

Many for One: An Exegetical Method in Mahāvihāra Buddhism

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for Jonathan Walters

ABSTRACT—The Theriya/Mahāvihāra¹ exegetes teach their audience to read a text, especially the canon², without always sticking to the literal meaning. The intended meaning of such words occurring in the Tipiṭaka is narrower than their literal meaning would suggest. If one does not clearly see these semantic shifts, one is likely to proffer many misinterpretations that were never intended by the original authors of these texts. When exegetes of the Mahāvihāra school encounter an expression in the canon whose literal meaning does not fully or partially match the relevant context, they offer specific hermeneutical strategies to teach the reader

¹ In line with traditional records like Dīpavaṃsa (c. 3rd century CE) and Mahāvaṃsa (5th century CE), the Theravāda branch of Buddhism was likely first established in Sri Lanka around the 3rd century BCE. See Dīp VIII 53_{,24}–54_{,15}; Mhv XII 82_{,1–16}. This branch was split into three schools during the first millennium as 1) Mahāvihāra, 2) Abhayagiri and 3) Jetavana. However, the Mahāvihāra is the only surviving school. This school transmitted all its texts in Pali, a Middle Indian language. In contemporary parlance, we use ‘Theravāda Buddhism’ or ‘Theriya Buddhism’ to denote the teachings transmitted by the Mahāvihāra school.

² The canon of the Mahāvihāra school is called Tipiṭaka (‘Triple Basket’), which consists of three sections—Vinayapiṭaka or basket of monastic law, Suttapiṭaka or basket of teachings and Abhidhammapiṭaka or basket of higher teachings. This school has extensive exegetical literature elucidating the meaning of the Tipiṭaka, including commentaries (Aṭṭhakathā) and sub-commentaries (Ṭikā), which can be dated from the 4th century CE.

to properly understand that expression. This article provides examples of how the authors of Aṭṭhakathās interpret some words with semantic transpositions found in the Tipiṭaka as well as how the authors of Ṭikās interpret such words found in the Aṭṭhakathās, examining the relevance of these interpretations in understanding the teachings—both in the canon and commentaries—of the Mahāvihāra school.

KEYWORDS: rūlhi, Mahāvihāra, aṭṭhakathā, ṭikā, exegetical tradition

Rūlhi and samudāyavohāra

According to Pali commentators, some terms found in the sources of the Mahāvihāra school, namely, canon, commentaries and sub-commentaries, witness two synecdochic features, namely: 1) substitution of a part for the whole or 2) the substitution of whole for a part.³ When the commentators encounter such a term, they typically label it as a *rūlhi* ('convention of speech').⁴ But more specifically, they further label such terms as either 1) *samudāye ekadesavohāra/samudāye avayavavohāra* ('a common way of speaking about a part with respect to a whole') or as 2) *ekadese samudāyavohāra/avayave samudāyavohāra* ('a common way of speaking about a whole thing with respect to a single part'). From now on, the first of these will be referred to in this paper as the 'part-for-the-whole method' while the second will be referred to as the 'whole-for-a-part method.' This study focuses primarily upon the second of these two categories, examining how the Mahāvihāra exegetes deal with words that differ from their literal meaning. In this article, I will show how the exegeses of the expressions with *ekadese samudāyavohāra* (i.e., whole-for-a-part method) help in gaining a clear understanding of some crucial concepts in the Vinaya, Dhamma and the Abhidhamma.

³ Bullinger offers a great deal of examples of synecdoches appearing in the Bible. (See Bullinger 1898). In his words, the first category can be called 'synecdoche of the species' while the second category can be called 'synecdoche of the genus.' See Bullinger 1898, 613. When a word expands beyond its literal meaning into a larger semantic field, it belongs to the first category. On the other hand, if a word is used in a narrower semantic range than its literal meaning suggests, then it falls into the second category.

⁴ With some examples, I have discussed elsewhere how the *rūlhi* that resembles synecdoche of the species appear in the sources of the Mahāvihāra school. (Gamage 2024 Forthcoming)

1. Cities = city

In the Apadāna there is a reference to a cake-maker who lived in the city of Aruṇavatī at the time of the Buddha, Sikhī.⁵ The commentary on the Apadāna⁶ explains why this city was given this name as follows:

tatiyāpadāne Aruṇavatiyā nagare (Ap I 218,22–23, V. 233a) *ti āsamantato ālokaṃ karonto uṇati* (Ce udeti) *uggacchatī ti aruṇo. so tasmim vijjati ti Aruṇavatī. tasmim nagare ālokaṃ karonto suriyo uggacchatī ti attho. sesanagaresu pi suriyuggamane vijjamāne pi visesavacanaṃ. sabbacatuppadānaṃ mahiyaṃ sayane* (Ce omits sayane) *pi sati* (Ce vasati) *mahiyaṃ sayati ti mahīso ti vacanaṃ viya rūlhiyasena vuttan ti veditabbaṃ.*

In the third Apadāna, **in Aruṇavatī city** means: because [it] rises (*uṇati?*), i.e., it goes up illuminating all sides up to [their end] (it is called) Aruṇa. Because this [Aruṇa] is found there (i.e., in that city) (=) Aruṇavatī. The meaning is that the sun rises shedding light on that city. Although sunrise is also found in the rest of the cities, [this] is a name specific to [a particular place]. [One] should know that [it] is stated by virtue of a convention of speech, just as, a *mahīsa* (buffalo) is so-called because [it] sleeps on the ground, although all quadrupeds sleep on the ground.

This gloss provides a creative etymological explanation for the term Aruṇa, stating that it is a synonym for the sun.⁷ Since the sun illuminates this city, it is called Aruṇavatī (lit. ‘having the sun’). The sun illuminates all cities, especially those in tropical countries like India. However, these cities are not called Aruṇavatī and it is used as a convention of speech (*rūlhi*) only for this city. The commentator explains this usage with a nice analogy. The literal meaning of

⁵ Ap I 218,^{22–23} V. 233 (=) B^e I 246,^{1–2}; C^e I 380,^{17–18} V. 233. Se I 327,^{14–15} V. 235: *Aruṇavatiyā nagare ahoṣiṃ pūviko* (B^e C^e *pūpiko*) *tadā, mama dvāreṇa gacchantaṃ Sikhinaṃ addasaṃ Jinaṃ.*

‘In Aruṇavatī city I was a cake-maker back then. I saw Sikhī [Buddha], Victor, traveling through a gate of mine.’

Walters 2017, 2432. See DOP, s.v. *pūvika*: ‘a seller of cakes.’

⁶ Ap-a 466,²⁵–467,² (=) B^e II 187,^{5–10}; C^e I 399,^{20–25}; S^e II 227,^{13–17}.

⁷ CPD, s.v. *aruṇa*; pw, s.v. *aruṇa*.

mahīsa is ‘the one who sleeps on the floor.’ But *mahīsa* does not denote all those who sleep on the ground, and is limited only to the quadruped called ‘buffalo’. The literal meaning of *mahīsa* suggests a broader semantic field, while its use as *rūḷhi* is restricted to a narrower sense. Likewise, one should understand the usage of *Aruṇavatī*.⁸

2. Houses = a house

The *Therīgāthā*⁹ has the following stanza:

*hitvā ghare pabbajitvā hitvā puttam pasuṃ piyaṃ,
hitvā rāgañ ca dosañ ca avijjañ ca virājjīya,
samūlaṃ taṇham abbuyha upasant’ amhi nibbutā ti.*

‘Giving up my house, having gone forth, giving up son, cattle, and what was dear, giving up desire and hatred, and having discarded ignorance, plucking out craving root and all, I have become stilled, quenched.’¹⁰

In his commentary on the *Therīgāthā*¹¹, *Dhammapāla* explains the term *ghare*:

ghare (Thī 125,₁₁ V. 18a) *ti gehaṃ. gharasaddo hi ekasmim pi abhidheyye kadāci bahūsu bījaṃ viya rūḷhivasena vohariyati.*

Houses means: a house. For the term *ghara*, although [it] designates something singular, sometimes is used idiomatically with respect to many [houses] by virtue of a convention of speech (*rūḷhi*), just as a [single] seed is commonly spoken of when [referring to] many [seeds].¹²

⁸ Here the terms *Aruṇavatī* and *mahīsa* are similar in that they both are *yogarūḍha* ‘etymologico-conventional’, from the point of view of Indian language philosophers. The *nirukti* of some terms expresses their general meaning while the conventional meanings of them refer to more specific senses. Indian philosophers of language recognize such kinds of terms as *yogarūḍhis* (‘etymologico-conventional’). Edgerton (1938, 709) explains *yogarūḍhi* as follows: ‘[S]ometimes the results of interpretation by *rūḍhi* and by *yoga* coincide.’ See also *Kunjūni-Raja* 1963, 46, 59, 61–62; *Dash* 1993; *Phillips* 2012, 76.

⁹ Thī 125,_{11–13} v. 18.

¹⁰ *Norman* 1971, 3.

¹¹ Thī-a 23,_{7–9}.

¹² See also *Pruitt* 1998, 37; *Norman* 1971, n. 61–62.

The term *ghare* ('houses') in this context, denotes *gharam* ('house') as an idiomatic usage or *rūlhi*. That is to say, here many is used for one. The commentator further states that the opposite of this is also possible. As a *rūlhi*, *bijaṃ* ('a seed') is sometimes used to denote *bijāni* ('many seeds'). Once one understands that *ghere* is a *rūhi* of contraction here, it can be translated as a singular term. Rhys Davids¹³ and Norman¹⁴ were probably influenced by Dhammapāla's gloss when they translated this term in the singular as 'home' and 'house', respectively.

3. Buddha = bodily relics of the Buddha

The Samantapāsādikā¹⁵ has the following statement:

*athāyasmā Mahā-Mahindo vutthavasso pavāretvā Kattikapuṇṇamāyaṃ
uposathadivase rājānaṃ etad avoca: mahārāja amhehi ciradiṭṭho
Sammā-Sambuddho, anāthavāsaṃ (E^e anāthavassaṃ) vasimha,
icchāma (B^e adds mayam) Jambudīpaṃ gantun ti.*

'And now the venerable Mahā-Mahinda having spent the Rains-residence and performed the Invitation ceremony (at the end of the rains), on the uposatha day of the full moon of Kattikā, said to the King, "Great King, it is a long time since we have last seen the Perfectly Enlightened One; we have lived as destitutes. We wish to go to Jambudīpa."¹⁶

After spending a rainy season in Laṅkā, the Elder Mahā-Mahinda says that he must return to Jambudīpa (i.e., India) to see the Buddha. When the Elder Mahā-Mahinda makes this statement, the Buddha has already passed away. Seeing the Buddha in the flesh is therefore impossible in the truest sense of the word. Immediately following this statement, the Samantapāsādikā—the commentary on the Vinaya—explains that *Sammā-Sambuddho* refers to the 'bodily relics'¹⁷ (*sarīradhātuyo*¹⁸) of the Buddha. In

¹³ Rhys Davids, 1948, 21.

¹⁴ Norman 2007, 70 n. 18.

¹⁵ Sp I 83₇₅₋₈ (=) B^e I 62₇₁₋₄; C^e I 48₃₃-49₁; S^e I 84₂₋₅.

¹⁶ Jayawickrama 1962, 73.

¹⁷ Sp I 83₁₅.

¹⁸ Jayawickrama 1962, 74.

his commentary on the Samantapāsādikā entitled Sāratthadīpanītikā¹⁹, Sāriputta explains thus:

ciradiṭṭho Sammā-Sambuddho (Sp I 83,₇) *ti Satthussa sarirāvayavo ca Sammā-Sambuddho* (Sp I 83,₇) *yevā ti katvā avayave samudāyavohārasena evam āhā ti datṭhabbam, yathā: samuddo diṭṭho ti.*

[One] should know that [the Elder Mahā-Mahinda] says thus: **it is a long time since we have last seen the Perfectly Enlightened One**, having considered: ‘a part of the teacher’s body is also **the Perfectly Enlightened One**, indeed’, by virtue of the whole-for-apart method, just as [in the statements]: ‘[he] saw the sea.’

When one sees only a very small part of the sea, one usually says: ‘I saw the sea.’ But that does not mean one has seen the whole sea. The principle of this usage is that a single part (*avayave*) stands in for the whole (*samudāya*). In the same way, Sammā-Sambuddha is identified here with his relics.²⁰ The relics represent a part of the physical body (*sarirāvayava*) of the Buddha, which stands for the whole.²¹ Sāriputta’s gloss teaches the reader to understand the term *Sammā-Sambuddho*, which appears here in accordance with the whole-for-a-part method.

¹⁹ Sp-ṭ I 170,₃₋₆.

²⁰ In his sub-commentary on the Samantapāsādikā entitled Vimativinodanītikā, Colīya Kassapa also identifies that here *Sammā-Sambuddha* is used to denote the relics of the Buddha. See Vmv I 34,₁₂: *ciradiṭṭho Sammā-Sambuddho* (Sp I 83,₇) *ti dhātuṃyo sandhāy’ āha.* ‘With reference to relics, [the Elder Mahā-Mahinda] says: **it is a long time since we have last seen the Perfectly Enlightened One.**’

²¹ There is also a very similar account in the Vimānavatthu. See Vv 68,₃₀₋₃₁, V.5 (=) Vv B^e 66,₅₋₆, V.5; Vv C^e 110,₁₈₋₁₉, V.5; Vv S^e 82,₇₅₋₆, V.5.

Satthu sarīraṃ uddissa vipprasanna cetasā,

nāssa maggaṃ avekkhissaṃ na taggamasā (C^e *tadaggamasā*; S^e *tadaṅgamasā*) *sati.*

‘[Since I was with] an extremely clear mind with reference to the Teacher’s body, I did not look at his [i.e., the cow’s] path, as [my] mind was not on that.’ See also Kennedy 1942, 8.

In the commentary on the Vimānavatthu, Dhammapāla glosses *sarīraṃ* as follows (Vv-a 201,₁₂₋₁₃): *sarīraṃ* (Vv 68,₃₀ V.5a) *ti sarīrabhūtaṃ dhātuṃ. avayave cāyaṃ samudāyavohāro yathā: paṭo daddho, samuddo diṭṭho ti ca.* ‘**Body** means: the relics as the body of [the Buddha]. And, this whole-for-a-part method, as in [the statements]: “the cloth is burnt” and “I saw the sea”.

4. *Sutta* = quote from a *sutta*

The author of the *Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā*²² states that the Buddha thought as follows:

*anāgate mama sāvako mahāpañño Moggaliputtatissathero
nāma uppannaṃ sāsanaṃ sodhetvā tatiyaṅgītiṃ karonto
bhikkhusaṅghassa majjhe nisinno sakavāde pañca suttasatāni paravāde
pañcā ti suttasahassaṃ samodhānetvā imaṃ pakaraṇaṃ bhājessatī ti.*

In the future, my disciple named the Elder Moggaliputtatissa, of great wisdom, having cleansed the impurities that have arisen in the *sāsana*, performing the third communal recitation, seated in the midst of the monastic community, will arrange this treatise, by putting together one thousand *suttas*: five hundred *suttas* concerning [one's] own theory [and] five [hundred *suttas*] concerning the other's theory.

The Elder Moggaliputtatissa, as the commentaries of the Mahāvihāra school state, authored the *Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa* having incorporated a thousand *suttas*.²³ In this context, if we understand the term *sutta* to mean an entire discourse, this appears problematic. For the received *Kathāvatthuppakaraṇa* does not contain a thousand complete discourses. Horner renders *sutta* in this context as 'discourse' in this context.²⁴ But obviously, *sutta* here refers to a quotation from a particular *sutta*. Nyānaponika takes *sutta* here to mean *Anschnitt* ('smaller section'), which is correct.²⁵ The *Pañcappakaraṇa-anuṭṭikā* states:

*suttasahassāharaṇaṃ (≠ Kv-a B^e 105,₂₀) c' ettha
paravādabhañjanatthaṃ ca sakavādapatitṭhāpanatthaṃ ca.
suttekadeso pi hi suttan ti vuccati, samudāyavohārassa avayavesu
pi dissanato, yathā paṭo daḍḍho, samuddo ditṭho ti ca. te pan' ettha*

²² Kv-a B^e 105,₁₇₋₂₀.

²³ As 4,₂₅₋₃₀; Sp-ṭ I 148,₂₆-149,₅.

²⁴ Mil 12,₂₆₋₂₈; *sakavāde pañcasuttasatāni paravāde pañcasuttasatāni ti suttasahassaṃ samodhānetvā vibhattaṃ Kathāvatthuppakaraṇaṃ*. Tr. Horner 1969, 17: 'The *Kathāvatthu*-composition, divided by combining a thousand discourses—five hundred from our own speakers, five hundred from dissenting speakers.' See also As 4,₂₈; Tin 1920, 6.

²⁵ On As 4,₂₈, see Nyānaponika 2005, 11.

*suttapadesā atthi puggalo attahitāya paṭipanno (Kv 13₂₆₋₂₇) ti ādinā āgatā veditabbā.*²⁶

And in this context, **citing one thousand suttas**, i.e., [citing them] in order to defeat the other's theory and to establish one's own theory. For, a part of a discourse is also called a discourse, because a common way of speaking about the whole thing is also seen with respect to parts, just as in the [statements] such as: 'the cloth is burnt' and '[he] saw the sea.' In this context, [one] should, furthermore, understand that those portions of discourses are transmitted [in the Kathāvatthupparakaraṇa] such as: 'is there a person who is practicing for [his] own welfare?'"²⁷

By reading the entirety (*samudāya*) into individual parts (*avayavesu*), an excerpt from a *sutta* can be referred to as a *sutta*. In addition to the analogy of seeing the sea, the author of this commentary provides the reader here with the analogy of a burnt cloth. Although only a small part of a garment is burned, we commonly refer to it with the statement 'the garment is burnt.'²⁸ This explanation shows that the terms *sutta*²⁹ and *suttanta*³⁰, which appear in the primary sources of the Mahāvihāra school, refer not only to the entire discourses but also to small parts of the discourses.

²⁶ Pp-nt 59₁₀₋₁₄.

²⁷ See also Aung and C. A. F. Rhys Davids 1915, 16.

²⁸ In a similar way, the author of the Nettippakaraṇa-Aṭṭhakathā explains the phrase *dasannaṃ suttānaṃ* ("of [these] ten discourses") found in the Nettippakaraṇa (Nett 117₃₁), by pointing out that the term *sutta* is sometimes used to mean only a part of some discourses. See Nett-a B° 203₄₋₇.

²⁹ For example, the commentary on the Vibhaṅga (Vibh-a 51₂₇₋₃₂) uses the term *sutta* for a brief statement from a discourse of the Saṃyuttanikāya (S IV 251₁₆₋₂₀); in the commentary on the Majjhimanikāya, Buddhaghosa uses the same term (Ps II 363₂₁₋₂₅) for a short sentence of the Majjhimanikāya (M I 301₁₅₋₁₆).

³⁰ The Kathāvatthu (Kv 425₂₄₋₂₆), for example, uses the term *suttanta* to refer to a brief statement occurring in the Majjhimanikāya (M III 281₈₋₉) and the Saṃsuttanikāya (S II 72₅₋₆).

5. Robes = a robe

Every monk should refrain from traveling and stay in a specific monastery during the rainy season every year. This period is called *kaṭhina*.³¹ The opening of the *kaṭhina* period is indicated by spreading a set of three robes, later also only one robe, that were made following specific rules only for this purpose. The community of monks decides which monk to give these robe materials to and acts accordingly. During the *kaṭhina* period a monk may go around within the *sīmā* ('ceremonial boundary') with less than three robes—outer robe, upper robe and lower robe.³² But when the *kaṭhina* period comes to an end, the usual rules apply again, and therefore a monk who has been separated from any of these three robes is guilty of the *nissaggiyapācittiya*-offence. The Vinaya reads the law code:

*niṭṭhitacīvarasmim bhikkhunā ubbhatasmim kaṭhine ekarattim pi ce bhikkhu ticivarena vippavaseyya, aññatra bhikkhusammutiya, nissaggiyaṃ pācittiyaṃ ti.*³³

The robe [matters] having been settled by a bhikkhu, the *kaṭhina* having been removed, if any bhikkhu should live apart from the three robes, even for one night, other than with the agreement of the bhikkhus, there is an offence entailing expiation with forfeiture.³⁴

In this context, the three robes are considered an inseparable unit. Therefore, living without any of them is an offence that entails expiation for a monk. The author of the *Samantapāsādikā*³⁵ explains this further:

³¹ DOP, s.v. *kaṭhina*: 'a framework (covered with a mat) to which the cloth for making robes was attached while being sewn.'

³² The *Padabhājanīya* ('word-analysis')-section of the Vinaya followed by this law code defines *ticivara* as follows (Vin III 199³¹⁻³²): ***ekarattim pi ce bhikkhu ticivarena vippavaseyyā*** (Vin III 199³¹⁻³²) *ti saṅghāṭiyā vā uttarāsaṅgena vā antaravāsakena vā*. 'If any bhikkhu should live apart from the three robes, even for one night means: either from an outer robe or from an upper robe or from a lower robe.' See also BD II 15.

³³ Vin III 199²⁴⁻²⁶ (=) Pāt 28¹⁰⁻¹².

³⁴ Based on Norman et al. 2018, 187 and Norman 2001, 29. See also Norman et al. 2018, 571, Appendix 20 and 21.

³⁵ Sp III 652⁴⁻⁸.

tattha ticīvarenā (Vin III 199,²⁵; Pāt 28,¹¹) *ti adhiṭṭhitesu tīsu cīvaresu yena kenaci. ekena vippavuttho pi hi ticīvarena vippavuttho hoti, paṭisiddhapariyāpannena vippavutthattā. ten' ev' assa padabhājane saṅghāṭṭiyā vā* (Vin III 199,³²) *ti-ādi vuttaṃ.*

In this context, **from the three robes** means: from any of the three robes that have been formally taken possession of. For, [one] who lives apart from even one of the robes, [one] is [considered] [‘one who] has lived apart from the three robes’, on account of the fact that [one] has lived apart from that which is included within what is prohibited. Because of the exact same reason, [it] is stated in its (i.e., the third *nissaggiyapācittiya*-offence) Padabhājanīya (‘word-analysis’): **either from an outer robe, etc.**

Sāriputta’s words³⁶ in the Sāratthadīpanīṭikā make it clear that ‘the three robes’ occurs in this context in the sense of ‘a single robe’:

ticīvarena vippavuttho hotī (Sp III 652,⁶) *ti rukkho chinno, paṭo daddho ti-ādisu viya avayave pi samudāyavohāro labbhatī ti vuttaṃ.*

[One] is [considered] [‘one who] has lived apart from the three robes’ means: because [it] is found the common way of speaking of the whole with respect to a part, just as in the [statements] such as: ‘the tree is cut’ [and] ‘the cloth is burnt’, [it] is stated [in the Samantapāsādikā].

³⁶ Sp-ṭ II 393,²¹⁻²² (≠) Kkh-pt 288,²²⁻²⁶. See also Vmv I 318,¹⁻²; *paṭisiddhapariyāpannā* (Sp III 652,⁶⁻⁷) *ti vippavasitū paṭisiddhesu tīsu cīvaresu antogadhena. ekena ca avayave samudāyopacāraṃ dasseti.* ‘From that which is included in what is rejected means: from that which is contained in the three robes apart from those which are rejected to live [for a monk]. And, with this [etena? statement], [the author of the Samantapāsādikā] shows the metonymical application with respect to a part.’

6. Offences = offence

The first *saṅghādisesa* ('the offence entails a formal meeting of the monastic community') in the Vinaya forbids monks from intentionally emitting semen.³⁷ The Padabhājanīya³⁸ defines the meaning of *saṅghādisesa* as follows:

saṅghādiseso (Vin III 112,₁₇₋₁₈) *ti saṅgho 'va tassā āpattiyā parivāsaṃ deti, mūlāya paṭikassati, mānattaṃ deti, abbheti; na sambahulā, na ekapuggalo. tena vuccati: saṅghādiseso* (Vin III 112,₁₇₋₁₈) *ti. tass' eva āpattinikāyassa nāmakammaṃ adhivacanaṃ. tena pi vuccati: saṅghādiseso* (Vin III 112,₁₇₋₁₈) *ti.*

[Offence] **entailing a formal meeting of the Order** means: the Order places him on probation on account of the offence, it sends him back to the beginning, it inflicts the *mānatta* (i.e., penance) discipline, it rehabilitates; it is not many people, it is not one man. Therefore, it is called an [offence] **entailing a formal meeting of the Order**. [This is] an appellation, a designation of the very same group of offences. For that is also why it is called an [offence] **entailing a formal meeting of the Order**.³⁹

According to the Padabhājanīya, the term *saṅghādisesa* is a designation for a group of offences. The Samantapāsādikā⁴⁰ explains why the Padabhājanīya uses *āpattinikāya* to introduce this term:

tass' eva āpattinikāyassā (Vin III 112,₂₈₋₂₉) *ti tassa eva āpattisamūhassa. tatha kiñcāpi ayaṃ ekā va āpatti, rūḷhīsaddena pana avayave samūhavohārena vā nikāyo* (≠ Vin III 112,₂₉) *ti vutto, eko vedanākkhandho* (Dhs 11,₁₄), *eko viññāṇakkhandho* (Dhs 11,₁₅₋₁₆) *ti-ādīsu viya.*

³⁷ Vin III 112,₁₇₋₁₈ (=) Pāt 12,₅₋₆: *sañcetanikā sukkavissaṭṭhi aññatra supinantā saṅghādiseso*. Tr. Norman 2001, 13: 'Intentional emission of semen other than in a dream, entails a formal meeting of the saṅgha.' BD I 195.

³⁸ Vin III 112,₂₆₋₃₀.

³⁹ In this translation by Horner (BD I 196–197), I have replaced some words. See also Norman et al. 2018, 129.

⁴⁰ Sp III 522,₁₉₋₂₃.

Of the very same group of offences means: of the very same assemblage of offences. In this context, although this is only a single offence, [either] in accordance with a term of convention of speech or in accordance with a common way of speaking of the assemblage with respect to a part, it is stated: **a group**, just as in the [statements] such as: ‘a single aggregate of sensation’ [and] ‘a single aggregate of consciousness’, etc.

According to the author of the Samantapāsādikā, the collective noun *nikāya* (‘group’) is used to denote the term *saṅghādisesa* although here it refers only to a single offence. The peculiarity of this gloss is that the commentator uses *rūḷhi* (‘convention of speech’) and *avayave samūhavohāra* (‘common way of speaking of the assemblage with respect to a part’) as two separate usages of language. The commentator gives two examples from the Abhidhamma: *eko vedanākkhandho* (‘a single aggregate of sensation’) and *eko viññāṇakkhandho* (‘single aggregate of consciousness’). As the context clearly demonstrates, the Dhammasaṅgaṇī uses these two phrases just to refer to a single sensation and a single consciousness, respectively.

The following gloss in the Vajirabuddhiṭikā (a sub-commentary on the Samantapāsādikā)⁴¹ leads us to believe that it treats *rūḷhi* and *avayave samūhavohāra* as two separate literary devices:

avayave samūhavohārena vā (Sp III 522,²¹⁻²²) *ti ettha sākhaçchedako rukkhacchedako ti vuccatī ti-ādi nidassanaṃ. vedanākkhandh-ādi* (D III 233,²³⁻²⁴; M III 17,³ etc.) **rūḷhisaddassa** (≠ Sp III 522,²¹) *nidassanaṃ.*

In this context: **or in accordance with a common way of speaking of the assemblage with respect to a part**, is exemplified with cases such as: ‘[one] who cuts a branch [of a tree] is called [one] who cuts a tree’, etc. [Whereas] ‘Aggregate of sensation,’ etc., is an example **of a term of common way of speaking.**

As he says, *vedanākkhandha* (‘aggregate of sensation’) etc., are examples of *rūḷhi*. Even if someone just cuts down a branch of a tree, he is commonly referred to as cutting a tree (*rukkhacchedako*). This is an example of *avayave samūhavohāra*.

⁴¹ Vjb 179,¹⁶⁻¹⁸.

It seems that Sāriputta⁴² thinks that *rūlhi* and *avayave samūhavohāra* do not refer to the same thing although they bear great resemblance. He defines *rūlhi* nicely and explains well how these two literary devices are related:

samudāye rūlho (B^e *nirulho*) *nikāya-saddo tad ekadese pavattamāno pi tāya eva rūlhiyā pavattatī ti āha: rūlhisaddenā* (Sp III 522,²¹) *ti. atha vā kiñci nimittam gahetvā sati pi aññasmiṃ taṇnimittayutte kismiñcid eva visaye sammutiyā cirakālatāvasena nimittavirahe pi pavatti rūlhi nāma* (B^e *pavattanirulho rūlhi nāma*). *yathā: mahiyaṃ setī ti mahiso* (B^e *mahiṃso*), *gacchatī ti go ti. evaṃ nikāya-saddassa pi rūlhibhāvo veditabbo. ekasmim pi viṣiṭṭhe sati pi sāmāññā viya samudāye pavattavohāro avayave pi pavattatī ti āha: avayave samūhavohārena vā* (Sp III 522,²¹⁻²²) *ti.*

The term group (*nikāya*), which conventionally [refers to] the whole, when it comes to refer to a part of that group, does so with the same convention of speech. As such, [the author of the *Samantapāsādikā*] says: **in accordance with a term of convention of speech**. Or rather, although (a word) has a certain reason for use (*nimitta*), what is known as a *rūlhi* word may come to refer by longstanding convention to another particular scope connected with that reason, even if the (original) reason for usage has gone (i.e., is (no longer) relevant), just as [in the statements]: ‘because it sleeps on the ground [it] is a buffalo’ [and] ‘because it walks [it] is a cow.’ In this manner, [one] should know the nature of convention of speech also of the term *nikāya*. Because even though only a single [object] is specified, the common way of speaking occurred to the whole, as a popular expression, occurs also on a part, [the author of the *Samantapāsādikā*] says: **or in accordance with a common way of speaking of assemblage with respect to a part**.⁴³

⁴² Sp-ṭ II 314,¹⁹⁻²⁶ (=) C^e II 656,¹⁷⁻²⁵.

⁴³ Colīya Kassapa follows Sāriputta and goes on to say that the reason for *rūlhi*, is *avayave samūhavohāra*. See Vmv I 255,²⁴⁻²⁷; ***rūlhisaddenā*** (Sp III 522,²¹) *ti ettha samudāye nipphannassāpi saddassa tad’ ekadese pi pasiddhi idha rūlhi nāma. tāya rūlhiyā yutto saddo rūlhisaddo, tena. rūlhiyā kāraṇam āha: avayave* (Sp III 522,²¹) *icc’ādinā*. ‘In this context, **in accordance with a term of convention of speech** means: even though [the usage] of a term is accomplished on the whole,

In this passage it is clear that Sāriputta considers *avayave samūhavohāra* to be an elaboration of *rūhi*. As is evident from this gloss, the commentator holds that *rūhi* is conventional expression in general, and *avayave samūhavohāra* is a type of *rūhi*. In the case of *vedanākhandha*, it is conventional because in reality there is no real heap of sensations, but it is as if all the sensations of the past, present and future are put together. It is conventionally referred to metaphorically as ‘heap of sensations’ or ‘aggregate of sensations.’

7. One who is covered = one in whom one of the three orifices is covered

In the first *pārājika*-section of the Vinaya⁴⁴, there is the following paragraph:

bhikkhupaccatthikā manussitthiṃ bhikkhussa santike ānetvā vacchamaggena ... pa ... passāvamaggena ... pa ... mukhena aṅgajātaṃ abhinisīdenti santhatāya asanthatassa ... pa ... asanthatāya santhatassa ... pa ... santhatāya santhatassa ... pa ... asanthatāya asanthatassa.

[If] opponent monks, having brought a human woman into a monk’s presence, make [her] come down on [his] sexual organ with [her] vagina [or] with [her] rectum [or] with [her] mouth; of a covered [woman], of an uncovered [monk]...; ... of an uncovered [woman], of a covered [monk]...; ... of an covered [woman], of an covered [monk]...; ... of an uncovered [woman], of an uncovered [monk].⁴⁵

As is evident from this paragraph, opponent monks (*bhikkhupaccatthikā*) force their fellow monks to have intercourse with human women. They bring a woman and force her to sit (*abhinisīdenti*) with her rectum (*vacchamaggena*) and vagina (*passāvamaggena*) on the fellow monk’s penis (*aṅgajātaṃ*). In addition, the woman is forced to put the fellow monk’s penis in her mouth (*mukhena*).

the well-known [meaning] [of the same usage] even on a single part of it, is called the convention of speech in this context. The term having that convention of speech (resolution of compound) (=) the term of convention of speech; with that term. [The author of the *Samantapāsādikā*] says the reason for convention of speech: with the [statements] **with respect to a part** etc.’

⁴⁴ Vin III 30₃₈-31₄.

⁴⁵ See also BD I 49-50.

In this paragraph, three orifices of a woman, the three orifices of a woman—rectum, vagina, and mouth—and a man’s penis are used in the context of sexual intercourse. The paragraph also contains four specific words, namely, 1) *santhatāya*, 2) *asanthatāya*, 3) *santhatassa* and 4) *asanthatassa*. All of these words are in the genitive singular, and their nominatives are *santhatā*, *asanthathā*, *santhato*, and *asanthato*, respectively. The first two are in the feminine, the latter two are in the masculine. The literal meanings of the words *santhatā* and *santhato* connote a woman and man, respectively, who are ‘covered’. Although the Vinaya does not define any of these words, the Samantapāsādikā⁴⁶ explains them:

tattha santhatāya asanthatassā (Vin III 31,₂₋₃) *ti-ādīsu: santhatāya* (Vin III 31,₂₋₃) *itthiyā vaccamaggena* (Vin III 31,₁) *passāvamaggena* (Vin III 31,₁₋₂) *mukhena* (Vin III 31,₂) *asanthatassa* (Vin III 31,₃) *bhikkhussa* (Vin III 30,₃₂-31,₁) *aṅgajātaṃ* (Vin III 31,₂) *abhinisīdentī* (Vin III 31,₂) *ti iminā nayena yojanā veditabbā. tattha santhatā* (≠ Vin III 31,₂₋₃) *nāma yassā tīsu maggesu yo koci maggo paliveṭhetvā vā anto vā pavesetvā yena kenaci vatthena vā paṇṇena vā vākapattēna vā cammena vā tipusīsādīnaṃ paṭṭēna vā paṭicchanno. santhato* (≠ Vin III 31,₃) *nāma yassa aṅgajātaṃ tesam yeva vatth’ ādīnaṃ yena kenaci paṭicchannaṃ.*

In this context, in the [statements] such as: **of a covered [woman]** [and] **of an uncovered [monk]**, [one] should understand the [grammatical] construction in accordance with the method as follows: [they] **make a covered [woman’s] rectum, vagina [and] mouth sit on** a monk’s sexual organ. In this context, **a covered [woman]** refers to **a [woman]**, **any of [whose] three paths** (i.e., rectum, vagina or mouth), having [it] wrapped around or inserted is covered either with any cloth or a leaf or a plate of tree-bark or a plate of tin and lead etc. **A covered [monk]** is called a [monk whose] sexual organ is covered with any of those exact same cloth, etc.

⁴⁶ Sp I 266,₂₉-267,₄.

When a woman covers any of the three orifices such the vagina, she is called *santhatā*. When a man covers his penis, he is called *santhato*. Only ‘a part’ (i.e., sexual organ etc.,) of a body of a man and a woman is covered; yet it is considered that they covered their ‘entire bodies.’ In his *Sāratthadīpanīṭikā*, Sāriputta⁴⁷ glosses:

santhatāyā (Vin III 31,₂₋₃) *ti ekadese samudāyavohāro paṭo daḍḍho ti-ādīsu viya. tathā hi paṭassa ekadese pi daḍḍhe paṭo daḍḍho ti voharanti, evaṃ itthiyā vaccamaggādīsu kismiñci magge santhate itthī santhatā* (Sp I 266,₃₂) *ti vuccati. tenāha: santhatā nāmā* (Sp I 266,₃₂) *ti-ādi. vatthādīni anto appavesetvā bahi ṭhapetvā bandhanam sandhāya paliveṭhetvā* (Sp I 267,₁) *ti vuttaṃ. ekadese samudāyavohārasen’ eva bhikkhu pi santhato* (Sp I 267,₃) *ti vuccatī ti āha: santhato nāmā* (Sp I 267,₃₋₄) *ti-ādi.*

Of a covered [woman] means: the whole-for-a-part method, just as in the [statements] such as ‘the cloth is burnt.’ For, when even a part of a cloth is burnt [people] commonly say: ‘the cloth is burnt’, so in the same manner, when any of the paths [orifices] of a female such as the rectum is covered, it is said: ‘the female **is covered.**’ Therefore, [the author of the *Samantapāsādikā*] says: **a covered [woman] is called** etc. With reference to binding the cloth etc., placing [them] outside without inserting [them] into [the rectum etc.,], [in the *Samantapāsādikā*,] [it] is stated: **having wrapped around.** Because by virtue of the whole-for-a-part method indeed, a monk is also called **a covered**, [so, the author of the *Samantapāsādikā*] says: **a covered [monk] is called**, etc.

As Sāriputta’s words suggest, these two words function as whole-for-a-part presentations in the Vinaya. According to him, by transposing the whole (*samudāya*) onto a single part (*ekadese*), both words are given as *santhatā* and *santhato*. However, in his *Vimativinodanīṭikā*, Coḷiya Kassapa takes the opposite view of the use of these two words. He⁴⁸ criticises Sāriputta’s opinion:

⁴⁷ Sp-ṭ II 92,₂₆-93,₃₅.

⁴⁸ Vmv I 146,₂₂-147,₇.

santhatāyā (Vin III 31,₂₋₃) ti samudāye ekadesavohāro daḍḍhassa paṭassa chiddan ti-ādīsu viya. yathā hi paṭassa ekadeso 'va vatthato daḍḍho ti vuccati, taṃ ekadesavohāraṃ samudāye paṭe upacārato āropetvā puna taṃ samudāyaṃ daḍḍhappadesasaṅkhātachiddasamb andhībhāvena 'daḍḍhassa paṭassa chiddan' ti voharanti, evam idhāpi itthiyā maggappadesavohāraṃ samudāyabhūtāya itthiyā āropetvā puna taṃ itthiṃ santhatamaggasambandhiniṃ katvā **santhatāya itthiyā vacchamaggenā** (Sp I 266,₃₀) ti-ādi vuttaṃ. Sāratthadīpaniyaṃ pan' ettha: **ekadese samudāyavohāro** (Sp-ṭ II 92,₂₆) ti vuttaṃ, taṃ na yuttaṃ, avayavavohārena samudāyass' eva patīyamānattā. itarathā hi **santhatāya vaccamaggenā** (≠ Sp I 266,₃₀) ti itthilingatā maggasambandhitā ca na siyā. ekadese samudāyopacārassa pana ekadeso 'va attho, sākhāya chijjamānāya rukkho chijjati ti-ādīsu viya. vatthādīni maggassa anto appavesetvā bahi yeva vethanaṃ sandhāya: **palivethetvā** (Sp I 267,₁) ti vuttaṃ. samudāye avayavūpacāren' eva bhikkhu pi **santhato nāmā** (Sp I 267,₃₋₄) ti-ādi vuttaṃ.

Of a covered [woman] means: the part-for-the-whole method, as in the [statements] such as: 'the hole of the burnt cloth.' As only a part of cloth from a garment is called 'burnt', having ascribed that common way of speaking about a part with respect to the whole of the cloth according to the metonymical application, [people] once more, commonly call that totality: 'the hole of the burnt cloth', due to the connection of the hole reckoned as the burnt spot, in the same manner, here too, having ascribed the common way of speaking for the spot of the female's paths (i.e., three orifices such as the rectum) on the female [who is] the totality, once more, having considered that female being connected with the covered path, [in the Samantapāsādikā,] [it] is stated: **with a covered woman's rectum**, etc. But in the Sāratthadīpanī, here [it] is stated: **a common way of speaking about a part with respect to the whole**. That is not correct, on account of the fact that in accordance with the common way of speaking of a part, only the whole is being understood. For, otherwise there would not be the femininity and the connection of the path (i.e., rectum): **with a covered [woman]'s rectum**, etc. But in the metonymical application of the whole with respect to a part, only

a part is meant, just as in the [statements] such as: ‘when cutting a branch, [it refers to] “a tree is being cut”. With reference to wrapping the cloth etc., only outside, without inserting [them] into the path (i.e., the rectum etc.), [in the Samantapāsādikā,] [it] is stated: **having wrapped around**. In accordance only with the metonymical application of a part with respect to the whole, [in the Samantapāsādikā,] [it] is stated: a monk is also **called a covered** etc.

Arguing persuasively and correctly, Coliya Kassapa shows that *santhatā* and *santhato* are used through the transposition of a single portion (*ekadesa*) on the whole (*samudāya*). That is to say, these two words are examples of part-for-the-whole method. The next example also shows that Sāriputta is sometimes confused when it comes to distinguishing between part-for-the-whole method and whole-for-a-part method.

8. Grass hut = a hut with grass roof

The following sentence occurs in the second *pārājika*-section of the Vinaya.

tena kho pana samayena sambahulā sandiṭṭhā sambhattā bhikkhū
Isigilipasse tiṇakuṭṭiyo karitvā vassaṃ upagacchimṣu.⁴⁹

Now at that time a large company of monks who were friends and intimate friends⁵⁰, having made grass huts on the Isigili mountain-slope, went up there for the rains.⁵¹

⁴⁹ Vin III 41₂₋₄.

⁵⁰ *sandiṭṭhā* and *sambhattā*. The first term refers to friends in general, while the second term refers to close friends. See Sp II 286₁₋₅: *sandiṭṭhā* (Vin III 41₃) *ti nātivissāsikā na daḷhamittā vuccanti* (B° omits *vuccanti*). *tattha tattha saṅgama diṭṭhattā hi te sandiṭṭhā* (Vin III 41₃) *ti vuccanti*. *sambhattā* (Vin III 41₃) *ti ativissāsikā* (E°; S° *vissāsikā*) *daḷhamittā* (E° *daḷhamittā ti*) *vuccanti* (B° omits *vuccanti*). *te hi suṭṭhu bhattā bhajamānā ekasambhogaparibhogā ti katvā sambhattā* (Vin III 41₃) *ti vuccanti*. ‘*sandiṭṭhā* are called those who are not very confiding; the friends who are not steady. On account of the fact that [they] have seen having come together here and there, they are indeed called *sandiṭṭhā*. *sambhattā* are called the friends who are very confiding and steady. For, having considered that they are well associated with, associating with [and] having eaten and lived together, [they] are called *sambhattā*.’ Cf. Sv II 546₁₄₋₁₆; Spk III 201₂₆₋₂₈.

⁵¹ BD I 64.

The Samantapāsādikā⁵² glosses the phrase *tiṅakuṭiyo karitvā* ('having made grass huts') as follows:

tiṅakuṭiyo karitvā (Vin III 41,₃₋₄) *ti tiṅacchadana-sadvārabandhā kuṭiyo katvā.*

Having made grass huts means: having made the huts with grass roofs and connected with their own doors.

The gloss of the Samantapāsādikā reveals that *tiṅa* ('grass') is an ellipsis of *tiṅacchadana* ('grass roofs'). In the Sāratthadīpanīṭikā, Sāriputta⁵³ points out that the interpretation *tiṅacchadanā kuṭiyo* ('huts with grass roofs') can be justified either due to the elision of the word *chadana* 'roof' in *tiṅakuṭi* or due to substitution of the whole with respect to a part:

tiṅacchadanā kuṭiyo (≠ Sp II 286,₁₂₋₁₃) *majjhepadalopīsamāsaṃ katvā, ekadese vā samudāyavohāravasena tiṅakuṭiyo* (Vin III 41,₃₋₄; Sp II 286,₁₂₂) *ti vuttā. vassaṃ upagacchimsū* (Sp II 286,₂₄) *ti vacanato vassūpagamanārahā sadvārabandhā* (Sp II 286,₁₂) *eva veditabbā ti āha: tiṅacchadanā sadvārabandhā kuṭiyo* (Sp II 286,₁₂) *ti.*

Huts with grass [covering] (=) having made the compound through the elision of the middle term. Or, by virtue of the whole-for-a-part method, [it] is stated: **grass huts**. Since [one] should know only the [huts] connected with [their] own doors [that] are suitable for going up for the rains, because of the [phrase]: [**they**] **went up there for the rains**, [the author of the Samantapāsādikā] says: **huts with grass [covering and] connected with [their] own doors**.

The roof is only part of a hut and is covered with grass (*tiṅa*). The other parts of a hut like walls and doors can be built from different materials like clay, wood, etc. When naming this hut, regardless of the other materials used in its construction, only the material used to cover the roof (i.e., grass) is taken into account. Therefore, it is called a *tiṅakuṭi*. In the Sāratthadīpanīṭikā, Sāriputta says that this usage arose by virtue of the whole-for-a-part method.

⁵² Sp II 286,₁₂₋₁₃.

⁵³ Sp-ṭ II 114,₈₋₁₁.

In fact, this is the exact opposite of what Sāriputta thinks. That is to say, the huts with grass roofs are called *tiṇakuṭiyo* due to the part-for-the-whole method. Thus, *tiṇakuṭiyo* is an example of the part-for-the-whole method. As we have seen Horner translates *tiṇakuṭiyo* as ‘grass huts’. But through the lens of the Mahāvihāra exegetes, the correct rendering of *tiṇakuṭiyo* is ‘huts with grass roofs.’

9. *Jhāna* = an object of the *jhāna*

The Saṅgītisutta⁵⁴ of the Dīghanikāya enumerates three wholesome thoughts:

tayokusalavitakkā:nekkhammavitakko,avyāpādavitaṅkko,avihiṃsāvitaṅkko.

Three kinds of wholesome thought: the thought of renunciation, the thought of non-ill will, and the thought of non-cruelty.⁵⁵

In the commentary on the Dīghanikāya entitled *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī*, Buddhaghosa shows how the thought of renunciation (*nekkhammavitakko*) occurs in various forms in the process of meditative absorption:

nekkhammapaṭisaṃyutto vitakko nekkhammavitakko (D III 215,₅).
so asubhapubbabhāge kāmāvacaro hoti, asubhajjhāne rūpāvacaro. taṃ
*jhānaṃ pādakaṃ katvā uppannamaggaḥalākāle lokuttaro.*⁵⁶

Thought coupled with renunciation (resolution of compound) (=) **thought of renunciation**. That [thought] becomes [something belonging to] the sphere of sensual experience at the prior stage [of the meditative absorption] on foulness⁵⁷; [it becomes something belonging to] the fine-material sphere in the meditative absorption on foulness. At the moment of the emergence of paths and fruits having made the support of that meditative absorption, [it becomes something belonging to] the supramundane.

⁵⁴ D III 215,₅₋₆.

⁵⁵ Here, I rely on Ñāṇamoli and Bodhi 1995, 207. See also Walshe 1987, 483. See also Rhys Davids 1921 III 208.

⁵⁶ Sv III 986,₁₃₋₁₆.

⁵⁷ See Sv-pt III 241,₅₋₆: *asubhapubbabhāge* (Sv III 986,14) *ti asubhajjhānassa pubbabhāge*. ‘At the prior stage on foulness means: at the prior stage of the meditative absorption on foulness.’

As this gloss states, the thought of renunciation belongs to the fine-material sphere in the *asubhājḥāna* ('meditative absorption on foulness'). Although Buddhaghosa uses the term *asubhājḥāna*, there is no such meditation absorption. Buddhaghosa used the word *asubha* to denote the object (*ārammaṇa*) that is predominant in the first *jhāna*. In the sub-commentary on the *Dīghanikāya*, Dhammapāla glosses:

asubhājḥāne (Sv III 986,₁₄) *ti asubhārammaṇe paṭhamājḥāne. avayave hi samudāyavohāraṃ katvā niddisati, yathā: rukkhe (E° rukkha) sākḥā ti.*⁵⁸

In the meditative absorption on foulness means: in the first meditative absorption having foulness as the object. For, having used the whole-for-a-part method, [Buddhaghosa] explains, just as in the [statement]: 'a branch on a tree.'

The object on foulness (*asubhārammaṇa*) is only a part of the first meditative absorption. However, that part is used in this context to denote the entire *jhāna*. Although the term *jhāna* is used here, it actually means the main object thereof. If the first *jhāna* resembles a tree, the foulness resembles its branch (*sākḥā*). Thus, through the lens of Dhammapāla, the thought of renunciation belongs to the fine material sphere when one focuses on foulness in the first *jhāna*. Although this explanation in the sub-commentary to the *Dīghanikāya* is quite brief, it is extremely helpful for the reader to clearly understand two important factors related to an Abhidhammic teaching of the Mahāvihāra school. Firstly, the reader learns that there is no identical state called *asubhājḥāna*, although the *Sumaṅgalavilāsinī* uses it as an example of the whole-for-a-part method. Secondly, he realises that *asubhājḥāna* simply refers to one of the objects that occurs in the first meditative absorption.

⁵⁸ Sv-pt III 241,₁₀₋₁₂°

10. Beautiful mind = happiness of thoughts

The Brahmajālasutta⁵⁹ of the Dīghanikāya presents an exhortation from the Buddha as follows:

mamaṃ vā bhikkhave pare vaṇṇaṃ bhāseyyuṃ, dhammassa vā vaṇṇaṃ bhāseyyuṃ, saṅghassa vā vaṇṇaṃ bhāseyyuṃ, tatra tumhehi (E° tumhe) na ānando na somanassaṃ na cetaso ubbillāvitattaṃ karaṇīyaṃ.

“And if, bhikkhus, others speak in praise of me, or in praise of the Dhamma, or in praise of the Sangha, you should not give way to jubilation, joy, and exultation in your heart.”⁶⁰

Buddhaghosa⁶¹ comments on the term *somanassaṃ* (‘joy’) in the Sumaṅgalavilāsinī thus:

sumanassa bhāvo somanassaṃ (D I 3,₂₀), cetasikasukhass’ etaṃ adhivacanaṃ.

The state of good mind (=) **joy**.⁶² This is a designation of mental happiness.

Somanassa, according to Buddhaghosa’s interpretation, represents the happiness among mental concomitants. In the sub-commentary on the Dīghanikāya, Dhammapāla⁶³ further clarifies Buddhaghosa’s statement in the following manner:

sobhanaṃ mano assā ti sumano, sobhanaṃ vā mano sumano. tassa bhāvo somanassan (D I 3,₂₀; Sv I 53,₂₄) ti tadaññadhammānam pi sampayuttānaṃ somanassabhāvo āpajjati ti. nāpajjati, ruḥhisaddattā, yathā paṅkajan ti dassento: cetasikasukhass’ etaṃ adhivacanan (Sv I 53,₂₄) ti āha.

⁵⁹ D I 3,₁₈₋₂₁ (=) B^e I 3,₁₆₋₁₈; C^e I 6,₇₁₋₄; S^e I 4,₇₁₁₋₁₃.

⁶⁰ Bodhi 2007, 3.

⁶¹ Sv I 53,₂₃₋₂₄.

⁶² See also Tin 1920, 162; Nyānaponika 2005, 223.

⁶³ Sv-pt I 78,₇₁₂₋₁₇.

Because one who has a beautiful mind (resolution of compound) is *sumana* (*bahuvrihi*-compound). Or, a mind that is beautiful (resolution of compound) is *sumana* (*karmadhāraya*-compound). If one would argue that there not be the unwanted consequence that the other [mental] factors, have the state of *somanassa* too, [then we say:] ‘no’, on account of the fact that [it] is a term of convention of speech. Showing that [it] is just like [the term] *paṅkaja* (lit. ‘mud-born’ i.e., ‘a lotus’), [Buddhaghosa] says: **this is a designation of mental happiness.**

Dhammapāla interprets *somanassa* in two ways. As he explains, it means the state of [having a] beautiful (*sobhana*) mind. But not all⁶⁴ beautiful mental concomitants occurring in the mind are called *somanassa*. Although the literal meaning of the term *paṅkaja* includes all those born in the mud, the word really only refers to a lotus flower. In the same manner, although *somanassa* literally means the state of [having a] beautiful mind, its usage is delimited only to mental happiness (*cetasikasukha*) as a *rūlhi*. In this *rūlhi*, the semantic range of *somanassa* has been narrowed down. In other words, *somanassa* is an example of the whole-for-a-part method. The explanations of Dhammapāla teach the reader how to understand the mental concomitant *somanassa* from the Abhidhammic perspective without being misled by its literal meaning.

11. Consciousnesses = a consciousness

The Dhammasaṅgaṇī⁶⁵ describes *citta* (‘cognizance’) with a number of synonyms as follows:

katamaṃ tasmim̐ samaye cittaṃ hoti? yaṃ tasmim̐ samaye cittaṃ mano mānasaṃ hadayaṃ paṇḍaraṃ mano manāyatanaṃ manindriyaṃ viññāṇaṃ viññāṇakkhandho tajjā manoviññāṇadhātu. idaṃ tasmim̐ samaye cittaṃ hoti.

What [kind of] cognizance does exist on that occasion? Whatever cognizance, mind, mentation, heart, lucidity, mind, mind-sense-

⁶⁴ The Abhidhammatthasaṅgaha lists nineteen universal beautiful mental-factors (*cetasikā sobhanasādhāraṇā*), including *saddhā* (‘faith’). See Bodhi 1999, 85.

⁶⁵ Dhs 10,₁₁₋₁₅

base, mind faculty, consciousness, consciousness-aggregate, [and] the element of mind-consciousness that suits [the particular thought that exists] on that occasion. This [kind of] cognizance exists on that occasion.⁶⁶

Of these synonymic designations, *viññāṇakkhandho* ('consciousness-aggregate') is the only collective noun, while all others obviously refer to a single entity (i.e., *citta*). Literally, *viññāṇakkhandha* refers to an accumulation of consciousness. Differently put, *viññāṇakkhandha* is the totality of many *viññāṇas*. The commentary⁶⁷ on the Dhammasaṅgaṇī entitled *Atthasālinī* teaches that while *viññāṇakkhandha* literally suggests many consciousnesses, it actually denotes only one consciousness:

vijānātī ti viññāṇaṃ (Dhs 10,₁₃) *viññāṇaṃ eva khandho viññāṇakkhandho* (Dhs 10,₁₄). *tassa rāsi-ādivasena attho veditabbo. mahā-udakkhandho tv' eva saṅkhaṃ gacchatī* (S V 400,₁₂₋₁₃; A II 55,₂₃₋₂₄) *ti ettha hi* (E^e omits *hi*) *rāsaṭṭhena khandho* (E^e *khandhajo*) *vutto. sīlakkhandho samādhikkhandho* (D III 229,₁₄₋₁₅) *ti-ādīsu guṇaṭṭhena. addasā kho Bhagavā mahantaṃ dārukkhandhan* (S IV 179,₈) *ti ettha paññattimattaṭṭhena. idha pana rūḷhito khandho vutto. rāsaṭṭhena hi viññāṇakkhandhassa ekadeso ekaṃ viññāṇaṃ. tasmā yathā rukkhassa ekaṃ desaṃ chindanto rukkhaṃ chindatī* (Vin IV 34,₄) *ti vuccati, evam eva viññāṇakkhandhassa ekadesabhūtaṃ ekaṃ pi viññāṇaṃ rūḷhito viññāṇakkhandho* (Dhs 10,₁₄) *ti vuttaṃ.*

[It is called] **consciousness** because [it] cognises. Consciousness itself is the aggregate (resolution of compound) (= **consciousness-aggregate** (= *kammadhāraya* compound). One should know the meaning of that [*khandha*] in terms of a mass, etc. For, in the context: 'but it is reckoned simply as a great mass of water', [the term] *khandha* is stated in the sense of mass; in [the statements] such as: 'the aggregate of virtuous behaviour, the aggregate of concentration', [the word *khandha* is stated] in the sense of [good] quality; in the context: 'the Blessed One saw a great log

⁶⁶ See Ñāṇamoli 1982, 193; Rhys Davids, C. A. F. 1997, 8. See also Tiṭṭila 1969, 113.

⁶⁷ As 141,₁₈₋₂₈ (=) B^e 185,₂₃-186,₃; C^e 141,₃₄-142,₄; S^e 192,₁₋₇. See also Nidd-a I 23,₁₈₋₂₇ ≠ It-a II 22,₃₁-22,₅; Paṭis-a II 521,₁₈₋₂₆; Vibh-a 2,₁₃₋₁₄.

(*dārukkhandha*), [it is stated] in the sense of mere designation. But in this context, [the term] *khandha* is stated in accordance with convention of speech. For, in the sense of mass, a part of the aggregate of consciousness is a single consciousness. Therefore, just as [when] cutting a part of a tree, [it is] said [that] ‘[one] cuts a tree’, in the same manner, even a single consciousness, which is a part of the aggregate of consciousness (resolution of compound) is called **aggregate of consciousness** (compound) in accordance with convention of speech.⁶⁸

The author of the Atthasālinī begins the gloss by emphasizing that both *viññāṇa* and *viññāṇakkhandha* are synonymous. He then uses canonical examples to point out the diverse meanings of the term *khandha* (‘aggregate’). Even though a *viññāṇa* (‘a consciousness’) is a part of *viññāṇakkhandha* (‘consciousness-aggregate’), in this context, the latter is used to denote the former as a *rūlhi*. The analogy given here—although in reality only a part of a tree is cut, we simply say ‘a tree is cut’—is helpful in understanding how the aggregate of consciousness is used to refer to a single consciousness. The exegesis in the Atthasālinī teaches the reader how the Mahāvihāra school understands *viññāṇakkhandha* (‘consciousness-aggregate’) in the Dhammasaṅgaṇī—although the literal meaning of *viññāṇakkhandha* indicates a plurality it should be understood as a referent to a single entity.

Conclusion

Convention of speech (*rūlhi*) can be identified as a special literary device. It appears in two modes—expansion and contraction of literal meaning. Substitution of a part for the whole and of the whole for a part are the functions of these two modes of *rūlhi*, respectively. The Mahāvihāra exegetes often use *rūlhi* as a hermeneutical strategy (*naya*). This strategy obviously reflects awareness relating to the philosophy of language of the school. The Mahāvihāra exegetes use this strategy when they encounter particularly important teachings not only in the canon but also in the commentaries.

⁶⁸ See also Tin 1920 I 186–187; Nyanaponika 2005, 249–250. Commenting on the term *cittaṃ* (‘mind’) in Dhs 9₂ and As 63₃₁–64₁₂, the author of the Dhammasaṅgaṇimūlaṭīkā also offer a quite similar interpretation. See As-pt 65₇₋₉.

With this strategy, they teach the audience to achieve the text-author's intention without grasping the literal meaning of the words contained in them. Thus, a lack of knowledge of this particular usage can potentially prevent the reader from gaining an accurate understanding of these teachings. On the contrary, with the awareness of *rūḥi*-exegeses, one is able to read these teachings accurately. Needless to say, knowledge of these exegeses helps those who translate these texts. This complex and flexible hermeneutical method of the Mahāvihāra exegetes insists that one should carefully consider all the different levels of meaning of words in both canonical and commentarial texts before interpretation.

ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS

I would like to thank the Alexander von Humboldt Foundation for granting me a postdoctoral fellowship at the Philipps University of Marburg, which enabled me to write this article.

Petra Kieffer-Pülz, my mentor, always encourages me to produce research articles while carrying out my project on legal commentaries. Alastair Gornall, Aleix Ruiz-Falqués, Jonathan Walters and Mark Allon kindly provided me with their insightful comments and corrections to earlier versions of this paper. The anonymous reviewer also provided a number of useful comments to further develop the content of the paper. As usual, Koṇḍaññakitti thera (SPS, Mandalay) sent me many canonical and commentarial texts in Burmese characters; Vijita Kumara and Lelvala Ariyadhamma thera offered their valuable suggestions to solve some problems that I encountered while translating some commentarial glosses. I would like to express my sincere gratitude to these kind souls.

ABBREVIATIONS

Ap	Apadāna
Ap-a	Apadāna-Aṭṭhakathā
As	Atthasālinī
BD	Horner 1938–1966
B ^e	Burmese Chaṭṭhasaṅgīti Tipiṭaka Edition
C ^e	Ceylonese Edition
CPD	Trenckner et al. 1924

D	Dīghanikāya
Dhs	Dhammasaṅgaṇī
Dīp	Oldenberg, 1879
DOP	Cone and Straube, 2001–
E ^e	European Edition
It	Itivuttaka
It-a	Itivuttaka-Aṭṭhakathā
Kkh	Kaṅkhāvitarāṇī
Kkh-pt	Kaṅkhāvitarāṇīpurāṇaṭṭhikā
Kv	Kathāvatthu
Kv-a	Kathāvatthu-Aṭṭhakathā
M	Majjhimanikāya
M	Milindapaṇha
Mhv	Geiger, 1912
Nett	Nettippakaraṇa
Nett-a	Nettippakaraṇa-Aṭṭhakathā
Nidd	Niddesa
Nidd-a	Niddesa-Aṭṭhakathā
Pālim	Pālimuttakavinayavinicchaya
Pāt	Pātimokkha
Paṭis	Paṭisambhidāmagga
Paṭis-a	Paṭisambhidāmagga-Aṭṭhakathā
Pp	Puggalapaññātti
Pp-nt	Puggalapaññātti-Anuṭṭhikā
Ps	Papañcasūdanī
PSED	Apte, 1890
pw	Böhtlingk 1856–1884
S	Saṃsuttanikāya
S ^e	Siamese BuddSir Edition
Sp	Samantapāsādikā

Spk	Sāratthappakāsini
Sp-ṭ	Sāratthadīpanīṭikā
Sv	Sumaṅgalavilāsini
Sv-pṭ	Sumaṅgalavilāsiniṭipuraṇaṭikā
Thī	Therīgāthā
VedPari	Adhvarīndra, 1942
Vibh	Vibhaṅga
Vibh-a	Vibhaṅga-Aṭṭhakathā
Vin	Vinaya
Vin-vn	Vinayavinicchaya
Vin-vn-ṭ	Vinayavinicchayaṭikā
Vjb	Vajirabuddhiṭikā
Vmv	Vimativinodanīṭikā
Vv	Vimānavatthu
Vv-a	Vimānavatthu-Aṭṭhakathā

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