insight was made possible by stressing the importance of “mindfulness” in the development of what has become understood as “insight meditation”. A stripped down theoretical framework to make “mindfulness” the central function in “insight meditation” came with this form of meditation. Later this made it possible, when it was introduced to the West, to understand “mindfulness” as a means to understand psychological processes so as to reduce the impact of unhelpful thinking and thus turn it into a self-help tool in a humanist context.

Ledi Sayadaw thought that the Abhidamma would engage the scientific mind. Representing Buddhism as a tradition built on reason could align it to science and therefore give it legitimacy under colonial rule. Ledi Sayadaw’s intent was
not to reduce the Dhamma to science, but that is what he may have inadvertently achieved. By starting a movement that has lead to the creation of a simplified approach to Buddhist “insight meditation”, he set in motion a historical process that may have satisfied his nationalist intentions but may also have had the unintended consequence of the colonisation of Buddhism itself.

What I teach in the workplace takes the active ingredient of “insight meditation” but employs a delivery tool which fits a workplace context. I have converted an eight-week therapy of about 50-60 hours of meditation (MBCT) to a form that asks for about 25

Braun helps the reader to understand that both the form and the content of the Buddhist tradition cannot exist outside a social context. To the reader interested in contemporary mindfulness, his book leads to the realization that the “active ingredient” and the “delivery mechanism” in MBCT may be accidents of history rather than necessary principles of action. This does not fit well with the assumptions implicit in the scientific method or with the views of those in our times who wish to define and practise an original Buddhism as taught by the Buddha himself two and a half thousand years ago.

The next step in understanding the mind within the scientific approach must be built on what has been established by the scientific method. So here is where I suggest that Braun’s book becomes particularly useful. It tells a story that enables the importance of context to be appreciated in the study of the functions of the human mind. Braun's book gives us a well-resourced argument that demonstrates that what we might be tempted to believe is an objective “active ingredient” of “insight meditation” is in fact something that has emerged from a historical and cultural context. Furthermore, after reading Braun’s book not only must we come to the conclusion that the “active ingredient” and the “delivery mechanism” of MBCT are not objects carved in stone: we can no longer even be sure that there is a real difference between them. Perhaps it is not so much that the Dhamma has become scientific as that the scientific method may now be understood in the context of Braun’s insights into the history of Buddhist thinking. Perhaps we can now see science, as well as the Dhamma, as social processes subject to the laws of dependent co-arising as taught by the Buddha long ago.

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At first glance, this slim volume has a relatively narrow focus of interest: the changes in the various narratives of Ajātaśatru from their appearance in early Pali texts to twentieth century versions of the story of “Ajase” (the Japanese version of the name Ajātaśatru) in the context of Japanese psychoanalytic theory, more specifically, the theory of the “Ajase complex”. It is, as the author states at the outset, “the story of a story” (p.1).

However, it is also much more than this modest introduction implies. In the process of a richly detailed textual exploration of the variations and transformations of the Ajātaśatru narrative, Radich not only demonstrates the ways in which this story has been adapted and re-interpreted in specific historical and cultural settings, but also uses this “story of a story” to reflect on both the globalization of Buddhist ideas and the use of these ideas in the context of late nineteenth and early twentieth century Japanese nationalism, and later in the discourse of Nihonjinron (theories of Japaneseness).

The book begins with an examination of the range of Ajātaśatru narratives in early Buddhist and Jaina texts. The variation here makes any concise summary of the story impossible – that would imply a coherence and consistency that do not appear to be present – but Radich does provide a useful list of the main features that recur in most of the versions which I found myself referring to as I traced the development of the story through subsequent chapters. A key aim here is to demonstrate the variety and plasticity of the narrative – Radich is concerned to contest the notion that there is a single authentic original source narrative to which later variants can be compared. Rather, he argues convincingly that a range of disparate elements can be identified in early texts, which are then combined in various ways.

Early Pali texts feature stories of how Ajātasattu, encouraged by Devadatta, usurped the throne of his father, together with a parallel set of stories of Ajātasattu’s repentance and confession to the Buddha of having killed his father. However, later Indic texts are far more elaborate. The main elements listed by Radich are: bad omens before Ajātaśatru’s birth, which in some versions lead his mother to attempt to abort the pregnancy; Ajātaśatru plots against his father, and
takes his throne and in some versions imprisons him and subjects him to starvation and/or torture; the king dies (in most, but not all texts); Ajātaśatru repents; the Buddha pronounces on what will now happen to Ajātaśatru – this varies from versions that state that he will be reborn in hell to versions that state that his sins have been eradicated. In a sub-set of these texts there is also a section that Radich calls “the prison sequence”, which contains references to Ajātaśatru’s mother trying to help her husband by smuggling in food for him, and also to the deposed King engaging in religious practice while in prison and being sustained by the Buddha.

Two particularly influential texts that Radich considers are the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa and Contemplation sutras. However he also notes that these contain a number of unusual features which differentiate them from other sources. For the Mahāparinirvāṇa sutra Radich notes the emphasis on Ajātaśatru’s suffering: he is afflicted with foul-smelling boils as a result of his crimes, and although his mother attempts to treat them she is unsuccessful. His eventual cure and also his release from the anticipated consequences of his deeds (such as being reborn in hell) come through his encounter with the Buddha. Radich summarises this as a “shift of focus to Ajātaśatru’s salvation from sin”, and links this to a concomitant shift in the way in which various teachings in this sutra are presented to focus on “the nature of sin and guilt and liberation from them” (p.36).

Another passage of note in this sutra deals with the events before Ajātaśatru’s birth as recounted to Ajātaśatru by Devadatta, who tells the prince that before his birth his father had killed a sage he encountered in the forest, who as he was dying vowed to cause the King’s death in his next life. As a result of this, the king and queen arranged for the queen to give birth to the child through a skylight in a tower so that it would be killed by the fall. It is these events, in this version of the story, which lead to Ajātaśatru becoming angry and having his father imprisoned, and also to attacking his mother and threatening to kill her when she attempts to visit the king in prison.

In the Contemplation sutra, Ajātaśatru’s mother takes a central role in the narrative. Again, Ajātaśatru attempts to kill her, this time because he is angry on discovering that she has been feeding her husband in prison. In a feature unique to this version of the narrative, the queen is then imprisoned, and experiences visions of the Buddha and learns about Amida’s pure land. Ajātaśatru’s repentance in this version is for the attempt to kill his mother – his father’s death is not mentioned. This shift to an emphasis on Ajātaśatru’s relationship with his mother
foreshadows the twentieth century use of the narrative by the Japanese theorists Kosawa Heisaku and Okonogi Keigo, explored further below.

Radich notes that the sections dealing with the Ajātaśatru narrative in both the Mahāyāna Mahāparinirvāṇa sutra and the Contemplation sutra may well have been written partly in China, or under Chinese influence, and in chapter four he offers an analysis of the ways in which aspects of early medieval Chinese society and culture may have contributed to the popularity or even the shaping of these versions of the narrative. These include the growing popularity in medieval China of ideas of the Pure Land and “other power”, and the modification of notions of filial piety to include an emphasis on the mother-child relationship.

Building on this, in chapter five Radich examines further developments in the Ajātaśatru narrative in sixth and seventh century China, including the treatment of the narrative by Shandao, one of the patriarchs of the Pure Land Buddhist tradition, who is in turn a very influential source for later Japanese versions of the story.

In chapter six, Radich turns to Kamakura Japan, and the importance of the Ajātaśatru narrative in the work of Shinran, the founder of the Jōdo Shinshū school of Pure Land Buddhism. In the Kyōgyōshinshō, Shinran quotes versions of the narrative drawn from the Mahāparinirvāṇa sutra in order to explain the importance of reliance on Amida Buddha. In this version it is only through reliance on the Buddha that Ajātaśatru can escape suffering—both in the sense of relief from his physical suffering in the present, which he interprets as punishment for his murder of his father, and in the sense of escaping rebirth in one of the hells reserved for perpetrators of the five grave offenses of Buddhism. Another aspect of this is the linking of the Ajātaśatru narrative with the notion of “rootless faith” (one interpretation of this notion is faith granted by the Buddha), also an important element of Shinran’s thought.

Chapters seven to nine continue the story of the Ajātaśatru narrative in the Japanese context, exploring influences from medieval Japan through to the early modern period and the elaboration of Kosawa’s theory of the Ajase complex, first published in 1931. Formulated in response to Freud’s theory of the Oedipus complex, Kosawa’s original article focuses on the suggestion that two kinds of guilt exist: the guilt of the Oedipus complex as described by Freud, which is driven by fear of punishment for the murder of the father, and the guilt of the Ajase complex, in which the impulse to murder is “melted” by the self-sacrificing actions of the parent and gives way to a sense of gratitude. In Kosawa’s version of the
story, this relates to Ajase/Ajātaśatru wishing to kill his mother, but then having this impulse “melted” by her actions. The emphasis here moves away from Ajase’s actions towards his father to his relationship with his mother. This second type of guilt thus centres on the mother-child relationship, rather than the father-son relationship of the Oedipus complex. A further new element to the story is also introduced: Ajase’s mother is depicted as “fearing the loss of her youth and beauty” (p.98) and therefore fearing the loss of her husband’s love. It is this fear that makes her wish for a child, in order to draw her closer to her husband. In line with this re-focusing of the narrative, the mother is also made responsible for the killing of the forest sage, thus setting in train the ensuing events.

Okonogi, Kosawa’s student, reviving Kosawa’s theory of the Ajase complex in the 1970s, modifies the narrative again, and shifts the emphasis further onto the mother. In early versions produced by Okonogi, the mother cures Ajase of his boils without the help of the Buddha, and in later versions she is the instrument through whom the Buddha cures Ajase. Okonogi also derives new elements in the story concerning Ajase’s mother, suggesting that she experiences a conflict between her role as mother and her role as wife. In the various versions of the story produced by Kosawa and Okonogi, therefore, the central drama becomes that of the conflicting relationships within a central triad of family roles: mother, father, and son – fertile ground for psychoanalytic reflection on twentieth century family life in Japan (and also probably elsewhere).

Although Radich notes that Kosawa and Okonogi have been criticized by Buddhologists for their departures from textual sources, he argues convincingly that they were not exceptional in their selective highlighting and re-working of aspects of the stories associated with Ajātaśatru. And he points out that some of the distinctive features of their versions are pre-figured in earlier sources, as outlined above.

Radich is also concerned here to argue that changes in versions of the narrative, and the different emphasis given to the different elements of the story, are linked with the social and historical contexts in which the different versions were produced. He suggests that we can see these narratives as “the mirror of an age”, moving from preoccupations with regicide and kingly legitimacy in the early period of Buddhism, to concerns of “other power” Buddhism and the use of the narrative by Shinran to illustrate the primacy of entrusting oneself to the Buddha, regardless of what acts one might have committed, and in the twentieth century to re-working the story as “a drama of the nuclear family, or of private, individual
psychology” (p.132).

This is in some ways perhaps a rather obvious point. Narratives are constantly being re-worked in ways that reflect contemporary concerns, and there are numerous examples of this in literature and theatre, as well as in stories from various religious traditions. However, it is still a point worth making in order to counter the tendency, noted by Radich, to view contemporary adaptations as somehow “debased”, departures from an authentic original source (p.135). For the Ajātaśatru narrative at least, Radich convincingly demonstrates here that the variation in the available versions of the narrative, even in the earliest surviving texts, makes the identification of an authoritative version an illusory goal. Importantly, Radich’s analysis also suggests ways in which “the story of a story” can also become a window into the study of social and cultural change.

All this relates to the wider issues of globalization and the history of Buddhism. Kosawa and Okonogi’s use of the Ajase narrative can be linked with broader socio-political changes following the opening of Japan in the late nineteenth century. Buddhism was implicated in these changes in a number of ways. Initially Buddhist institutions came under pressure in Japan from the forced separation of Buddhism and Shinto, and the persecution of Buddhism in the early part of the Meiji period. However, from the end of the nineteenth century, until the Pacific War and afterwards, there was a shift in how Japanese Mahayana Buddhism was positioned, both within Japan and abroad. On the one hand its representatives sought to position Japanese forms of Buddhism in the context of an emerging essentialising discourse of Buddhism as a global religion (and alternative to other world religions or systems of philosophy), while on the other hand, paradoxically, Japanese Mahayana Buddhism was increasingly linked with a putative “unique” essence of Japanese culture.

The development and adaptation of the story of Ajātaśatru/Ajase in modern Japan refracts these discourses of globalization and nationalism in some interesting ways – as Radich points out, it is never entirely clear whether Kosawa and Okonogi’s theory of the Ajase complex is offered as a globally applicable alternative to Freud’s theory of the Oedipus complex, or as a phenomenon unique to Japan and arising from culturally specific aspects of Japanese society. The use of a narrative derived from Buddhist texts can be linked to the mobilization of Buddhism within Japan in the pre-war period as both an alternative religion/philosophy/ideology with global credentials, and as a philosophical underpinning for nationalist themes. This nationalist aspect is also evident in the use of the Ajase
complex as part of a body of *Nihonjinron* writing concerned with elaborating a culturally specific psychology of the Japanese.

The story of this narrative therefore stands at the intersection of various sorts of histories, including the history of Buddhism and Buddhist ideas; the history of Japanese nationalism and the history of theories of Japanese identity; and the history of psychoanalytic ideas in a cross-cultural context. It also provides a very useful case study of globalization, which, as an anthropologist, I found particularly interesting.

Radich’s fine-grained and sophisticated analysis offers a meticulously researched examination of one small corner of what could be called, in Appadurai’s terms, the Buddhist “ideoscape” (Appadurai 1990), and the ways in which this has overlapped with other ideoscapes including notably those of national identity and psychoanalytic theory in twentieth century Japan. He gives us a valuable insight into the ways in which particular channels are carved out in what Tsing (2000:330) has termed “the uneven and contested … terrain” of globalization and how the changes in the Ajatashatru/Ajase narrative reflect and refract shifting social and cultural contexts. In doing so, Radich resists the temptation to resort to any essentialised notion of local cultures to which a master narrative adapts, and argues convincingly that “it is too simplistic to analyse changes like those undergone by the Ajatashatru narrative in terms of one or two factors alone, or in terms of a vague and amorphous notion of cultural essence like ‘Chinese/Japanese religiosity’” (p.131). This resonates with anthropological theorizing on globalization such as that offered by Appadurai and Tsing, in which the imagery used is of landscapes, flows and channels, rather than interaction between clearly bounded entities. But while some of the theorizing on globalization can be frustratingly abstract, Radich’s work shows how these concepts can be applied to one closely examined case.

Radich’s account is exemplary in its scholarship and attention to detail. Inevitably a brief review cannot do justice to the full complexity of his argument. It is fascinating to read, and also very well written. Perhaps the only point on which I had reservations was that I felt slightly uneasy about his use of terms such as “salvation”, and “faith”, which seem to have a particularly Christian resonance. Although I recognize the difficulties surrounding terminology and translation, I wondered whether these were the most appropriate terms to use in some places. This question of translation is a separate debate in itself, and one that has been much discussed in recent years, particularly with reference to Pure Land Bud-
Buddhism; there is an extensive literature, much of it written by followers of Pure Land Buddhism, simply on the use of the word “faith” and the problems associated with it. However, this is a relatively minor point, and arguably not directly relevant to Radich’s argument here. Overall, this is a very impressive piece of research, which does much to advance our understanding of the processes of globalization of Buddhist ideas. It deserves a wide audience.

References


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If one wants to recommend an introduction to Indian Buddhist Philosophy to an English-speaking beginning student, one’s choice is limited. One may either suggest Williams and Tribe’s “Buddhist Thought” to those coming from the perspective of Buddhist Studies, or Siderits’ “Buddhism as Philosophy” for the more philosophically inclined. Amber Carpenter has now contributed a new work that seems to be primarily aimed at teaching Indian Buddhist thought to philosophy students without linguistic or other Indological background.

The book is divided into eight chapters which try to strike a balance between an historical and a topical discussion. Chapter 1 focuses specifically on the Buddhist notion of duḥkha and its relation to the four noble truths and the eightfold path, taking great pains to provide a philosophical motivation for the prima facie quite unintuitive idea that “all is suffering”. The second chapter introduces the theory of anātman and the five skandhas; here the focus is on explaining how this ontological doctrine is linked up with the ethical and soteriological aims of Buddhism. Chapter 3 is called “Kleśas and compassion”, though “Nietzsche and the Buddha” may have been a better title. The chapter focuses on the Nietzschean objection that there are aims superior to the elimination of suffering. In discussing the move from the idea of the arhat to that of the bodhisattva Carpenter explains how various such aims (virtue, love, god, truth, and life itself) can in fact be understood (when properly interpreted) as entailed by, or at least not diametrically opposed to the Buddhist conceptualization of liberation. Chapter 4 introduces Madhyamaka by discussing some key topics from Nāgārjuna’s works. This chapter gives a clear, though necessarily condensed explanation of how Madhyamaka can be construed as a critique of the Abhidharma project. My one qualm with the chapter is the discussion of how causal dependency can be seen as implying emptiness on pp 85-86. It fails to highlight how this argument depends essentially on the principle of momentariness, a metaphysical claim for which a separate argument would have to be adduced at this stage.

The following two chapters interrupt the historical narrative to discuss two systematic concepts. The fifth chapter deals specifically with philosophical problems connected with the notion of karma. It gives a fine differentiation of the different meanings of the karma in Buddhist, Brahmanic, and Jain contexts and discusses important questions such as that of the opacity of karma (does it matter
that we cannot know the consequences of all our actions?), the role of karma in moral thought (is karma a form of blaming the victim?), and the possibility of naturalizing it (can we make sense of karma without reincarnation?). This chapter is particularly useful as the sustained philosophical discussions of karma Carpenter presents in this chapter are otherwise hard to find in the introductory literature.

Chapter 6 looks at the theory of anātman in more detail and concentrates on a discussion of a set of increasingly sophisticated Nyāya criticisms of the notion of selflessness, based on the idea that a form of self is required to act as a synchronic and diachronic unifier of the set of mental states that are ascribed to ‘me’.

As the Madhyamaka chapter is focused on Nāgārjuna, the seventh chapter, on Yogācāra, concentrates on Vasubandhu. Again, the coverage of this philosophical schools is not intended to be comprehensive (there is, for example, very little discussion of the philosophical perplexities that accompany the notion of the ālayavijñāna), but Carpenter presents a clear discussion of the Yogācāra rejection of external objects and concludes the chapter with a discussion of the question whether the notion of parinīspanna-svabhāva could be considered as re-introducing a notion of the self through the back door.

The final eighth chapter is by far the longest in the book, aptly called “the long sixth to seventh century”. Here Carpenter discusses the theories of Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti, the Madhyamaka critique of Yogācāra, and finishes with a treatment of Śāntideva’s ethics. The chapter manages to bring a variety of issues together, though the structure feels a bit jumpy (the discussion goes from Diṅnāga and Dharmakīrti to Yogācāra/Madhyamaka and then back again to apoha theory).

The book finishes with four two-page appendices on the languages of Buddhism, its intellectual context, the Abhidharma, and a “snapshot of Indian Philosophy”. I am not entirely sure of the purpose of these. Given their brevity it would have been preferable to incorporate the first three into the main text or the notes; the final one could have been put together with the “Chronology” at the beginning of the book.

There is much to like about Carpenter’s book. Here are four particularly strong points:

1. The book shows a strong focus on arguments, rather than mere exegetical paraphrase. As such it is particularly suitable for being used in philosophy courses, and provides an entrance to Indian Buddhist thought to students outside of Indology or Buddhist Studies.
2. The discussion is based on sound hermeneutic principles (p. 5 “If we pose a question to which the texts seem only to offer stupid answers, or lame ones, we ought to consider whether our question is really as clear or deep as we suppose, or whether there might be a fundamental difference in orientations or aims [...]”). Throughout the book Carpenter tries to give the Buddhist philosophers as good a run for their money as possible, thereby achieving a sophisticated systematic discussion of their theses that is unfortunately still far too infrequent in the contemporary literature.

3. Throughout the book Carpenter frequently draws comparisons with ancient Greek philosophy in order to explain ancient Indian views. This is not only interesting because the study of ancient Indian and ancient Greek philosophy faces similar methodological challenges, but also because students are likely to have been exposed to ancient Western philosophy in some way, thus providing an explanatory bridge to an unfamiliar tradition. Given the philosophical focus it is perhaps surprising that there are so few references to the contemporary Western philosophical discussion. Chapter 4, for example, would have profited from some references to the current debate about metaphysical grounding, while the discussion in chapter 6 could have been brought to life even more by some reference to the likes of Parfit, Dennett, or Metzinger.

4. The book contains details discussions of ethical aspects of Indian Buddhist thought that are hard to find in the introductory literature. What is particularly valuable is the stress on the inextricable linkage of ethical/soteriological and metaphysical/epistemological concerns in Buddhist thought that underlines the extent to which Buddhist thought is a unified philosophical project, and also helps to bring out its distinctness from the majority of other philosophical traditions.

One would have hoped that the editors paid more attention to proofreading, especially with respect to Sanskrit diacritics (I spotted five misspellings just in the table “Development of Buddhist Thought in India”) and dates (the “chronology” gives the date of the Buddha as 4th century BCE, two pages later it is 500-400 BCE, on p. 243 Pāṇini lived “between the seventh and fourth centuries BCE”, on 244 “around the sixth century BCE”). The main problem with such infelicities is that they may give the browser the impression that the book has been shoddily put together, which is certainly not the case.

All of Carpenter’s references to primary sources refer to English translations. This is in itself not problematic (though her choice of translations is sometimes not the most fortunate: the reference translation for Nāgārjuna’s Mūlamadhyā-
makakārikā is now the one by Katsura and Siderits, for the Nyāyasūtra and Bhāṣya it is preferable to consult Angot, instead of the problematic Sprung translation of the Prasannapadā readers should be referred to those of Schayer, May, and de Jong). It would, however, have enhanced the book’s potential for use outside of philosophy courses if the endnotes had also given the original texts of the quotations, so that readers with the necessary linguistic background could check the accuracy of the translations for themselves. A translational choice I find particularly problematic is translating rūpa as ‘form’. Both in the context of skandha theory and in the discussion of the Heart Sūtra its most straightforward rendering is ‘matter’. Translating it as ‘form’ is apt to mislead particularly those who may read this term with the Aristotelian form/matter distinction in mind.

Carpenter is to be applauded for having taken on the challenging task of writing a sophisticated introduction to a complex intellectual tradition spanning more than one millenium and a half, and doing so in a way that is clear, accurate, and well-written. Teachers and students of Indian Buddhist thought will be grateful for having this new resource at their disposal.

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