

# **Between Universal Consciousness and Cultural Patterns of Thought: Perspectives on Yu Yu's Notion of Logic in the 1930s**

*Jan Vrhovski*

## **Abstract**

This article aims at pinpointing the main characteristics of the notion of logic in the work of Yu Yu, a renowned propagator of Buddhist philosophy and Indian *hetuvidyā* in Republican China. In so doing, it focusses exclusively on Yu's work in the late 1920s and 1930s, when Chinese discussions on Buddhism and logic were at their height. The study sets out from Yu Yu's early investigations into the *hetuvidyā*, from whence it then gradually traces the development of a comprehensive notion of logic. In the main analysis, it aims at shedding some light on Yu's later view on the relationship between Western and Chinese logic and his subsequent adoption of a special kind of language-conditioned "logical relativism". Concurrently, the study also aims at presenting a few preliminary insights into how Yu's notion of logic was influenced by contemporary reinterpretations of Buddhist epistemology on one side and contemporary Chinese discourse on logic and language on the other.

**Keywords: Buddhism, Chinese logic, *hetuvidyā*, Yu Yu, Republican China**

## **1. Prologue**

In 1920s and 1930s China, Buddhist philosophy once again became regarded as an important source of philosophical ideas. From the beginning of the

1920s on, members of both the senior and the younger generation of Chinese intellectuals, such as Ouyang Jian (歐陽漸, courtesy name Jinghu 鏡湖, later changed his name into Jingwu 竟無, 1871-1943), Chen Daqi (陳大齊, 1886-1983), Liang Shuming (梁漱溟, 1893-1988),<sup>1</sup> Xiong Shili (熊十力, 1885-1968), Lü Cheng (呂澂, 1896-1989), Dharma master Taixu (太虛法師, original name Lü Peilin 呂沛林, 1890-1947) as well as other lay and clerical adherents of Buddhism, persistently endeavoured to reintroduce various aspects of Buddhist philosophy into the contemporary intellectual discourse. Although the revival of Buddhist philosophy had in fact started much earlier – e.g. the revival of the Yogācāra tradition (*Yuqie xingpai* 瑜伽行派) which had started as early as the late 1890s (Makeham 2014, 2) – a major step forward was made only by the May Fourth generation of philosophers, who, each in his own capacity, managed to take the theoretical adaptations of ideas from Buddhist philosophy to a brand new level.

Apart from the extremely popular Consciousness Only (*Weishi* 唯識) school of Yogācāra Buddhism, which became a synonym for the latter (together with *Faxiang* 法相 (*dharma-lakṣaṇa*) “Dharma Characteristics”), in the late 1920s, the notion of Buddhist logic suddenly gained relevance in circles of Chinese intellectuals who maintained an interest in Buddhist philosophy. On the one hand, it may be assumed that the emergence of Buddhist logic was stimulated by the ongoing debates on ancient Chinese logic and Western logic, which developed in line with the intellectual trends related to the May Fourth movement 1919. On the other hand, by the gradual reinvigoration of the entire tradition of Indian logic – the *yinming* 因明 literally “understanding of reasons,” Skt. *hetuvidyā* – the Chinese adherents of Buddhist philosophy were able to furnish their modern philosophical meditations with a methodological basis, comparable to those applied by Chinese propagators of either Western or traditional philosophical or scientific worldviews. (Cf. Zhou Yunzhi 1989, 133-24; 2004, 301-52)

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<sup>1</sup> Liang was also among the first Chinese adherents of Buddhism to have advanced a critical view on Russell’s philosophy. As early as 1917, Liang composed a critical essay directed against Russell’s *Problems of Philosophy* (1912). A few years later (1920), Liang also raised his voice against Russell’s logicism in his *Outline of Yogācāra* (*Weishi shuyi* 唯識述義), where he described Russell’s mathematical epistemology as pure delusion. In 1921, when Russell was still in China, Liang composed another critical article entitled “My Reservations Against Russell.” Liang’s critical evaluations of Russell’s philosophy were most reverberating and influential examples of Buddhist criticisms of logicism and New-Realist epistemology in 1920s China (Schwarcz 1991-2, 137).

Moreover, the rise of *yinming* between the late 1920s and early 1930s derived its significance from the fact that its occurrence took place within the context of the debates on Chinese traditional logic, and subsequently matured in the intellectual climate of cultural relativism and intense neo-traditionalist tendencies of the 1930s. The significance of Buddhist logic, as a special kind of logic, grew in the pivotal moment of Chinese intellectual history, when many influential Chinese philosophers engaged in developing new systems of modern Chinese philosophy, where concepts and categories from Chinese tradition would be intertwined with modern methodologies from the West.

Among those who made the greatest contribution to the introduction and dissemination of the notion of *yinming*, which was also referred to as “Buddhist” or “Indian logic” (*Yindu luoji* 印度邏輯), was also the Buddhist philosopher and psychologist Yu Yu (虞愚, original name Deyuan 德元 courtesy name Foxin 佛心, Zhuyuan 竹園, 1909-1989). Although Yu was arguably one of the leading proponents of Buddhist logic in 1930s China, and left a significant imprint on the general discourse on Western and Chinese logic, unfortunately his logic-related ideas have not yet been extensively studied. As of today, in China there only exist a few articles focusing mostly on Yu’s exposition of *yinming*, while Western studies that even superficially touch on Yu’s logic-related thought are unfortunately even rarer. (See “Appendix”)

In this study, I will provide a general outline of Yu Yu’s notion of logic in the 1930s, focusing on his first considerable contributions to the spread of Buddhist or Indian logic in China. In my analysis of the main characteristics of Yu’s understanding of logic, where possible I will also try to highlight how these were linked to other ideas which co-shaped the development of the discourse on Western and Chinese logic in the 1930s, as well as how and why Yu’s ideas differed from those of other Chinese intellectuals at the time. But first, I shall present to the reader some basic biographical information about Yu Yu.

## 2. A Biographical Sketch

Yu Yu, originally known as Yu Deyuan, was born in the year 1909 in the city of Amoy (Ch. Xiamen 廈門), Fujian province (Liu Peiyu 1990, 32). After he finished elementary and secondary school in his home town, in 1926 he enrolled in the Wuchang Buddhist Academy (Wuchang Foxueyuan 武昌佛學院) in Wuhan (Yu Yu 1937a, p. 2), established by the famous Buddhist monk Taixu (太虛) in the early 1920s (around 1922), becoming one of his most faithful disciples. (Cai 1931, 12) Studying under Taixu, Yu first engaged in intensive studies of Buddhist

doctrine (*neixue* 內學 or “inner studies”). In the context of his basic training in Buddhist philosophy in Wuhan, Yu became familiar with the immensely popular Consciousness. Only philosophy as well as *Dharmalakṣana* philosophy, then equally influential. Two years later (1928), in pursuit of deeper and more updated knowledge of Yogācāra philosophy, Yu decided to enrol in the prestigious Chinese Institute for Inner Studies (Zhina neixueyuan 支那內學院) in Nanjing. The institute was established in 1922 by a group of leading Chinese Buddhist philosophers and influential exponents of the learning of *yinming*, headed by Ouyang Jian and Lü Cheng. The Institute for Inner Studies, which at the time was one of the major centres of study of Buddhist philosophy in China, was also the venue of Yu’s contact with Buddhist logic or, more specifically, Indian *hetuvidyā* (*yinming* 因明).

In 1930, Yu moved to Shanghai and enrolled in the preparatory school of the recently (1924) established Great China University (Daxia daxue 大夏大學). In 1931, after completing the preparatory course at the university, Yu became an undergraduate student of psychology at that university. (Liu Peiyu 1990, 32) Yu completed his studies of psychology three years later, when he graduated from the department of psychology at Xiamen University (廈門大學).

In the years between 1928 and his graduation in 1934, apart from topics related to his studies of psychology, Yu also invested great effort into researching Indian and Chinese logic (later referred to as *mingxue* 名學). Thus, as early as 1929, Yu already started publishing introductory articles on the *yinming(xue)*, in which he probed into different historical or theoretical aspects of both Western and Indian logic.<sup>2</sup> At the same time, according to Yu’s own reminiscences, he also started intensively researching Western formal logic (Yu Yu 1937a, p.2). In 1936 Yu’s research of logic was epitomised in his first independent monograph *The Learning of Hetuvidyā* or *Yinmingxue* 因明學.

Upon his graduation from Xiamen University in 1934, Yu decided to stay at the university, assuming the post of lecturer in logic at the preparatory level (Liu Peiyu 1990, 32). In the following year, he was invited to the Minnan Buddhist Academy (Minnan Foxueyuan 閩南佛學院), where he taught sociology and Chinese logic (Yu Yu 1937a, p. 2). A few months later, he assumed the post of a senior editor at the Control Yuan (Jiancha yuan 監察院) in Nanjing and remained working there until the outbreak of war in 1937. (Liu Peiyu 1990, p. 32)

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<sup>2</sup> The first such article appeared in 1929 in the first issue of the *Chinese Academic Research Quarterly* (*Zhongguo xueshu yanjiu jikan* 中國學術研究季刊). The article bore the title “The Essentials of *Hetuvidyā*” (*Yinmingxue yao* 因明學要).

In 1937, Yu published his third<sup>3</sup> major monograph entitled *Chinese Logic* (*Zhongguo mingxue* 中國名學). Two years later, he completed a revised version of his *Yinmingxue* 因明學 of 1936. The new book, which was extended to include further aspects of *hetuvidyā* as well as its correlations with Western formal logic, was now published under the title *Indian Logic* (*Yindu luoji* 印度邏輯). The book was published by the Commercial Press in Chongqing.

In 1941, Yu resumed his academic career as a lecturer in logic and later also as assistant professor of logic at the wartime Guizhou University (Guizhou daxue 貴州大學). Two years later he rejoined his *alma mater* Xiamen University as an assistant professor of philosophy. In 1946 he was promoted to the rank of professor, and following the establishment of the People's Republic (1949), to be head of the Logic Research Group at the same university. In the following years he also worked as a professor at the Chinese Buddhist Academy, while in 1979 he became a member of the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences. (Ibid.) Yu passed away in his hometown of Amoy (Xiamen) in 1989.

### 3. Yu's Notion of Logic: Cultural Relativity, Ethics, and the Question of Epistemological Limitations of Logic

#### 3.1 Preliminary Notes on Buddhist Philosophy and Intellectual Trends in the 1930s

Before I proceed to a closer examination of Yu Yu's notion of logic in the 1930s, I shall present to the reader the following few preliminary notes, related to the general intellectual climate of the period under examination. I think this could assist our understanding of the context and theoretical foundations of the emergence of the notion of *hetuvidyā* in the 1930s.

The following five points will serve as the theoretical and historical framework within which we will observe Yu Yu's notion of logic in the 1930s:

1. Since the notion of *hetuvidyā* resurfaced at the moment when the modern Chinese discourse on logic started to overlap with the ongoing ideological contest between the leading philosophical worldviews, the emerging notion of Buddhist logic was also deeply immersed in this intellectual atmosphere. As such, it tended to be generally portrayed as a methodological

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<sup>3</sup> The second one was *The Psychological Principles of Calligraphy* (*Shufa xinli* 書法心理) published in 1937.

foundation of Buddhist philosophy, by virtue of which the latter would be able to counter the objectivist claims of the proponents of contending worldviews – such as dialectical materialism and the Western scientific worldview.

2. Because the discourse on Buddhist philosophy emerged at the time when traditional worldviews were directly challenged by the import of Western discourse on science and metaphysics, in which the objectivism of the Western scientific worldview was contrasted with the subjectivist “view on life”, the subsequent discourse on Buddhist logic would also revolve around the dichotomy between subjective sensation and objective knowledge (facts), relevant also to similar meditations on the relationship between epistemology and logic.
3. Because, in the intellectual struggles of the 1930s, Buddhist philosophy was considered as an integral part of the intellectual currents associated with traditional Chinese thought, the Buddhist discourse on logic would also develop in a natural congruity with the philologically oriented main current in contemporary discourse on “Chinese logic” (*mingxue* 名學).
4. Beside the current philosophical trends, dominated by the confluence of reinvention of traditional philosophical concepts and influx of modern ideas, the development of the notion of Buddhist logic in the 1930s was also influenced by the relatively strong wave of “cultural relativism”. This *quasi* Boasian relativistic stance had emerged already in the late 1920s, and was, on the one hand, an indirect consequence of the recent establishment of modern social sciences in China, (Cf. Li Guannan 2012, 109-37) and on the other, also proliferated as a fitting standpoint to be adopted by the proponents of Chinese tradition in their defence against the allegedly aggressive Westernisation of Chinese modern thought. In this sense, this “cultural relativism” could also be understood as a possible theoretical foundation of “neo-traditionalism”, promulgated by the GMD government in the early 1930s.

5. Finally, the Buddhist interpretations of the relationship between Buddhist *yinming(xue)* and alternative types of logic were conditioned by the epistemological or psychological tenets of the prevalent Buddhist philosophical doctrines, such as the *Yogācāra* tradition mentioned above. In the same regard, the main objective of Chinese expositions of Buddhist logic would have been to present an epistemologically limited notion of logic, derived from the main doctrinal tenets of Buddhist ontology (e.g., the underlying ontological emptiness (*xukong* 虛空, Skt. *śūnyatā*) of all phenomena (*xiang* 相, Skt. *lakṣana*) or appearances (*se* 色, Skt. *rūpa*)) as well as the perception or experience-based epistemological methods of discerning the illusory and transient nature of the universe as proposed in the Consciousness Only philosophy.<sup>4</sup>

Although some of the above points would usually find their rightful place in the conclusion of such a discussion, I have decided to list them as a general framework preceding the central discussion on Yu Yu's notion of logic. My main reason for that is that some of the circumstances listed cannot be directly deduced from the specialised discussion which is about to follow, and yet can serve as a general context of such a discussion. Moreover, by having already provided the context, I will be able to focus more on specific internal aspects of Yu's thought and their possible connections with the ideas of other, non-Buddhist Chinese intellectuals from the period, who also took part in the public discourse on logic in 1930s China.

### ***3.2 Initial Explorations into the Hetuvidyā and Western Logic - Late 1920s***

Although Chinese publications – mainly articles and a few books (e.g. Lü Cheng 1926) – on *hetuvidyā* already started to emerge at the beginning of the 1920s,

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<sup>4</sup> A solid example thereof would be Xiong Shili's *New Treatise on the Uniqueness of Consciousness* (*Xin weishilun* 新唯識論) (1932). In his final version of the treatise (the vernacular version was published only in 1944), Xiong Shili devotes much energy to deriving logical reasoning from the basic epistemological apparatus of human consciousness. By and large, Xiong intended to demonstrate that logic cannot replace the experience and sensation of the essence of reality (Xiong 2015, p. 34). Moreover, in Xiong's adaptation of the Buddhist notion of logic, the latter serves merely as a tool for processing propositions about already established states of affairs. This further implies that an excessive formalization of logic would lead only to senseless sophistry (*ibid.*, p. 56).



the bulk of Yu Yu's own contributions on the topic appeared within the first minor surge of written discussions on the topic in the last years of the 1920s. Eventually, also with regard to the time of their publication, his articles from 1929 became an important part of only a few essential introductions to the topic which had been published in the 1920s.

Between 1929 and 1930, Yu published a series of articles intended to serve as a general introduction to the study of Buddhist logic. These early articles focused largely on the applications of Indian *hetuvidyā* in Buddhist philosophy; they were published in the *Great China Monthly* (*Daxia yuebao* 大夏月報) journal. More importantly, in 1929 an epitomised version of his introduction to *hetuvidyā* was published in the *Chinese Academic Research Quarterly*. The treatise bore the title “The Essentials of *Hetuvidyā*” (Yu 1929). To a certain degree, these articles from 1929 also outlined the future developments of Yu's general notion of logic.

In the introductory part of “The Essentials of *Hetuvidyā*” Yu set out to define the place of what is called Buddhist logic in the pantheon of the logics of the World. In order to achieve that, Yu compared the main features of the syllogistic method of the former with the deductive syllogism in Western formal logic (*lunli zhi xingshi* 論理之形式).<sup>5</sup> Even though Yu clearly recognized that Indian and Western formal logic both developed a form of syllogistic reasoning, he claimed that the essential difference between the two consisted in the “direction of reasoning” (Yu 1929, p. 2). Whereas the Western syllogism starts with a “major premise” and continues with the “minor premise”, on the basis of which it reaches a final judgment, the line of reasoning in *hetuvidyā* proceeds in the opposite direction. It commences by setting out the main assertion (*zong* 宗), the truth of which is then tested in the remaining two (or three) steps. An assertion of cause (*hetu*) serves as a minor premise, while the major premise, given in the final step, consists of two separate propositions, which ultimately prove the initial statement by providing the verifying analogical examples (*yu* 喻). (ibid.)

In the abovementioned article from 1920, Yu concluded his comparison between *yinming* and Western formal logic by providing the following list of contrasting features:

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<sup>5</sup> At this point, Yu still used the commonly used term *lunli(xue)* 論理(學) to refer to logic in general. At the same time, he also pointed out that Western logic can also be translated as *luoji* 邏輯 or *mingxue* 名學. (Yu 1929, p. 1)



- a. Formal logic embodies the (formal) rules of human *reasoning* (*sikao* 思考); and the *yingming* gives a set of rules for *disputing matters* (*bian shi* 辯事) and *investigating the principles* (*cha li* 察理).
- b. As revealed by the direction of its syllogistic method, formal logic embodies a *deductive form* of reasoning, while the *yingming* is essentially a method of *proving* (*zhengming*) propositions.
- c. The ultimate goal of formal logic consists in *correct reasoning*, whereas the main objective of *yingming* consists in *proving* the main postulates of Buddhist doctrine.
- d. And finally: while, on the one hand, formal logic focuses mostly on its theory of *fallacies* (*guoshilun* 過失論), on the other hand, the *yingming* expands its domain by encapsulating the *inductive method*. (Ibid., p. 3)

Yu Yu's early perspective on "Buddhist" and Western logic, as outlined in this article, emphasized a general limitation of logical methods in respect of human accumulation of positive knowledge of the universe. However, the view described also painted a contrast between Western logic and the logic of Buddhist philosophy, which ascribed to the latter a greater degree of practical application, and thereby also a lesser degree of epistemological narrowness. As the pivotal methodology for testing the facts and correctness of doctrinal postulates, Buddhist logic was believed to take an active part in shaping a unified teaching about the laws of the universe (*dharma* 法). It may be assumed that, for Yu, the pragmatic or "verifiable" nature of *yingming* became greater by virtue of the recognition that it also contained the inductive method.

### **3.3 Developing a Discourse on *Yinming(xue)*, 1930-1935**

The number of publications on Indian logic and Buddhism started to grow steeply in the years following 1929. Between the late 1920s and the early 1930s, Chinese publications on the topic almost doubled in number and continued to increase in successive years. At the same time, monographs on Buddhist and Indian logic also started to appear. In 1930, a relatively noteworthy monograph *Logic* (*Lunlixue* 論理學) was published as a part of the *General Discussions on Buddhology* (*Foxue tonglun* 佛學通論) series, edited by Master Cirenschi

(Cirensi zhuren 慈忍室主人, ?) and Taixu. This was soon followed by a number of monographs on *yinmingxue* and related topics. Among the most noteworthy early monographs were Chen Wangdao's (陳望道) *Yinmingxue* 因明學 from 1931 and the notoriously long and peculiar work *The New Philosophical Yinmingxue* (*Zhexue xin yinmingxue* 哲學新因明學) by Tan Shougong 譚壽公. Concurrently, several annotated reproductions of Xuanzang's translation of Śāṅkara Svāmin's (Shangjieluo Zhu 商羯羅主) *Treatise on Mastering Logic* (*Yinming ruzheng lilun* 因明入正理論, Skt. (*Hetuvidyā*) *Nyāya praveśa tarka śāstra*) (Vidyabhusana 2006, p. 302) were produced by various authors. Yu Yu himself composed a short introduction to the history of the text for An Outline of the *Treatise on Mastering Logic* (*Yinming ruzheng lilun kepan* 因明入正理論科判<sup>6</sup>) which was published in 1933. The volume was issued by the influential Three Ages Study Society in Peking, which had been established in 1927, with the aim to advance research and propagation of the Consciousness Only philosophy.

Throughout the following few years, Yu continued to publish historical and theoretical overviews of *hetuvidyā*. In 1930, for instance, he composed "A Comparative Study on Ancient and Modern *Hetuvidyā*" (*Yinmingxue gu-jin bijiao zhi yanjiu* 因明學古今比較之研究), which revolved almost exclusively around the transformation of the classical five-step syllogism from the *Nyāya Sūtras* to the later Buddhist innovation of the three-step formula (*sanzhishi* 三支式). He completed another historical writing in 1931, when he reviewed the "Important Metamorphoses in the Development of *Hetuvidyā*" (*Yinmingxue fazhan zhong zhongyao zhi bianzhi* 因明學發展中重要之變態).

Yu's early thought and introductory work on *hetuvidyā* started condensing around the year 1935, when Yu also started to publish much longer treatises; as for instance the "Introduction to *Hetuvidyā*" (因明學發凡) from 1934. In many ways these publications were already announcing Yu's forthcoming major work on *hetuvidyā*. In the "Introduction to *Hetuvidyā*", for instance, Yu already expounded on a wide array of theoretical similarities between Indian and Western formal logic. Yu's past endeavours were crowned two years later (1936) with the publication of his quintessential work *Yinmingxue* 因明學. Although, at a general level, the book more or less recapitulated his earlier views on the topic, as well as the results of Yu's Chinese predecessors in the field (such as Liang

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<sup>6</sup> The term *kepan* 科判 denotes a method of organizing or outlining the content of a text by dividing it into chapters and paragraphs.

Shuming, Xiong Shili and others), on the other hand, the main aim of the book, stated in the introduction, clearly reflected the prevalent spirit of the time. In that way, the work voiced a more straightforward statement about the position of Indian logic in the global pantheon of logic, proceeding in the direction towards establishing the cultural autonomy of Asian thought in general. In one of the prefaces to the book, Jiang Kanghu (江亢虎, 1883-1954) captured the overall notion of logic expounded in the book in the following manner: if one does not comprehend Chinese logic (*mingxue* 名學), one's words will not be in proper order (*shun* 順, "in compliance") and one will not be successful in handling affairs (*shi* 事); if one does not comprehend Indian logic (*yinming*), then one's exposition of doctrine (i.e. Buddhist) and analysis of the principle (*li* 理) will be without solid foundations; and without comprehension of Western logic (*luoji* 邏輯) one will be unable to establish the "spiritual and social sciences" (Yu 1936a, p. 1). In many ways, these ideas efficiently summarized the general notion of logic contained in Yu Yu's work on *yinming*. The latter's view on logic approached maturity just in the years around the publication of the above-named book, when his intellectual journey took a deep incursion into the realms of Western formal logic and, most importantly, Chinese logic. Yu's treatment of the remaining two kinds of logic originated in the idea of inherent (epistemic) partiality of individual kinds of logic, which also entailed a certain degree of equality between the "logics of the World".

When Yu's ideas are put into combined perspective with other contemporary comparative explorations into the realm of Buddhist logic, we will discover a relatively wide spectrum of mutual divergences, pertaining mainly to their general idea of logic. Concurrently, as the most fervent advocators of Buddhist philosophy closed ranks and spoke out for the contemporary relevance of Buddhist logic, in these treatises we can also observe an increased degree of congruence between their discursive approaches. Thus, for instance, in his *Logic and Hetuvidyā* (*Luoji yu yinming* 邏輯與因明) from 1935, Gong Jiahua (龔家驊, ?) argued for a relatively high degree of content-related congruence between Western formal logic and Indian *hetuvidyā*, ascribing to the latter a proportional degree of practical effectiveness as possessed by Western formal logic.<sup>7</sup> (Gong Jiahua 1935: p. 155) In contrast

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<sup>7</sup> As its title suggests, Gong's *Logic and Hetuvidyā* outlines the main characteristics of both Western and Indian logic. Gong pointed out ten major features shared by both, including the syllogistic form, some aspects of inductive reasoning, extension and intension of concepts, the notions of necessity and probability. Strikingly, Gong also considered dialectical method (or dialectical logic) as an integral part of Western logic, indicating that a similar kind of

to Gong's extremely modernist attempt, in his *New Precedents of Hetuvidyā* (*Yinming xinli* 因明新例) from 1936, the established Chinese Buddhistologist and professor of philosophy, Zhou Shujia (周叔迦, 1899-1970) presented a slightly less ambitious image of *hetuvidyā*. In his moderate opinion on the “logicity” of *hetuvidyā*, Zhou pointed out that the latter is not as practically applicable as Western formal logic. Because, since the time immemorial, its discursive method was only put to use in problems related to the unity and consistence of Buddhist dogma. Hence, Zhou maintained, in its history the *hetuvidyā* was critically devoid of positive inquiry about the fabric of the universe. On the other hand, Zhou noted that the Chinese modern revival and redefinition of *hetuvidyā* was bound to be an extremely difficult task, mainly for the following two reasons: the current lack of philological studies in Indian thought (contextual and conceptual ambiguities) and, most importantly, the fact that every type of logic necessarily encapsulates a culture/language conditioned type of thought. Zhou pointed out that Chinese, European and Indian logic “were all generated based on the grammar of their [respective] languages. Grammar constitutes the rules of a language. It is the ordered pattern of the people's (*minzu* 民族, “nation”) thought.” (Zhou 1936, p. 2) Consequently, because the Chinese language greatly differs from Indian and European languages, so do the types of logic which developed in the Chinese past. Zhou further attributed the historical lack of formal logic in China to the “most active/lively” (最活動的) development of Chinese language, which considerably hindered the process of its grammaticalisation. (Ibid.)

Between 1935 and 1936, this form of language-based “cultural relativity” permeated the Buddhist discourse on logic. In consequence, during the same period of time, meditations about the differences between the three kinds of “World logic” also became the main focus of a new series of Yu Yu's treatises on

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propensity towards comprehensiveness and unity of substance was also inherent in the *hetuvidyā*. Concurrently, Gong also recognized three main categories of divergence between them. Apart from having acknowledged two kinds of formal difference between them – sequence of propositions in the syllogism and rules of inference – he also pointed out that they differ in their “substance”: Western logic focuses mainly on reasoning, whereas the *hetuvidyā* is concerned almost exclusively with “comparison and inference” (*biliang* 比量); while Western logic is inextricably connected to Western philosophy, the *hetuvidyā* is concerned with inner realization (*neiming* 內明) and the principles of Buddhist doctrine. Finally, according to Gong, the two also differed in the scope of their “effectiveness”: while Western formal logic is most suitably applied in reasoning, the usefulness of *hetuvidyā* pertains to its elementary nature of being a “discourse on discourses” (*lun zhi lun* 論之論), and it is thereby most suitably applied in logical demonstration and proof (*lunzheng* 論證). (Gong Jiahua 1935, pp. 138-155).

logic, where *hetuvidyā* has been replaced by Chinese logic (*mingxue* 名學) and a special notion of logical relativism became the defining feature of Yu's notion of universal logic.

### ***3.4 From Hetuvidyā to Western and Chinese Logic: The Rise of a Language-Based Notion of Logic, 1935-6***

An interpretational tendency similar to that found in Zhou and Gong's thought on formal logic and *hetuvidyā* was also conveyed in Yu Yu's thought on Chinese and Western logic. Around the year 1935, when the Chinese publishing activities on *hetuvidyā* reached another significant peak, Yu set out to publish articles on Chinese and Western (deductive) logic. Although Yu's first article on Western logic emerged already in 1931 – an article comparing logic to dialectical method – his studies in Chinese logic came to expression only in 1935, when Yu's comprehensive view on logic started to bear its first concrete results. According to Yu Yu's own account, his studies of Chinese logic started in the early 1930s. (Yu 1937a, 3) The first considerable results, however, went through the printing press only around 1935. In this new stage of development, as a scholar of logic, Yu did not completely depart from his early interests in Indian or Buddhist *hetuvidyā*, but rather used his former studies as a prism through which he evaluated the nature and results of Chinese logic.

Thus, in 1935, Yu published a long text entitled “A New System of Mohist Science of Logic” (Mojia lunlixue de xin tixi 墨家論理學的新體系), in which he aimed at presenting a new evaluation of the inner structure of Mohist logic, observed through the perspective of the theoretical frameworks of *hetuvidyā* on one side and Western formal logic on the other. An important aspect of Yu's initial evaluations of Chinese logic was related to his close attention to the epistemological foundations of ancient Chinese studies of logic. At the same time, as a major standard of modernity, Yu endeavoured to identify in ancient Chinese logical thought (*mingxue* 名學) elements of Western inductive method, which he regarded as the pinnacle of evolution of logic in general (Yu 1935a, p. 390-1). However, at the same time, as an ardent follower of the Consciousness Only school of philosophy,<sup>8</sup> Yu relied heavily on the Buddhist notion of psychology together with its main epistemological tenets, which also ascribed great importance to human perception and its “fallacies” (Skt. *pakṣābhāsa*, or *pratyakṣābhāsa* “false perceptions”). In the same context, he also recognized a great value in

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<sup>8</sup> In the same year, Yu also published two articles on the psychological thought of Consciousness Only school of philosophy, entitled “General Notion of Psychology in Consciousness Only” (Weishi xinlixue dayi 唯識心理學大意) (See: Yu 1935b).

the use of inferential (Skt. *anumāna*) validation of knowledge. Yu believed that the development of logical method in Mohist philosophy rested upon Mozi's consideration of logic as a significant source of knowledge. The logical method developed in Mohism subsequently followed six major guidelines: to separate right from wrong, to tell apart consistent and inconsistent lines of reasoning (*ji* 級), to understand the locus of identity and difference, to comprehend the patterns (*li* 理) of names (*ming* 名) and actualities (*shi* 實), to differentiate between benefit and harm, and to dispel (doctrinal) doubts. (Ibid., p. 398) In the remaining parts of the discussion Yu devoted much energy to showing how, akin to Indian logic, Mohism already contained profound elements of inductive reasoning and a *quasi*-formal notion of syllogistic inference. Adhering to the earlier Chinese discussion on Mohist logic and the School of Names (*mingjia* 名家) – in particular Zhang Shizhao's writings from the mid-1920s, Yu also tried to highlight the fact that Mohist and Indian logic both possessed something called “the logic of the middle term”(ibid. pp. 413-4), as well as their own theories of logical fallacy. Generally speaking, in his attempt to demonstrate a certain degree of modern formality of Chinese logic, Yu apparently emulated the manner and structural layout of contemporary Chinese textbooks on Western logic – most of all Tu Xiaoshi's (屠孝實, 1898-1932) *Logic Primer (Mingxue gangyao 名學綱要)*. While in respect to contemporary Western discourse on logic, possibly due to its high degree of philosophical consonance with one of the currently prevalent synthetic notions of Buddhist epistemology as well as its profound agreement with the idea of “cultural relativism”, Yu relied mainly on Dewey's notion of experimental logic.

In the same year, Yu also composed an independent study on “Logical Thought of the School of Correct Names” (Zhengming xuepai de lunli sixiang 正名學派的論理學派) and a review of theories of logical paradox (fallacies) in Western logic, with examples from ancient Chinese philosophy, entitled “Errors in Deductive Inference” (Yanyi tuili shang de miuwu 演繹推理上的謬誤). In the article on the school of “correct names” (*zhengming* 正名) Yu listed three kinds of logical method in early Confucian thought – instituting names (*zhiming* 制名), systematic inquiry (*gezhi* 格致), and pursuit of truth (*qiucheng* 求誠), claiming that the most potent amongst them (*gezhi*) came to expression only in neo-Confucian thought, due to neo-Confucians' openness to ideas from Daoism and Chan Buddhism. (Yu 1935d, p. 15) In general, Yu characterized the logical thought of Confucianism as predominantly ethical in nature, remarking that quite possibly this tendency was not a flaw at all.

Observed from the perspective of Yu's notion of Chinese logic, a significant



aspect of his writings on *mingxue* 名學 from 1935 and 1936 resided in his interpretational approach, which defined logic through language. Although the term *mingxue*, which by the 1930s was already synonymous with “Chinese logic”, on its own already implies a language-based or semantic theory (*mingxue* means literally “the learning of names”), on the other hand, the language-based theory of logic, which Yu adopted in his writings, was also inextricably related to a special idea of “cultural relativism” adopted by many prominent Chinese intellectuals since the end of the 1920s. The fact that similar language-based approaches were not only used to explain the phenomenon of Chinese logic but any other kind of logic as well, speaks strongly in favour of the second option. Moreover, as I have indicated in the foregoing discussion, similar ideas have been adopted by other exponents of Buddhist logic in the years before 1935. Regardless of the concrete provenance of the above-named approach, a superficial overview of treatises on *mingxue* or *mingjia* 名家 from the late 1920s also reveals that there also existed a continuity between the underlying style of philological commentary and the later “language-based” approach in defining Chinese logic. In Yu’s case, however, this approach became most emphatically expounded in his writings on *mingxue* in the years following 1935. Quite curiously, in the same period the terminology used in Yu’s discussions also underwent some minor changes, mainly in the direction of standardization and disambiguation.

As the representative example of the intellectual vicissitudes in Yu’s logical writings from mid-1930s we could name his article “Introduction to Chinese Logic” (*Mingxue daoyan* 名學導言, or “Introduction to the Learning of Names”) from 1936. One year later a slightly modified version of the text was included as a preface in Yu’s book *Chinese Logic* (*Zhongguo mingxue* 中國名學). The main objective of the book was:

... to enumerate the four schools of Chinese logic with respect to their historical evolution, their thought, and the attitude which we need to adopt in our future research [into Chinese logic]. The objective of this discussion will also be to describe the meritorious applications of logic, all in order to highlight the value of understanding the structure of substance. Even though in our exposition we will make use of the old, in fact what we will try to promote here will be a survey of pure logic in China. (Yu 1937, 4)



In his “introduction to Chinese Logic”, and in consequence also in his book *Chinese Logic*, Yu adopted a similar explanation of the notion of Chinese logic to Zhou Shujia before him, with some major differences. In contrast to Zhou, Yu presented a much broader discussion on language and its relationship with logic and, more importantly, also indirectly revealed the source of his ideas, namely the thought of the reformists Liu Shiwei (劉師培, 1884-1919) and Zhang Taiyan (章太炎, later changed his name to Binglin 炳麟, 1869-1936). Both represented a more than suitable theoretical source for Buddhist discourse on logic. While Liu Shiwei’s theory of the abstract origin of language, in which onomatopoeias and phonetic mimicry were considered as its first (abstract) evolutionary stage and the formation of mental representations (*yixiang* 意象) as the next step towards concretization of language, Zhang Taiyan spoke more in favour of the original concreteness of language, and the *a posteriori* of spoken language. (See Kaske 2008, pp. 352-3.) If the theory of Liu Shiwei implied that concretization and grammaticalization of language were the key prerequisites for the cultural and intellectual development of a nation – the same thought was expressed by Zhou Shujia; on the other hand, Zhang Binlin’s strong affinity for Buddhist and Indian philosophy (e.g. the *vaiśeṣika* philosophy), as alternatives to a Western solution to Chinese intellectual challenges (Ibid., p. 353), made his philosophy even more suitable for application in Buddhism-centred discourse.

#### *Origins of Language and Logic*

Yu’s preface to the book *Chinese Logic* was divided into three main parts: origins of names, their meaning, and their use. While the second and the third part answered the questions of the ontological nature of language and its application in matters of a practical nature, the first part was concerned with what we can also call the cultural foundations of language<sup>9</sup> and in turn also with logic. Like Zhou before him, Yu wanted to reveal the basic nature of logic by tracing it back to its origins in human language, saying: “The written language (*wenzi* 文字) is based on spoken language (*yuyan* 語言) and the spoken language originates from sounds.” (Yu 1936, p. 607) He described language as a main medium through which our thoughts and emotions are communicated, akin to “routes of transportation and the vehicles [travelling] on them.” (Ibid.) In order to highlight the general importance of language Yu pointed out that without language, one would be unable to communicate compassion between the individual own-mind (*zixin* 自心, Skt. *svacitta*) and the collective mind or

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<sup>9</sup> He defined *ming* 名 as spoken (語言) and written language (文字) combined. (Ibid.)

the mind of the masses (*zhongxin* 眾心), emphasizing that language “is in no way inferior to mathematics”. (Ibid.) In his remaining discussion on the origin of language Yu quoted his mentor Taixu’s interpretation of Liu Shipei and Zhang Taiyan’s views on language. By combining both Liu Shipei’s theory of the abstract origins of language (名) and Zhang Taiyan’s theory of concreteness as the original form of language,<sup>10</sup> Yu ultimately decided to choose the middle path. He stated that regardless of whether the origins of language had been abstract or concrete, the names used in language all originate from human sensations (*chu* 觸, Skt. *sparśa*) and perception (*shou* 受, Skt. *vedana*), take root as mental images, and end in human reflection (*si* 思). (Ibid.) According to Yu, the main difference between names was that those that arise from subjective impressions are initially abstract, while those that arise from objective images are from the beginning concrete. Finally, from abstract concepts develop sound-based (onomatopoeic) names (*ming* 名). (Yu 1937a, p. 352) Concurrently, Yu also adopted Zhang Taiyan’s positive (ontological) notion of language, which entailed that a sufficiently ordered language would be capable of conveying a clear image of the world. In Yu’s view, this was also the reason why logic first arose: in order to establish correct relations between names and substances, and order the process of inference. On the other hand, this fact also entailed that the form or variety of logic was inextricably connected to the nature or state of the language in which it operated.

Yu recognized three separate evolutionary stems of global logic, every single one of which was rooted in its own specific language-related environment, namely: Western (Greek) logic or *luoji* 邏輯, Indian logic or *yinming* 因明 and Chinese logic or *mingxue* 名學. Alongside these three specialized terms, Yu further used the word *lunli(xue)* 論理學 as a general term for “logic”. Such a tripartite division of “World logic” was not Yu’s innovation, but can be traced back to a relatively great number of his predecessors in the debate on logic. The same view was, for instance, propagated already by Chen Qitian (陳啓天, 1893-1984) in his treatise *Mingxue jigū* 名學稽古 (*Logic – Studies in Ancient Texts*) from 1922. In a nutshell, in his introductory discussion on the origin of language and logic Yu proposed a version of a culturally relative notion of logic, which I suspect was established on epistemological principles from the Consciousness

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<sup>10</sup> Yu quoted from Liu Shipei’s *Expounding on Subtleties of Philology* (*Xiaoxue fawei bu* 小學發微) and Zhang Taiyan’s *The Origin of Language* (*Yuyan yuanqi shuo* 語言緣啓說) (orig. publ. 1907 and 1908).

Only school of philosophy and at the same time connected to a major current of Chinese contemporary philological discourse, which had originated in the final years of the Qing dynasty. Concurrently, Yu's theory also drew its modernity and discursive relevance from its thorough theoretical affinity with Western formal logic, established in his early comparative evaluation of "Indian logic".

Finally, the last and central pillar of Yu's work from the mid-1930s was his interpretation of the development and nature of Chinese logic.

*The Character and Classification of Chinese Logic*

Essentially Yu maintained that, akin to Indian *hetuvidyā*, ancient Chinese logic had also contained an abundance of elements of deductive and inductive inference. While in his opinion the main source of deductive logic in Chinese antiquity had been the Mohist school of philosophy, he believed that invaluable inductive logic could be found in the "Xiao qu" 小取 chapter of the Mohist Dialectics and Xunzi's doctrine on *zhengming* 正名. With regard to the question of Gongsun Long (公孫龍) and the genealogy of the School of Names, Yu advocated the view that the latter constituted an independent school of philosophy which, however, followed similar doctrinal principles to those of neo-Mohist philosophers. In that way he distinguished between four major schools of Chinese logic: school of namelessness (*wuming xuepai* 無名學派), school of correct names (*zhengming xuepai* 正名學派), school of establishing names (*liming xuepai* 立名學派) and school of "shapes and names" (*xingming xuepai* 形名學派). As the names suggest, the main trait of each of the four schools resided in its idea of "language" (*ming* 名, "names").

Nonetheless, in the analytical conclusion of the treatise, Yu claimed that the four schools actually represent only two main schools of logic: the school of correct names (*zhengming* 正名) and the school of non-names (*wuming* 無名). He further asserted that, with respect to its philosophical tenets, the logical thought of Hui Shi 惠施 was in fact Daoist epistemology imported into the school of "shapes and names" (*xingming* 形名). Mozi's ideas, on the other hand, are essentially of the same stock as the school of correct names, while Gongsun Long's logic represented a special "side branch" (*pangpai* 旁派) of the same school. (Ibid., p. 120)

Following a brief discussion on the underlying ontological character of language and logic, which closely resembled an atomistic approach, Yu concluded with Liang Qichao's words; saying that in the final analysis knowledge alone cannot unlock the fundamental principles of the universe, but needs to be assisted by logic and the establishment of correct relations between names and

actualities. (Ibid., p. 121) In this sense, he noted that albeit the school of non-names (無名) did not focus on real phenomena (*xiang* 相), it still possessed an effective logical methodology for processing inferences within the domain of pure knowledge. But “since I cannot attain ‘the state of abandoning reason and returning purity of [consciousness]’ or ‘the unity of right and wrong’ again and again I am forced to select words to express my emotions or infer what is right and wrong.” (Ibid.) This was Yu’s way of emphasizing that in practical matters the preferring of *zhengming* 正名 to *wuming* 無名 is an utter necessity.

In the concluding part of his assessment of Chinese Logic, Yu reflected on the historical underdevelopment of Chinese logic in comparison with Indian and Western logic, for which he proposed the following four causes: excessive attention to practical matters and human affairs (*renshi* 人事), excessive diversity and theoretical divergence among the schools of logic (lack of a unified theory), excessive influence of tradition, and irrefutability of tradition. (Ibid., pp. 121-4) In the same regard, Yu’s strong adherence to Buddhism became most apparent. His inclination towards the idea of the intellectual superiority of Buddhism found its strongest expression in the assertion that the later advances in Chinese logic had been marked by the introduction of Buddhist logic into Chinese philosophy. More specifically, he claimed that the entry of Buddhist logic into the Chinese intellectual sphere had in fact initiated the first wave of formalization and systematization of Chinese logical thought. (Ibid., p. 12)

### **3.5. Late 1930s: Indian Logic and Maturation of Yu’s Cultural Relativism**

In 1936, Yu produced one more article on logic. In the essay entitled “Deductive Logic and *Hetuvidyā*” (Yanyi luoji yu yinming 演繹邏輯與因明) Yu once again reiterated his views on the relationship between Western formal logic and Indian logic. The article from 1936 was published again two years later, when Yu was preparing his last major monograph from the 1930s, his *Indian Logic* from 1939.

Concurrently, following the year 1936, when Yu published a wide array of treatises on the nature and classification of religion, including three articles on the “The Character of Religion and Its Types” (Zongjiao de xingzhi jiqi zhonglei 宗教的性質及其種類), “Scientific Study of Religion” (Zongjiao de kexue yanjiu 宗教的科學研究) and so on, his theory of the language-based origin of logic slowly matured into a comprehensive view of “cultural relativity”. Thus in September 1939, almost exactly one year after the first publication of Zhang Dongsun’s (張東蓀, 1886-1973) influential writing “Thought, Language and Culture” (Sixiang, yuyan yu wenhua 思想語言與文化) (June, 1938), Yu published his own discussion

on the “The Character of Culture and Its Types” (Wenhua de xingzhi yu zhonglei 文化的性質與種類), in which he also expounded on the pivotal role of language in culture. His article appeared in the same year as the final version of Zhang Dongsun’s treatise “Different Types of Logic and Culture – Discussed Together with Chinese Neo-Confucianism,” which elicited a wide response in Chinese intellectual circles.

#### 4. Epilogue: From Buddhist Modernist Apologetics to an Alternative Version of Cultural Relativism

It is beyond doubt that Yu’s writings on logic in the 1930s represented a mere fragment of the contemporary Buddhist discourse on *hetuvidyā*, and a small stone in the wide mosaic of Buddhist discussions on epistemology, which were conducted in the framework of contemporary perspectives on logic. However, as I have shown in the foregoing outline, Yu’s thought also contained a series of what were at the least original adaptations of ideas and concepts from the contemporary Chinese debate on logic and Buddhism. On the other hand, Yu’s main contribution resided more in his extensive propagation of a certain notion of, first the logic of *hetuvidyā*, and later also Chinese logic.

Firstly, his notion of logic rested on a firm belief in a universal relevance of *hetuvidyā* as a central methodological means of rational “inquiry” in Buddhism. Nonetheless, even though in his treatises Yu relied heavily on Western formal logic as the main discursive norm, in matters related to epistemology and ontology Yu usually relied upon his interpretation of the teaching of Consciousness Only. Consequently, although his early major writings almost certainly aimed at providing both a contrast with and a similarity between *hetuvidyā* and Western logic, in his early treatises logic was sometimes portrayed as a blunt and limited instrument — as a tool devised as a supplement to the epistemological process (from sensation, intuition, and experience to thought), overseeing the correct alignment of true and false statements.

Secondly, in confluence with the current debates on logic and culture Yu’s early studies of *hetuvidyā* gradually developed into a general notion of logic, including Western as well as Chinese logic. Thus around the year 1935, Yu started also publishing articles on Chinese logic. As in his work on *hetuvidyā*, the underlying idea of Yu’s interpretations of Chinese logic was a fundamental correspondence between basic Western formal logic and Chinese logic. In consequence, he advocated the view that ancient Chinese logic, for instance the logic of the *zhengming* 正名 school, contained both deductive and inductive reasoning, as well as a series of other significant formal characteristics inherent in Western formal logic.

The development of Yu's thought on Chinese logic reached its peak with the publication of his book *Chinese Logic* in 1937. Here Yu's general ideas about logic were expressed alongside his general discussion on the content of ancient Chinese logic. This general notion of logic presupposes a tripartite division of "global logic", in which its three main stems – Chinese, Indian and Western logic – were considered as parallel phenomena and thus closer to being equal in their core value, whereas the superiority of Western logic resided in its advanced formalization of the same principles as were contained equally in Indian and Chinese logic. In this very context, the equality of logics, suggested by the adherents of the cultural theory of logic, including Yu Yu, denoted primarily the equal *epistemic* value of each particular logic, derived from its *embodiment* of the *principles* of the universe, while the degree of its *formalisation* (symbolic or linguistic expression) was probably understood more in light of its utility. (Cf. Gong 1935, pp. 138-155) Hence the formal "underdevelopment" of Chinese and Indian logic meant that they could not be as effectively applied in practical matters related to "physical" reality, such as science, industry and so on. However, in the eyes of the Chinese advocates of culture-relative theory of logic, this did not completely diminish the "objective" value of Chinese or Indian logic, for both could be as effectively used within one's inner spiritual domain, assisting one's moral self-perfection or pursuit for higher awareness by providing various insights into the underlying tissue of a universe in which the subjective is complementary to the objective.

Furthermore, the inherent value of Chinese and Indian logics was considered relative to the variety of language (*ming* 名) from which they originated. In the same context, Yu borrowed extensively from Liu Shipei and Zhang Taiyan's theories of the origin of the (Chinese) language, which were ultimately shrouded in Buddhist ideas on the nature of cognition. Although Yu maintained that language constituted the pivotal "vehicle" (*cheng* 乘) of human thought and emotion, he did not explicitly state that the consequent fact of "logical relativism" entailed by the overall linguistic differences would also imply a pluralist theory of thought. On the contrary, the same Buddhist notion of epistemological universality which permeated his early writings on *hetuvidyā* was present also in his later notion of logic. Consequently, in Yu's vision of logic and language, relativism seems only to have existed at the level of language, which, similar to his notion of logic, was portrayed as a rather formal and thus also limited



vessel.<sup>11</sup> Moreover, the universal essence of knowledge and enlightenment would only temporarily assume the form of a particular language, namely in the process of intersubjective transmission through speech and writing. In Yu's view of linguistic relativism, logic developed as an efficient tool for rectifying and ordering the imperfect linguistic expression of human awareness. Due to the extremely important role of intersubjectivity in Buddhism – the bridge between self-mind and others is crucial for dissemination of *Buddhadharma* in this world, Yu understood, not only from the treatises of important Chinese intellectuals like Liu Shipai and Zhang Taiyan, that logical improvement of language (systematisation and grammaticalization) was crucial for the development of knowledge. Akin to many other Buddhist or non-Buddhist thinkers from the period, he believed that deficiencies in development of Chinese logic were related to intellectual rigidity in the past Confucianism-dominated tradition as well as to the general lack of systematisation of language on one side and logical thought on the other. As a proponent of Buddhism, Yu also believed that the introduction of *hetuvidyā* to China represented the main event in development of Chinese logical thought, which led to blossoming of the logical method of *gezhi* 格致 under the wings of neo-Confucian synthesis of Buddhist and Daoist ideas with Confucian philosophy.

Concurrently, in his re-evaluation of the Chinese logical past Yu distinguished between two main currents of thought, that differed mainly in their view on the ontologically positive nature of language: the adherents of the Daoist-dominated school of non-names (*wuming xuepai* 無名學派) rejected the existence of any positive relationship between substance and language, whereas the school of correct names (*zhenming xuepai* 正名學派), led by Confucians and Mohists, advocated the view that language (*ming* 名) can effectively reflect the underlying patterns of reality. It also appears that in the very same period Yu gravitated towards recognising a far more positive value of logic than in his previous writings. Yu's relative distancing from the epistemologically negative notion of logic also entails a certain degree of deviation from conventional Consciousness-only epistemology, similar to that which can be found in Liang Shuming's synthesis of *Yogācāra* and Confucian philosophy, which is also in line with Xiong Shili's criticism of *Yogācāra*. (See Meynard 2014; Hammerstrom 2014) Since such a synthesis is possible only through maintaining an ontologically

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<sup>11</sup> A similar relationship can be also recognised in Zhang Dongsun's view on the cultural conditionality of logic. See, for example: Rošker 2010, pp. 44-56.



positive notion of knowledge (*zhi* 知 or *zhi* 智 “wisdom”), this would also explain the borderline character of Yu Yu’s general idea of logic (culture-specific as well as universal aspects of logic) revealed throughout the foregoing outline of Yu’s work. Correspondingly, the general idea of logic based on this kind of synthetical epistemology would also entail that the Chinese ontological concept of the “pattern” (*li* 理) of substance (Yu 1937, p. 4) be conjoined with the Buddhist concept of *dharma* (*fa* 法).

With respect to its quest for common ground, Yu Yu’s idea of logic was very much in consonance with the endeavours of other contemporary proponents, or rather interpreters, of Buddhist philosophy in China, who struggled to establish a harmonic synthesis between traditional psychologistic epistemology on one side and that of the modern scientific worldview on the other. In the context of these general intellectual propensities that permeated the intellectual debate in 1930s China, Yu Yu stood out as the Chinese Buddhist community’s foremost commentator on the idea of logic, whose main mission was to reconcile the three main competing logics of the time, while preserving their inner cultural essence.

Towards the end of the 1930s, Yu’s language-conditioned “logical relativism” also received a cultural dimension. In the same year as Zhang Dongsun (1939) published the revised and enlarged version of the lengthy treatise in which he expounded the inextricable connection between language, culture and logic, Yu published a much more modest meditation on differences between cultures. Akin to Zhang, in his essay of 1939 Yu treated language as the main conditioning factor of culture. In this very context, Yu’s philosophical undertakings of the 1930s followed the main trajectory of Chinese intellectual trends. While in some respects his thought converged with the spirit of neo-traditionalism and the rising Chinese version of cultural relativism, at the same time his excursions into the realm of Indian, Chinese and Western logic promulgated a Buddhist vision of Chinese intellectual modernity. While he emphatically advocated universality in the realm of knowledge and consciousness, he recognised an unbounded, yet still historically indisputable, pluralism of its linguistic and cultural expression.

In my understanding, in its concrete embodiment as Chinese, Indian or Western logic, logic was thus seen as culturally or linguistically conditioned, while at the same time, as a partial manifestation of the underlying patterns of the universe, it was also universal and unconditioned by grammar or form of expression. In other words: if there is originally only one “pure” logic, whose laws are in uniformity with those of the universe, the expression of logic

diversifies through linguistic expression, while its overall theoretical disposition is additionally conditioned by various other aspects of cultural perception.

Still, in Yu's Buddhist world of ideas the development of human awareness does not end with a pluralism of truth-expressions. Instead, Yu hoped that the linguistic and cultural boundaries in the plural expression of truth may be gradually overcome through correct application of Western, Chinese or Indian logic, and all divergent threads of cultural experience be rewoven into one unified network of knowledge.

### **Appendix: A Brief Overview of Contemporary Scholarship on Yu Yu and *Hetuvidyā***

The earliest Chinese article on Yu Yu and *hetuvidyā* (*yinmingxue*) appears to be “Yu Yu Discusses the Transmission and Development of Indian logic in China” (Yu Yu tan yinming zai Zhongguo de zhuanbo he fazhan 虞愚談因明在中國的轉播和發展) published in 1983 by the renowned historian of Chinese logic, Cui Qingtian 崔清田. In the following years up until now, ten more articles have been devoted exclusively to Yu Yu's thought. The most recent and the most relevant to the present discussion are Zhang Zhongyi's 張忠義 “Yu Yu and his *Yinmingxue*” (Yu Yu he ta de *Yinmingxue* 虞愚和他的《因明學》) (2009), Yang Wujin's 楊武金 “On Yu Yu's Application of *yinming* and Logic in Studies of Mohist Dialectics” (Yu Yu Mobian yanjiu zhong dui yinming he luoji de yingyong 虞愚墨辯研究中對因明和邏輯的應用) (2010) and Zhang Xiaoxiang's 張曉翔 “Yu Yu's Contributions to the *yinming*” (Yu Yu xiansheng dui yinming de gongxian 虞愚先生對因明的貢獻) (2013). In 2009, Liu Peiyu and others compiled and published the monograph *Shu xue, chang shi, han mo xiang: Jinian Yu Yu xiansheng* 述學昌詩翰墨香：紀念虞愚先生, a few chapters of which also indirectly involved the topic of this article. Following the year 1995, a series of different collections of Yu's works were published in China.

Yu's notion of logic is analysed briefly in the epilogue to Joachim Kurtz's *The Discovery of Chinese Logic* (2011). However, in the essay preliminary to that book, entitled “Matching Names and Actualities: Translation and the Discovery,” Kurtz (2004, 472) indicates that the “Chinese historians of logic and philosophy...focus their analysis on the first systematic studies, written at least a decade later, by trained logicians such as Hu Shi, Zhang Shizhao, Guo Zhanbo or Yu Yu.” Here Kurtz is probably referring to general outlines of the history of Chinese logic, written from the late 1980s on; the

same enumeration, though, appears also in the work of Liu Peiyu 劉培育 (2010, p. 2). However, a closer look at the literature reveals that even in later specialised histories of Buddhist logic in China, as for instance *The History of Buddhist Logic in China* (*Zhongguo Fojiao luoji shi* 中國佛教邏輯史) edited by Shen Jianying 沈劍英 (2001), Yu Yu's studies in Buddhist logic are touched on only superficially (Shen 2001, pp. 379-380). Yu's later work (after 1949) is discussed in a chapter reviewing contemporary Chinese research into "Indian Syllogistic Logic" in Guo Qiyong's *Studies on Contemporary Chinese Philosophy (1949-2009)* (Guo 2018, 478-481). As for the remaining Chinese histories of logic: the fifth volume of the monumental *History of Chinese Logic* (*Zhongguo luoji shi* 中國邏輯史), edited by Li Kuangwu 李匡武 and written by Zhou Yunzhi 周云之 and others, focuses mainly on the contributions by Lü Cheng, Xiong Shili and Chen Daji, and again mentions Yu Yu only briefly (see: Zhou Yunzhi 1989: 133-206). Albeit in the shadow of other important contributors to the study of Indian logic in China (1919-1930s), Yu is also mentioned in Yang Peisun's 楊沛蓀 *A Course in the History of Chinese Logical Thought* (1988, pp. 352-360). Similarly, in their *A Course in the History of Chinese Logic* Wen and Cui (2012, 382-387) cover mainly the contributions of Lü Cheng. In the comprehensive study *History of Hetuvidyā in China* (*Zhongguo yinmingxue shi* 中國因明學史), edited by Zheng Dui 鄭堆, a short chapter (three pages) is also devoted to Yu Yu's contribution in the 1930s and 1940s (Zheng Dui 2017, pp. 219-223). A similar situation recurs in recent Chinese articles on the topic. As an example of a broader overview of studies of *hetuvidyā* we can mention, for instance, Yao Nanqiang's (姚南強, 1948-) "A Survey of Chinese Research in Hetuvidyā in the Last One Hundred Years" (Bainian lai Zhongguo yinmingxue de yanjiu gaikuang 百年來中國因明學的研究概況) (1995).

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